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The act of writing is painful. It is only by looking at the blank page that you 
realize how difficult it is to organize thoughts, insecurities, expectations and dreams 
into words, sentences, paragraphs and pages. Perhaps that effort is even more daunting 
in the case of a thesis, as you need to clarify ideas, give meaning to theories, create a 
sense of logic, simplify complexities. But the act of writing is also joyful, especially 
when it comes to a Ph.D. You materialize reflections on a caring theme, present your 
findings, discuss with peers, interview people invested in your topic and reorganize 
temporal processes. All fuelled by inadequate amounts of coffee and sleep deprivation. 
As most (all?) Ph.D. candidates, I experienced a mix of these two extremes, always 
trying to find the right balance between hitting writer’s block and convincing myself I 
had a great idea. 
The guidance provided by my supervisor Prof. Andrés Malamud was crucial for 
making me persevere. Throughout the Ph.D., he gave me unbridled support and 
orientation. Since he first emailed me, confirming that I was selected for the Institute of 
Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL) to the last sentence written and 
the revision of this thesis, he encouraged my ideas and believed in me, sharing his 
impressions and telling me to endure, always with a friendly and clever advice. Being a 
fellow Latin American, he always said I should question entrenched views, challenge 
“official narratives” and bring something “fresh” and provocative into the equation. I 
tried to do that in this thesis. It would not be possible without his encouragement, 
assistance and patience. I am truly grateful for that and I will keep his lessons in my 
academic career. Andrés, muchas gracias por todo.  
This thesis would also not be possible without the generous PRIMO Marie Curie 
Initial Training Network’s scholarship, which provided me the chance to leave Rio de 
Janeiro and move to Lisbon. During these years I could be part of the most fascinating 
and diverse group of professors, researchers, post-docs and Ph.D. candidates I have ever 
seen in the field of International Relations. In our Power and Region in a Multipolar 
Order program, I could discuss the role of developing countries in a changing global 
order, having lively debates and confronting ideas in roundtables, side-events, seminars 
and workshops in Lisbon, Brussels, Oxford, Hamburg, Stellenbosch and Shanghai. I am 
thankful to all “PRIMO scientists in charge”, especially Prof. Cord Jakobeit, Prof. Andy 
Hurrell, Prof. Janis van der Westhuizen, Prof. Detlef Nolte, Prof. Miriam Prys and Prof. 
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Beatrix Futak-Campbell, not to mention Prof. Malamud and Prof. Bruno Reis. You all 
contributed to this thesis. PRIMO provided me with friends in different parts of the 
world. Melina Breitegger, Débora Terra, Insa Ewert, Ali Lantukh, Martin Pioch, Miklos 
Lazar, Monica de Luna, Mingde Wang, Deepak Pandaya, Fleur Huijskens, Eleonora 
Tafuro, Manaíra Assunção, Faiz Sheikh and Beverley Loke, thank you for being there 
when I needed it.  
Several parts of this thesis were discussed – formally or informally - at the ICS-
UL. From the first presentation of the Ph.D. project to Prof. Reis and Prof. Raquel Vaz 
Pinto, the courses of José Santana Pereira and Marcelo Camerlo, the summer school on 
MAXQDA, and the weekly debates at the study group to the completion of this thesis, 
ICS-UL was a great place to test the waters, receive feedback and reformulate ideas. 
The passion shown by Prof. Octavio Amorim Neto in his intensive one-week seminar 
on qualitative methods decisively made me delve into process tracing and comparative 
case studies. Prof. Reis’ words of support were also noteworthy. Room 4.16, ICS-UL’s 
library and the Ph.D. student’s room became my house in Lisbon. There, I could share 
great moments and worries with colleagues part of the Comparative Politics Ph.D. 
program and its COMPOL group, as well as with colleagues part of other Ph.D. 
programs. Pedro Seabra, Débora Terra, Sofia Serra, Carlos Martins, Silvia Anciães, 
Yanis Kartalis, Edalina Sanches, Joana Rebelo, Filipa Raimundo, Cláudia Almeida, 
André Paris, Susana Coroado, Federico Rojas, Canberk Koçak, thank you for reminding 
me that the path to a Ph.D. also involves good memories. Filipa Madeira, João Baía, 
Sara Merlini, Sofia Ribeiro and Rodrigo Domenech, thank you for our talks, lunches 
and coffees. I should also not forget the daily support given by ICS-UL staff, especially 
Maria Goretti Matias, Sónia Arroz and José Pedro Cardeiro, who were there for me 
when I needed it.  
Parts of the thesis were produced during my secondments at Stellenbosch 
University, in welcoming South Africa, and at the Latin America Institute of the 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), located in the amazing city of 
Hamburg. I received great support from Prof. Westhuizen and Melina in Cape Town 
and Stellenbosch, where I could participate in a roundtable on Latin America and give a 
lecture on Brazilian politics. I was impressed with the students’ interest and feedback. 
At the GIGA I had the chance to receive insightful suggestions, discuss my work with 
Prof. Nolte, Prof. Prys, Prof. Sandra Destradi and be part of its research program 
“power and ideas”. Sharing an office with two fellow Brazilians, Regina Cazzamatta 
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and Carolina Salgado, was a happy surprise. Those months would not be possible 
without the financial aid of the Gulbenkian Fellowship.  
I was invited by Prof. Malamud to partake in the German-Portuguese project  
“Interregionalism as a foreign policy tool: new concepts and trends”, which allowed me 
to visit lovely Nuremberg twice and put me in contact with Prof. Gian Luca Gardini, 
one of the brightest minds working on Brazil and Latin America. His encouraging 
words and attention to detail helped me surpass enduring methodological difficulties I 
had during my academic journey. Without our talks this thesis would certainly lack 
accuracy and potential. I am also grateful to Prof. Christina Stolte and Nelia Müller, 
who challenged me to present some thoughts on Brazil’s foreign policy and the role of 
developing powers in the climate change regime at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität 
(FAU).  
The present shape of this work is also tributary to endless debates throughout 
these years. I remember GEM-STONES’ Ph.D. Summer School “Critical Perspectives 
on Globalization”, organized at the Université de Genène, where I met a PRIMO-like 
and equally unique network of scholars. I had the chance to return to Geneva to be part 
of the academic workshop “The EU and the Crisis of the International Liberal Order: A 
Systemic Crisis?”, in which I presented my work to distinguished Prof. Oran Young, 
reencountered some scholars part of the GEM-STONES group and made new contacts. 
I am sure that the Geneva Transformative Governance Lab will continue thriving and 
bridging gaps of knowledge production on international matters. Additionally, I must 
not forget my days at the Berlin Summer School in Social Sciences (BSS), my 
participation at a Portuguese Association of Political Science (APCP) conference, the 
four times I presented papers and acted as discussant and chair at the conferences of the 
International Studies Association (ISA Baltimore, Atlanta, San Francisco and Toronto), 
and the many times I had the chance to engage in activities at the University Institute of 
Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), the Nova School of Social Sciences and Humanities (FCSH) and 
the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI-UNL). 
A Ph.D. is hardly completed without the ego-crushing process of submitting 
your work to academic journals. I did so with alternative versions of this thesis’ 
chapters and, in most times, I received valuable feedback from reviewers and editors. I 
happened to learn the tiring and lasting process of academic publishing, having 
successfully published with Global Society, International Negotiation, Carta 
Internacional, Brazilian Journal of International Relations, Strife, not to mention 
	 vi	
working papers, book chapters and blog posts. I express my appreciation to everyone 
who took the time to read and comment on parts of this and of previous works, 
including Prof. Carmen Fonseca, Prof. Thiago Lima, Gustavo Bezerra, Prof. Miriam 
Gomes Saraiva and Prof. Letícia Pinheiro. Miriam and Letícia, I couldn’t be more 
thankful for all your support and friendship.  
Similar can be said about my interviewees. I had the chance to interview two 
Brazilian chancellors, several senior and junior bureaucrats part of Brazil’s government, 
and officials working for the United Nations (FAO, IPCC, UNFCCC and the UN 
Secretariat) and civil society organizations. You had a tremendous and invaluable 
contribution to my work. This thesis only exists because of your interest and 
availability. The last months of the writing phase were shared with my colleagues at the 
UN International Organization for Migration (IOM), who understood how exhausting it 
is to combine a 9h-18h job with a Ph.D. thesis. Beyond reaffirming my belief in 
multilateralism, IOM has shown me that academic and non-academic worlds can be 
joined.  
Por último, mas não menos importante, eu não tenho palavras para agradecer aos 
meus familiares por todo amor e apoio. Saudades, sempre. Vocês estiveram ao meu lado 
em todas as circunstâncias, me fazendo às vezes esquecer o quão longe o outro lado do 





A key debate of today’s international relations is whether developing powers will 
accept, reject or modify Western-centered rules, practices and norms. As they rise, 
developing powers devise strategies to advance interests, influence ongoing 
negotiations and promote more representative institutions. In spite of this plurality, most 
works tend to stick definitive criteria to these players’ conducts, opting for static 
classifications that range from revisionism to status quo. With that in mind, I study how 
developing powers interact with regimes’ normative and operational foundations, or 
their principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Focusing on Brazil, this 
thesis combines within-case and cross case research strategies to investigate how the 
concepts of concentric circles, responsibility while protecting and right to food 
respectively engage with the basic components of the regimes of climate change, peace 
and security and food security. These conceptual contributions are compared in view of 
three explanatory factors: regime structure, domestic assets and domestic decision-
making procedures. Original data from in-depth interviews demonstrate that in the time 
frame 2011-2014 Brazil did not defend alternative views of world order and ordering or 
expected to harm current norms and principles. Instead, Brazil followed a nuanced 
approach in its multilateral engagements, expecting to promote specific changes in how 
regimes’ rules and decision-making procedures should function while keeping 
normative components in place. Rather than changes of regimes, Brazil therefore hoped 
for changes within regimes. The research also emphasizes that Brazil’s multilateral 
behavior is essentially individual and aiming to place the country as a reasonable 
negotiator in-between developing and developed states. I conclude presenting the 
concept of foreign policy inertia to explain how Brazil’s activism was possible even in a 
scenario of mounting economic crisis, lack of presidential diplomacy and reversal of 
certain domestic assets.  
 







Um dos principais debates no campo das relações internacionais é se países em 
desenvolvimento como Brasil, China, Índia e outros vão aceitar, rejeitar ou tentar 
modificar a ordem internacional liberal em vigor. Esta tese estuda o comportamento 
multilateral do Brasil e questiona como o país interage com os componentes normativos 
e operacionais que consubstanciam os regimes de alterações climáticas, paz e segurança 
internacionais e segurança alimentar. O faço a partir do exame de três conceitos 
respetivamente promovidos por negociadores brasileiros: os círculos concêntricos, a 
responsabilidade ao proteger (RwP) e o direito à alimentação (R2F). A investigação tem 
por base o estudo do multilateralismo, da política externa, do Direito Internacional e de 
processos decisórios domésticos. 
A tese inicia-se, no primeiro capítulo (i), com a análise da teoria de regimes, 
nomeadamente seus princípios, normas, regras e processos decisórios, e de concepções 
sobre multilateralismo e ordem global. Discuto visões teóricas que apontam que a 
ascensão de países em desenvolvimento necessariamente acarretará comportamentos 
revisionistas e provocará tensões sistémicas; abordagens que defendem que a ordem 
vigente é resiliente o suficiente para acomodar múltiplas visões; e trabalhos que 
estudam conceitos como o de socialização. Argumento que essas perspetivas têm 
limitações para explicar a mudança. Por um lado, não a conceitualizam. Por outro, não 
localizam as condutas de países em desenvolvimento como o Brasil em contextos 
específicos e tampouco o fazem de forma comparativa. Assim, acabam por atribuir 
categorias de comportamento a esses países, muitas das quais condescendentes, eivadas 
de um olhar ocidental e contrário ao pluralismo. Países em desenvolvimento estariam 
determinados, portanto, a serem revisionistas ou favoráveis à manutenção do status quo. 
Esta tese mostra que essa interpretação é simplista e que há outras formas de abordar o 
problema. Estudar a teoria de regimes de forma crítica, dividindo seus componentes em 
normativos – princípios e normas – e operacionais – regras e processos decisórios –, 
mostra-se como alternativa viável e, quando alicerçada a fatores explicativos que 
ultrapassem a análise unidimensional, apropriada para o estudo da política externa.  
 O segundo capítulo (ii) traz discussão sobre metodologia, dados, seleção de 
casos e marco cronológico. Explico que a conjugação da metodologia de process 
tracing com o método comparativo possibilita a observação de como processos 
desenvolvem-se ao longo do tempo, bem como a identificação de padrões e desvios no 
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indicadores de cada caso. Por ser iterativo, process tracing aplica-se a casos individuais 
e permite que se compreenda como conceitos e ideias, vistos na terminologia como 
“mecanismos”, são formulados, discutidos nacionalmente, avançados a nível 
multilateral e continuados posteriormente. O método comparativo, por sua vez, 
possibilita que fatores explicativos e resultantes (outcomes) estudados a partir de 
parâmetros semelhantes sejam aferidos, o que permite generalizações para além do caso 
individual e uma amplitude maior da investigação.  
Os três estudos de caso são observados no marco cronológico 2011-2014, ou 
quando ocorreu o primeiro governo de Dilma Rousseff. Este período conjuga a 
transição entre um momento em que o Brasil agia ativamente em fóruns multilaterais e 
ampliava sua projeção no mundo para o momento atual, quando lideranças nacionais 
questionam a ordem liberal em vigor. O que se passa neste intervalo mantém-se pouco 
estudado e compreendido. É justamente em meio a esse contexto adverso que 
negociadores brasileiros avançaram os conceitos parte desta tese. Esses são comparados 
à luz de três fatores explicativos: a estrutura do regime em questão, as capacidades 
domésticas e os processos decisórios em âmbito nacional. O modo como articulam-se é 
relevante para o entendimento de como contribuições conceituais surgem e são 
eventualmente descontinuadas. Para tal, realizei 65 entrevistas, ao longo de quase três 
anos, com membros do governo federal, funcionários de organizações internacionais 
parte do sistema das Nações Unidas (ONU) e de organizações não-governamentais, 
think tanks, centros de investigação e entidades da sociedade civil. Esse grupo alargado 
de entrevistados envolveu pessoas diretamente associadas com as propostas 
relacionadas com os três regimes, o que garantiu que eu pudesse questionar a “visão 
oficial” e compreender nuances relacionadas com a formulação e a execução de política 
externa do Brasil em três arenas multilaterais ainda pouco estudadas.  
O terceiro capítulo (iii) tem por foco o regime de alterações climáticas, a 
proposta brasileira de círculos concêntricos e sua relação com os componentes 
normativos e operacionais do regime, nomeadamente o princípio das responsabilidades 
comuns porém diferenciadas e respetivas capacidades (CBDR-RC, em inglês). Base do 
regime estabelecido em 1992 com a Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre 
Alterações Climáticas (UNFCCC), o princípio dividiu responsabilidades pelas emissões 
de gases de efeito estufa entre países industrializados (anexo-I) e em desenvolvimento 
(não anexo-I) . Em termos gerais, a ascensão de países como China, Índia, Brasil e 
África do Sul tornou o documento anacrónico e fez com que blocos negociais como a 
	 x	
União Europeia e países com menor desenvolvimento relativo os pressionassem para 
assumir metas obrigatórias de redução de emissões. Além de colaborar para a formação 
da coligação BASIC, o Brasil propôs em 2014 o conceito de círculos concêntricos como 
forma de acomodar interesses divergentes e assentar as bases para o futuro Acordo de 
Paris, que garantiria a continuidade do regime no ano seguinte. A proposta brasileira 
trazia três níveis de responsabilidade e, como o acordo, previa progressão nos 
compromissos assumidos. Enquanto os países anexo-I deveriam ter metas absolutas de 
redução de emissões e países com menor desenvolvimento relativo precisariam de fazer 
cortes que não implicassem suas economias como um todo, nações em desenvolvimento 
como o Brasil estariam situadas em posição intermediária dos círculos concêntricos. 
Com a ideia, os negociadores brasileiros esperavam apresentar o país como interessado 
em avançar o regime e em moderar visões antagónicas. Essa proposta é estudada a partir 
dos três fatores explicativos parte da tese: estrutura do regime, capacidades domésticas e 
processo decisório doméstico relacionado com a temática das alterações climáticas. O 
capítulo demonstra que apesar de o regime estabelecer distinções formais entre seus 
membros, esses não tinham poder de veto. Além disso, o regime passava por hiato entre 
a vigência inicial da Convenção-Quadro e a assinatura do novo Acordo de Paris, o que 
permitia aos estados-parte promoverem novas ideias. Quanto às capacidades 
domésticas, argumento que o Brasil possuía imagem positiva na comunidade 
internacional em virtude de sua matriz energética e do sucesso das políticas e planos 
nacionais de combate ao desmatamento e à degradação florestal, ainda que os primeiros 
sinais de reversão desse quadro já fossem observáveis. Quanto aos principais atores 
burocráticos envolvidos na tomada de posições, o processo decisório era controlado 
pelo Itamaraty em parceria com o Ministério do Meio Ambiente, que mantinham a 
memória da negociação, articulavam a agenda do país em âmbito multilateral e 
isolavam vozes contrárias. Tomando por base o método de process tracing, os três 
fatores explicativos foram individualmente necessários e coletivamente suficientes para 
que a ideia dos círculos concêntricos surgisse e fosse apresentada pelo Brasil sem o 
apoio de parceiros regionais ou extra-regionais. Se por um lado apresentava o Brasil 
com país interessado na temática, por outro valia-se das bases jurisdicionais do regime 
para evitar que assumisse metas obrigatórias de redução de emissões. Concluo o 
capítulo com o argumento de que a proposta de círculos concêntricos congrega 
perspetiva legalista de manutenção do princípio original de CBDR-RC, com a intenção 
de adaptá-lo à distribuição de poder atual, tornando o regime mais efetivo.  
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O quarto capítulo (iv) analisa o conceito de responsabilidade ao proteger (RwP), 
proposto pelo Brasil em 2011, após intervenção militar da Organização do Tratado do 
Atlântico Norte (NATO) na Líbia, e o modo como interage com a norma de 
responsabilidade de proteger (R2P) e com o princípio da não intervenção. Enquanto o 
princípio é parte da Carta de São Francisco e forma um dos pilares do regime de paz e 
segurança internacionais, a R2P era debatida há cerca de uma década nas Nações 
Unidas, nomeadamente na Assembleia Geral, e defendida por estados como Canadá e 
Austrália porém sem plena aceitação por seus pares. Quando da propositura da RwP, o 
Brasil integrava o Conselho de Segurança ao lado de China, Rússia, Índia e África do 
Sul, sendo a primeira vez que os cinco países dos BRICS estavam presentes no órgão 
com capacidade de emitir resoluções de capítulo VII e autorizar o uso da força. 
Sucintamente, a R2P estabelece que os estados têm a responsabilidade de proteger suas 
populações de quatro crimes: genocídio, crime de guerra, crime contra a humanidade e 
limpeza étnica. Além disso, baseia-se em três pilares: o primeiro trata da 
responsabilidade estatal frente aos quatro crimes, o segundo aborda a responsabilidade 
da comunidade internacional auxiliar estados em cumprir essa obrigação, e o terceiro 
afirma que em situações em que um estado não quer ou não possa exercer sua 
responsabilidade, ação “rápida e decisiva através de meios necessários e apropriados” 
poderá ser tomada. Apesar de ser presente em diversos debates do Conselho de 
Segurança, a R2P ainda carecia de implementação prática. Esta viria a acontecer no 
contexto da Primavera Árabe, quando protestos contra o regime de Muammar Khadafi 
eram reprimidos pelas forças do regime. Ao longo de diversas semanas, indícios de 
crimes contra a humanidade contra civis eram discutidos nos media, por organizações 
da sociedade civil, no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU e no Conselho de 
Segurança. Em fevereiro, esse último aprovou unanimemente a resolução 1970, que 
relembrava a responsabilidade das autoridades líbias de proteger, referia a situação ao 
Tribunal Penal Internacional, entre outras medidas. Com o acirramento dos conflitos e a 
proximidade de tropas pró-Khadafi de Benghazi, membros permanentes do conselho 
como França e Reino Unido tentavam apoio da Liga Árabe, da União Africana e de 
outros estados em prol do estabelecimento de uma zona de exclusão aérea. Essa viria a 
ser aprovada pela resolução 1973, que contou com abstenções de Alemanha, China, 
Índia, Rússia e Brasil. O argumento brasileiro era que o parágrafo operativo da 
resolução poderia ter efeitos colaterais não previstos, exacerbar as tensões no terreno e 
causar mais mal do que bem aos civis que deveriam ser protegidos. A ação da NATO 
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derrubou Khadafi, promoveu a mudança de regime político, extrapolou os limites da 
resolução mandatada pelo conselho e mergulhou a Líbia em instabilidade contínua por 
cerca de uma década. Mostro que foi nesse contexto que negociadores brasileiros 
trouxeram a ideia de RwP. A proposta acentuava a importância da diplomacia 
preventiva; advogava que a comunidade internacional demonstrasse um alto nível de 
responsabilidade ao proteger quando do exercício da responsabilidade de proteger; e 
trazia a noção de que o uso da força deveria ser proporcional, limitado e autorizado pelo 
Conselho de Segurança. Quanto aos fatores explicativos parte do modelo analítico, o 
capítulo expõe que a estrutura do regime e o processo decisório controlado pelo 
Itamaraty foram fundamentais para a existência da RwP. O Brasil valeu-se de sua 
posição de membro não permanente em um regime hierárquico e com distinção formal 
entre membros permanentes com direito a veto e demais membros para engajar-se nos 
debates sobre a situação da Líbia, o uso da força e a proteção de civis. Tendo 
encontrado a resistência inicial de alguns países, a RwP angariou apoios e manteve-se 
parte das discussões do conselho mesmo após o fim do mandato brasileiro. Afirmo, 
dessa forma, que a estrutura regime foi fator explicativo necessário para a existência da 
proposta, mas não para a sua continuidade. Já as capacidades domésticas tanto materiais 
quanto imateriais não tiveram relevância para a RwP, o que foi corroborado por 
documentos oficiais e entrevistas com os responsáveis pela ideia. Por fim, o papel do 
corpo diplomático foi essencial para a RwP, que não foi discutida previamente com 
entes da burocracia federal como o Ministério da Defesa ou com parceiros regionais ou 
extra-regionais. O capítulo conclui-se com o argumento de que a RwP buscava regular o 
uso da força, mas não impedi-lo, interagindo diretamente com os parâmetros normativos 
do regime e reforçando as balizas jurisdicionais e institucionais de órgãos como o 
Conselho de Segurança. A proposta viria a perder força por conta de fatores domésticos 
como o pouco interesse por parte da presidência, a saída do chanceler Antônio Patriota e 
o início da instabilidade doméstica no país.  
O quinto capítulo (v) estuda o apoio brasileiro ao conceito de direito à 
alimentação (R2F) e como esse dialoga com as principais normas, princípios e regras do 
regime de segurança alimentar. Também presente na literatura como direito humano à 
alimentação, direito à alimentação adequada e similares, o R2F funciona como um 
corolário à noção de segurança alimentar e aparece em debates na Organização das 
Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura (FAO) e no Programa Mundial de 
Alimentos (PMA). Ao trazer a importância de uma dimensão de direitos humanos, o 
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R2F ganhou escopo institucional na FAO e recebeu o apoio de organizações da 
sociedade civil. Estados passaram a incorporá-lo em legislações nacionais e textos 
constitucionais, com destaque para países da América Latina como o Brasil, que 
assegurou o R2F como direito social. A atuação do país pautava-se não pela negação 
das bases normativas do regime, mas pelo reforço da sua dimensão de direitos humanos 
e pela disseminação do R2F não só por meio de debates na FAO, mas de iniciativas 
como a Reunião Especializada de Agricultura Familiar (REAF) do MERCOSUL. Ainda 
que não tenha sido elaborado em Brasília, o conceito de R2F recebeu o apoio de 
negociadores e do governo brasileiro durante o marco temporal de 2011-2014 em 
diversas circunstâncias na FAO, como na negociação das Diretrizes Voluntárias em 
Apoio à Realização Progressiva do Direito à Alimentação Adequada, e nos debates de 
seu Comitê de Segurança Alimentar (CSA). O conceito também era discutido em foros 
regionais como o MERCOSUL e a CELAC. Diversos parceiros tinham visão 
semelhante à brasileira quanto ao R2F e apoios eram comuns nos debates na FAO, mas 
sem haver atuação em bloco. O capítulo demonstra que a FAO ganhou importância na 
política externa, de que é exemplo a eleição de José Graziano da Silva, antigo ministro 
extraordinário de segurança alimentar e combate à fome, ao cargo de diretor-geral da 
organização em 2011. O tema da segurança alimentar e o conceito do R2F também 
apareceram por meio de iniciativas de cooperação sul-sul e trilaterais, muitas das quais 
herdadas do governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Tomando por base o 
modelo analítico desta tese, os três fatores explicativos tiveram relevância para a 
promoção do R2F por parte do Brasil na FAO. Com a reforma do CSA e o reforço de 
mecanismos de participação da sociedade civil, alguns dos quais incentivados por 
Graziano da Silva, e do exemplo doméstico do Conselho Nacional de Segurança 
Alimentar e Nutricional (CONSEA), temas como o R2F ganharam força nos debates. 
Além disso, a FAO é agência das Nações Unidas com orçamento regular, o que torna a 
distribuição de poder entre seus membros menos dependente de doações como ocorre 
no PMA, onde o Brasil também tentou ampliar sua influência por meio de doações de 
alimentos e apoio emergencial. Quanto às capacidades domésticas, iniciativas de 
combate à fome e à pobreza como o Fome Zero e o Bolsa Família possibilitaram a saída 
do Brasil do mapa da fome da FAO em 2014. Por diversas vezes, o país era referendado 
por publicações da entidade, assim como do Banco Mundial, do PMA e das Nações 
Unidas, elogiado por suas “tecnologias sociais” e procurado por delegações 
estrangeiras. O fato de ser um dos maiores produtores e exportadores agrícolas do 
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mundo criava uma ambiguidade com os temas da FAO, estando mais diretamente 
associado às posturas brasileiras na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC).  Tal 
como ocorreu nos demais estudos de caso, o Itamaraty controlava e harmonizava o 
processo decisório em política externa, limitando conceitos mais disputados, como o de 
soberania alimentar, e tentando harmonizar tensões entre o modelo de agronegócio e o 
de pequena produção agrícola. A dualidade doméstica era visível em iniciativas de 
cooperação técnica, mas minimizada na FAO pela pouca presença do Ministério da 
Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA) nesse fórum. Outros entes burocráticos 
como o Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA) e o Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS) compunham posições com o 
Itamaraty, o que passava a imagem de um processo decisório coeso e coerente, 
permitindo menor dissonância na defesa das experiências desenvolvidas a nível 
doméstico. O ativismo brasileiro no regime de segurança alimentar perde força ainda no 
segundo governo Rousseff (2015-2016), quando são observáveis os primeiros sinais de 
reversão na trajetória inclusiva das políticas de combate à fome e à pobreza e o início da 
crise económica.  
No capítulo final, reafirmo a importância não só do multilateralismo, mas dos 
princípios, normas, regras e processos decisórios parte de regimes internacionais. Ainda 
que estados desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento disputem e discutam o conteúdo 
normativo e operacional dessas áreas temáticas, esses não apresentaram alternativas à 
ordem liberal em vigor. Quanto ao Brasil, seus negociadores não questionaram os 
fundamentos dessa ordem, o que exclui a ideia de tratar-se de ator revisionista. Da 
mesma forma, tampouco agiram em prol do status quo. Em âmbito multilateral, a 
política externa brasileira era, até recentemente, prudente. Buscava uma via media: 
manter e reforçar os componentes normativos existentes, mas procurar alterar regras e 
controlar sua implementação. Isso era feito por meio de diversas estratégias negociais, 
entre as quais a propositura de conceitos e propostas, o que foi abordado nesta tese. Em 
outras palavras, o Brasil objetivava favorecer mudanças na ordem, mas não da ordem. 
Se por um lado era beneficiário do estado de coisas, por outro não tinha capacidades 
para produzir transformações mais amplas. Apesar de suas diferenças, os três estudos de 
caso demonstram que os decisores de política externa buscavam apresentar o Brasil 
como mediador responsável e também resguardar os interesses do país. Não por 
coincidência, os três conceitos trabalhados nesta investigação referendavam 
experiências domésticas e/ou colocavam o Brasil como aberto ao diálogo com parceiros 
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desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento. Além disso, os estudos de caso ressaltam que o 
Brasil busca protagonismo individual, não articulando previamente contribuições 
conceituais com parceiros regionais ou extra-regionais. Isso foi um dos fatores para que 
as propostas brasileiras não avançassem nos regimes de alterações climáticas e de paz e 
segurança internacionais. Os círculos concêntricos e a RwP foram inicialmente 
incompreendidos pelos pares, o que contribuiu para dificultar sua continuidade nas 
negociações. Já no regime de segurança alimentar, a articulação com parceiros latino-
americanos ocorria a depender da temática discutida, mas poderia ser maior caso 
iniciativas de integração regional como o MERCOSUL e a CELAC tivessem agendas 
diretamente ligadas à dimensão multilateral.  
Termino a tese com o conceito de “inércia em política externa” para analisar 
como e por que o Brasil foi capaz de manter comportamento ativo nas negociações 
sobre alterações climáticas e em fóruns como o Conselho de Segurança e a FAO mesmo 
durante a vigência de uma administração refratária à manutenção do dinamismo em 
política externa e já convivendo com os primeiros sinais de crise económica e política. 
Explico que a instabilidade doméstica, agravada pelo impeachment de Rousseff, ainda 
não era perceptível para atores externos e mesmo para forças sociais no âmbito 
nacional. Em contrapartida, seu governo não promoveu mudanças bruscas em relação à 
compreensão de mundo da política externa de Lula da Silva e não atuou de modo 
contrário às burocracias advindas da administração anterior, o que poderia 
impossibilitar a existência das propostas estudadas. Se é verdade que manteve relação 
pouco cordial com o Itamaraty, não contrapôs seus negociadores em âmbito multilateral 
ou objetou conceitos como os círculos concêntricos, a RwP e o R2F. 
A tese concluiu-se com o argumento de que a inércia em política externa 
começou a ser interrompida durante a presidência de Michel Temer (2016-2018), mas 
foi terminada somente no primeiro ano do governo de Jair Bolsonaro (2019-). 
Juntamente com o chanceler Ernesto Araújo e outros ministros, o presidente passou a 
usar fóruns multilaterais como a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e o Conselho de 
Direitos Humanos para atacar a própria ordem de que são parte. Ainda que tenha 
sustentabilidade questionável, essa estratégia marca uma ruptura com a política externa 
desenvolvida no Brasil democrático. Com Bolsonaro, o país passou a contestar os 
elementos normativos e operacionais vigentes, o que o afasta da ideia de procurar agir 
por meio da moderação e o aproxima de comportamento revisionista. Mudanças foram 
observáveis nos três fatores explicativos, o que afetou o comportamento do Brasil nos 
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três regimes. Quanto à estrutura do sistema internacional, antigos desafios ganharam 
força e outros surgiram, como os populismos, os nacionalismos e visões que pregam o 
“antiglobalismo”. No campo das capacidades domésticas, o Brasil sob Bolsonaro 
continuou convivendo com índices de crescimento residuais e com a manutenção de 
permanente conflito entre governo e oposição, média, ciência e sociedade civil 
organizada. Isso afetou a imagem externa do Brasil, agora visto como fonte de 
instabilidade. No que se refere aos processos decisórios domésticos, o novo governo 
alterou a correlação de forças dentro do Itamaraty, abrindo espaço para não diplomatas 
e realizando promoções e mudanças de função seletivas. Outros ministérios e órgãos 
governamentais também ganharam mais espaço no processo decisório de política 
externa, em virtude da falta de coordenação e das disputas intra e inter-burocráticas.  
Futuros trabalhos devem discutir os argumentos aqui enunciados, testando o 
modelo analítico e os métodos utilizados nestes e noutros estudos de casos e estudar, a 
partir das mesmas ferramentas, não só a política externa do Brasil, mas a de outros 
países.  
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A key debate of today’s international relations is whether developing powers 
will accept, reject or try to modify Western-centered rules, practices and norms that 
sanction and guide state behavior. That proves even more important in a context of 
rising populisms, renationalization of governance, reconfiguration of existing 
institutions and promotion of novel interpretations of order and ordering (Acharya, 
2004; Hurrell, 2015).1 After the diffusion of power brought about by the September 11 
terrorist attacks, the Iraq war, the 2008 financial crisis, and the relative rise of 
developing countries, more voices are being expressed, carrying distinct degrees of 
influence and prompting a more plural and yet unstable world order. Adding to that, 
states until then upholding liberal values started to question more frequently the current 
state of affairs and its foundational principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures. 
Debating about a crisis of multilateralism is not new. Cox (1992), for instance, 
discussed how a unilateral United States affected the continuation of the United Nations 
(UN) as a functional political forum. Years later, the focus of the discussion was on 
how the liberal internationalist project (Ikenberry, 2018) or the “Western international 
community” could endure (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2005), which is associated with 
Ruggie’s (1993: 35) classical assertion that the multilateral form has characteristics that 
enhance its “durability and ability to adapt to change”. The current discussion is related 
to but partly shifted away from studying the United States and the European Union 
(EU). It focuses on the behavior of countries like Brazil, China and India, namely how 
they engage with normative and operational frameworks, whether they expect to 
transform existing multilateral foundations and, if so, how much change are they willing 
and able to promote. 
Taking into consideration the pool of theories informing the discipline of 
International Relations, this thesis initiates by looking into how developing powers 
engage with the basic components of the existing order, exploring how much 
convergent are their behaviors and inquiring to which extent their ideas are bringing 
about change. In particular, this work relies on these broad debates to center on Brazil’s 
																																																								
1 The debate involving Amrita Narlikar, Andreas von Staden, Laurence Helfer and Marlene Wind, held at 
the 2018 General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) also refers to 
that. See: https://lecture2go.uni-hamburg.de/l2go/-/get/v/23334, accessed on 23 February 2020. 
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behavior in specific multilateral regimes. How to characterize its foreign policy in 
forums like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)? Is it possible to say that Brazil considers 
multilateralism as the “primary means of solving conflicts and making decisions 
internationally” (Amorim, 2010: 214)? Which explanatory factors may account for its 
multilateral conducts? How much transformation is Brazil expecting to promote? 
Taking into consideration works on regime theory and foreign policy and their 
insufficiencies, this thesis investigates what change means and to which degree 
countries like Brazil are pursuing it. For this purpose, I unpack Krasner’s (1982) 
definition of regimes and look into their operational and normative components, 
studying whether Brazil fits into certain categories of behavior and exploring possible 
patterns about how this country’s foreign policy is displayed in distinct multilateral 
forums. I draw on the research question “how developing powers interact with the 
normative and operational foundations of multilateral regimes?” to delve into Brazil’s 
approaches to multilateralism.  
Two contending hypotheses animate this thesis. The first (H1) states that 
developing countries like Brazil act to revise normative and operational components 
making the existing international liberal order. In other words, they question its bases, 
expect to harm its core presupposes and promote broader changes, altering the guiding 
components of multilateral regimes. This hypothesis directly refers to works on 
revisionism and transformative change like the ones of Mearsheimer (2001), Schweller 
(2015), and Ward (2017), also echoing notions that countries not following the rules of 
the game can be deemed irresponsible (Patrick, 2010).  
The second hypothesis (H2) asserts that developing countries behave as pro-
status quo players, complying with the state of things and avoiding advocating for 
changes. This hypothesis is closely associated with authors identified with liberal-
institutionalist views (i.e. Ikenberry, 2015; Keohane, 2001), who contend that the 
present order is to endure even with the multiplication of voices and perspectives. 
According to this view, present normative and operational parameters are resilient 
enough to integrate newcomers and harmonize differences. In between these two poles, 
works (i.e. Acharya 2004; Bloomfield, 2016; Checkel, 2005; Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann, 2013; Terhalle, 2011) bring discussions on socialization and norm 
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entrepreneurship, illustrating that developing countries can be socialized and agents of 
socialization. 
The problem with most of these works is that they do not clearly distinguish 
what change actually means and what countries like Brazil are expecting to alter. They 
disregard the pivotal discussion of what regimes are made of, sticking definitive criteria 
to state behavior and opting for static classifications (Buzan, 2010). Having that in 
mind, I study the regimes of climate change, peace and security and food security as 
means to test the mentioned hypotheses and confer my views on the matter. Next 
chapters demonstrate that until recently Brazil had not assumed a pro-status quo nor 
displayed a revisionist position. Instead, it followed a nuanced approach in its 
multilateral engagements, promoting specific changes in how issue-areas should 
function while keeping normative components in place. By and large, this research 
demonstrates that Brazil advocated for changes within regimes, but not of regimes.2 
While its negotiators acted to keep in place regime’s main principles and norms, they 
hoped for altering certain rules and decision-making procedures. 
The three case studies are analyzed in the time frame 2011-2014, or when 
president Dilma Rousseff served her first term. That is a crucial and understudied part 
of Brazil’s history, as the country was ending a period of macroeconomic stability and 
hyperactive foreign policy to enter a moment of protracted economic crisis and 
engulfing political tension (Burges, 2008; Power, 2014). Having said that, this thesis is 
not about a presidential mandate or necessarily related to the political party – Worker’s 
Party (PT) - governing the country at that moment. It focuses on specific proposals 
Brazilian negotiators forwarded at the UNFCCC, the UNSC and FAO. I explore how 
the ideas of concentric circles, responsibility while protecting (RwP) and right to food 
(R2F) respectively engaged with the normative and operational bases of the regimes of 
climate change, peace and security and food security. As next chapters illustrate, these 
concepts are not bounded by the mentioned time frame, being byproducts of previous 
configurations of domestic and structural explanatory factors. 
The mentioned concepts are compared in view of three explanatory factors: 
regime structure, domestic assets and domestic decision-making procedures. 
Resembling what the literature of process tracing identify as causal mechanisms, such 
																																																								
2 Similarly, Tourinho (2015) argues that Brazil’s primary concern with the emergence of liberal norms 
has not been about their substance, but rather the product of a genuine normative concern with the 
hegemonic way in which these norms have historically been enforced and implemented. 
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concepts enable the researcher to make stronger within-case inferences about the 
occurrence of outcomes (Beach and Pedersen, 2011; Van Evera, 1997), tying together 
the path between foreign policy production and its interactions with regimes’ normative 
and operational components. I resorted to process tracing as a supplement to the 
comparative method, as it is a clever way to uncover causal sequences and attach 
meaning to the complementary phases explaining how a phenomenon emerges (Collier, 
2011). Together, the comparative method and process tracing substantiate the 
methodological approach of this thesis.  
 
Data 
 The main source of original data consists of 65 online and in-person semi-
structured interviews conducted between June 2015 and April 2018.3 The group of 
respondents comprises bureaucrats and negotiators working for Brazilian federal 
ministries and governmental bodies as well as staff of international organizations, 
international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks, 
research centers and universities.4 Relying on a stratified purposeful sampling strategy 
(Palinkas et al., 2015; Patton, 2014), most interviewees were selected in accordance 
with their proximity with the concepts part of the three case studies.5 Besides high-
ranking representatives such as ministers, ambassadors, and senior officials, other 
interviewees were identified and contacted via snowball sampling, namely junior 
officials and medium-level bureaucrats who were involved with the production of the 
mentioned concepts. I purposely selected not only governmental sources, but also staff 
of civil society organizations and intergovernmental institutions who were able to 
provide distinct interpretations of Brazil’s foreign endeavors. Doing so allowed me to 
question entrenched “official” perspectives, capture contrasting storylines and critically 
study Brazil’s multilateral behavior.   
 The number of interviews varied according to the case in question. The peace 
and security case (8) had fewer respondents in comparison to the climate change case 
(34) and the food security case (21). Two interviews were not related to specific case 
																																																								
3 I conducted individual and group interviews, with the latter normally having two respondents at the 
same time.  
 
4 See Appendix A for a complete list of interviewees.  
 
5 I combined positional and reputational approaches when sampling potential interview subjects. On that 
matter, see Tansey (2007). 
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studies, as the respondents had functions not directly related to a thematic area. That 
discrepancy happens in reason of the nature of the topics being discussed. As chapter IV 
reveals, a very reduced group of people was involved with Brazil’s proposition of RwP, 
which was controlled and streamlined by the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), 
also known as Itamaraty. That was not repeated in the two other cases. The number of 
interviewees related to the food security case was smaller in comparison to the climate 
change case because of the turbulent and polarized political context in Brazil after 
Rousseff’s 2016 impeachment, exactly when most interviews for this case were 
conducted. When in power, her successor Michel Temer (2016-2018) extinguished 
ministries and promoted changes in the federal administration, which made some 
respondents avoid discussing food security-related topics and presenting their views for 
fears of suffering possible reprisals. That occurred even with me ensuring anonymity 
and confidentiality.  
 Anonymity was an important issue. Since most interviewees were working for 
the federal government and for international organizations, they decided to offer their 
views, but requested not to be personally identified. A small number of respondents 
agreed to be identified, but asked to check how their responses appeared in the final 
manuscript. Some had no further comments, some requested revisions, and others – as 
contexts changed – decided to eventually remain anonymous. Because of that, some 
chapters – notably the one on Brazil’s role in the food security regime – ended up with 
only two key informants opting to be identified. For these reasons, all interviewees were 
quoted but I decided not to identify any of them. Almost all of them gave oral consent 
in authorized recorded interviews and some in written form. Only two conversations 
took place in informal settings and were not recorded.6  
 Conducting interviews was a critical research tool for this thesis, as doing so 
allowed me to examine complex decision-making processes, uncover causal paths, go 
beyond mere descriptions and ask theoretically driven questions (George and Bennett, 
2005). As explains Tansey (2007: 765), the aim of process tracing is to “draw a sample 
that includes the most important political players who have participated in the political 
																																																								
6 Most interviews lasted around one hour, being later transcribed and coded using software MAXQDA. 
All anonymous interviewees were identified by codes related to their institutional positions (i.e. the first 
person working for the UNFCCC I interviewed was coded UNFCCC#1; the first diplomat I interviewed 
was coded MRE#1, while the second was coded MRE#2. I repeated that process with all interviewees). 
All interviews followed a list of pre-determined topics and questions that varied in accordance with the 
case study. Appendix B contains a sample interview guide with several questions.  
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events being studied”. Some of them also shared technical notes, meeting minutes and 
personal notes, which enriched the analysis.  
 Other data sources include official documentation from Brazilian governmental 
bodies such as Itamaraty’s Citizen Information Service (SIC), federal ministries, 
research centers and agencies related to each case study; comprehensive documentation 
from UN-related international agencies, programs and institutions such as FAO, the 
UNFCCC, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank; and extensive 
literature review involving works on multilateralism, regimes, norms, International 
Law, developing powers, foreign policy analysis, Brazilian foreign policy, and more 
specifically, climate change, humanitarian intervention and food security. Data was 
gathered for at least five years before and five years after the mentioned period from 
2011 to 2014.  
 
So what? 
This work is relevant for six main reasons.  
First of all (i), this thesis matters for its conceptual and theoretical contributions. 
It goes deep into the study of multilateralism, relating it to the plausibility of change and 
the behavior of developing states like Brazil. I unpack the concept of regimes, 
delineating its constituents and discussing how much resilient are they. It is only by 
carefully looking into principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that one 
can grasp what interests states are pursuing in multilateral discussions and how much 
transformation that may originate (Krasner, 1982). Saying that specific states are 
revising, challenging or supporting the established order is not enough. What does that 
exactly mean? Why attaching specific categories of behavior to countries if preferences 
can vary sometimes even within the same regime? What explanatory factors should be 
taken into consideration when reviewing these classifications? Having the intention to 
grasp the relative rise of developing states, I critically look into the state of the art, 
having a focus on theories and concepts and further testing their appropriateness to 
Brazil’s multilateral behavior.  
Second (ii), this thesis is driven by consistent methodology. Many works on 
Brazil tend to center on describing the country’s foreign policy in a specific period, 
particular negotiation or bilateral relation without relying on any methods. Although 
descriptive works can prove useful, proper use of methodology enriches the analysis, 
making clearer the pathways the researcher followed to reach a conclusion. In these 
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pages, I combine the use of process tracing with the comparative method to see how 
Brazilian-led concepts interact with regime’s normative and operational foundations. 
Process tracing is a powerful methodological tool not sufficiently employed in the study 
of developing powers, especially when it comes to Brazil.7 Together with it, the 
comparative method paved the way for me to test the weight of explanatory factors, 
look for patterns and ascertain contrasts. By focusing on explanatory factors and their 
combinations, causal mechanisms and outcomes, the analytical framework part of this 
work can be further tested in studies on Brazil and other developing states.  
Third (iii), this study goes beyond single, within-case analysis, but does not 
overgeneralize its findings. It keeps a middle-range focus, comparing three 
representative cases of Brazil’s participation in multilateral regimes and presenting 
conclusions that can be contrasted with similar cases. In the words of Gerring (2004: 
346), “it is often difficult to tell which of the many features of a given unit are typical of 
a larger set of units (and hence fodder for generalizable inferences) and which are 
particular to the unit under study”. Acknowledging such an ambiguity, this work has a 
clear focus on the importance of providing evidence-rich and accurate accounts of 
multilateral behavior coupled with rigorous qualitative methodology. I consider the 
contexts the mentioned cases are embedded in and their matching hypothesized 
explanatory factors and possible common outcomes, avoiding the pitfalls of attempting 
to compare things that are incomparable or finding one matching aspect but ignoring the 
whole.  
Fourth (iv), this research looks into three understudied examples of how a 
developing state can intermesh with norms and rules. Recent works tackle Brazil’s 
engagement in the climate change regime (i.e. Basso, 2019; Hochstetler and Inoue, 
2019; Viola and Franchini, 2018), but overlook relevant accounts of multilateral 
participation such as the concentric circles. Works tend to emphasize either Brazil’s 
more active years in the regime or its inaction, disregarding more nuanced approaches. 
Furthermore, analyzes avoid making explicit reference to methods, being more based on 
specific cases or theoretical debates. The literature is much less developed in the case of 
the food security regime. Authors miss studying Brazil’s role at FAO and the WFP, its 
																																																								
7 Exceptions include Amorim Neto and Rodriguez (2016), Lopes and Valente (2016), Schenoni (2018), 
Seabra (2016), and Silva and Pérez (2019). 
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conceptual contributions and how domestic decision-making impacts foreign policy.8 
Available research is more devoted to South-South development cooperation initiatives 
(i.e. Lopes Filho, Sabourin and Sayago, 2018; Milhorance, Bursztyn and Sabourin, 
2019) and national public policies and programs (Takagi, 2011). Lastly, some works 
explore Brazil’s idea of RwP (i.e. Kenkel and Stefan, 2016; Tourinho, Stuenkel and 
Brockmeier, 2015), but not in a comparative manner. All in all, research on Brazil and 
multilateralism either emphasizes historical accounts (Lessa, Couto and Farias, 2010; F. 
Mello, 2014; Miyamoto, 2000) or a specific regime or negotiation.  
Fifth (v) this thesis contains unpublished interview data, particularly for the 
climate change and food security cases. That extensive material enabled me to 
reconstruct causal paths and understand how ideas are produced domestically and 
promoted in multilateral forums. Many of these dynamics are still ill comprehended. 
Talking to some actors directly involved with Brazil’s international insertion is crucial, 
especially for works dealing with process tracing like this one. Beyond providing 
necessary contextual information, some interviewees were able to make comparisons 
regarding not only the country’s behavior in a specific regime, but also with respect to 
its overall foreign policy. That greatly enriched the analysis.  
Sixth (vi), this is a timely contribution. Looking into multilateralism proves even 
more important today, as some developed and developing countries are questioning its 
foundations, bringing uncertainties on the configuration of tomorrow’s world. In the 
specific case of Brazil, president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) took advantage of his speech at 
the 2019 UN General Assembly (UNGA) to criticize the essentials of the international 
liberal order. According to his chancellor Ernesto Araújo, “the ultimate aim of 
globalization is to break the link between God and man”.9 What aspects drove this 
change? How much consistent is Brazil’s foreign policy? Studying the complex 
configurations of domestic and structural explanatory factors as well as understanding 
how Brazil interacts with multilateralism becomes now even more significant.  
 
Outline of thesis 
This thesis is organized into five substantive chapters. 
																																																								
8 Recent works (i.e. Lima and Santana, 2020; Inoue and Coelho, 2018) are bringing new perspectives on 
the matter. 
  
9 See: https://www.france24.com/en/20181123-brazils-diplomacy-risk-rupture-with-araujo-appointment, 
accessed on 25 February 2020. 
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Chapter I concentrates on theory and conceptualization. It starts with a 
discussion of the concepts of multilateralism and regimes, identifying their inner 
normative and operational components. Relying on the works of authors like Krasner 
(1983) and Ruggie (1992; 1993) and bearing in mind how the main theories of 
international relations approach the likelihood of change, I argue that today’s 
international liberal order is divided in thematic arenas called regimes. These regimes 
are formed by principles and norms, or normative components, and rules and decision-
making procedures, or operational elements. I contend that the study of change should 
take into consideration this separation, which is not usually seen in the literature. 
Subsequently, I delve into the debate of how developing countries interact with these 
operational and normative frameworks, investigating whether their conducts are 
convergent with certain categories of behavior. Reflecting specific theoretical currents, 
overarching classifications such as free rider, revisionist and partner confine the 
multilateral endeavors of states like Brazil, China and India to specific and 
predetermined types of multilateral engagement. I end the chapter defending that these 
players do not necessarily act to alter prevailing normative foundations. Instead, they 
might expect to promote ad hoc and gradual changes in the functioning of instances of 
global governance. Brazil is an inherent part of this broad discussion, as the three cases 
substantiating this thesis revolve around its multilateral behavior.  
Chapter II centers on methods, research design and case selection. It 
concentrates on the qualitative methods of comparative case studies and process tracing, 
demonstrating that they can be combined to produce comparable within-case 
knowledge. Moreover, this chapter features the analytical framework. It consists of 
explanatory factors, causal mechanisms and outcomes. The three explanatory factors - 
regime structure, domestic assets and domestic decision-making procedures – are 
context-dependent and interact to produce the causal mechanisms, here treated as the 
manifestations of strategic courses of action. Such mechanisms embody the execution 
of foreign policy and are ontologically connected to and part of the logic linking 
explanatory factors and outcomes. The causal mechanisms are Brazilian-led proposals, 
ideas or concepts its negotiators push forward – possibly with the collaboration of 
regional and extra-regional peers - in specific multilateral debates. The outcomes 
involve the country’s interactions with regimes’ normative and operational components. 
The chapter ends justifying the selection of the three case studies – climate change, 
peace and security, and food security -, pointing out their importance and pertinence.  
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Chapter III is about Brazil’s proposal of concentric circles and how it 
interrelates with the normative and operational foundations making the climate change 
regime, namely the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). This chapter explores the tree explanatory factors: 
regime structure, Brazil’s domestic assets and policies in the climate realm, and the 
country’s decision-making procedures related to climate change. Afterwards, I define 
the concentric circles and discuss its relationship with the explanatory factors and the 
regime’s normative and operational components. Generally speaking, the concentric 
circles was promoted by Brazilian negotiators in 2014, when parties were struggling to 
accommodate interests on the way to the 2015 Paris Agreement. It intended to maintain 
the regime’s normative foundations while adapting its operational provisions to current 
power shifts. The chapter demonstrates that regional and extra-regional peers did not 
have a say in the concentric circles. I conclude highlighting that the explanatory factors 
were individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the idea to emerge.  
Chapter IV scrutinizes Brazil’s proposition of RwP and investigates how it 
interacts with the normative and operational foundations making the peace and security 
regime, especially the norm of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the principle of non-
intervention. First proposed in the aftermath of the much-contested 2011 NATO-led 
intervention in Libya, RwP appeared when Brazil was part of the UNSC as a non-
permanent member together with China, Russia, India and South Africa. RwP did not 
deny R2P, but expected to control its operationalization, avoiding indiscriminate use of 
force to protect civilians. When it comes to explanatory factors, chapter IV underscores 
that the seat at the UNSC and the existence of domestic decision-making procedures 
largely controlled by Itamaraty contributed for RwP to occur. Differently from the 
previous case study, domestic assets did not play a significant role. I conclude the 
chapter illustrating that RwP continued appearing in UN debates even after Brazil left 
the council, which reinforces the centrality of specific bureaucratic actors.  
Likewise, chapter V investigates Brazil’s support for the concept of R2F and 
evaluates its associations with the idea of food security and other normative and 
operational underpinnings part of the regime. Broadly, R2F can be understood as a 
corollary to the notion of food security, integrating a human rights approach to its core 
meaning. Although not being invented in Brasília, R2F received Brazil’s multilateral 
support in several circumstances at FAO. When promoting R2F, Brazilian negotiators 
attempted to mediate the positions of specific ministries and domestic actors in order to 
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avoid associating it with the more disputed concept of food sovereignty. Brazil’s 
multilateral activism gained strength with the election of José Graziano da Silva, former 
extraordinary minister of food security and fight against hunger, for the post of FAO 
director-general in 2011. The chapter ends showing that national policies on hunger 
fighting and poverty alleviation, Itamaraty’s control of bureaucratic dissent, and FAO’s 
non-hierarchical structure were crucial for Brazil to forward R2F.     
I conclude by arguing that Brazil’s recent multilateral inroads were neither 
revisionist nor pro-status quo. Instead of advocating for changes of regimes or 
defending alternative views of world order, Brazilian negotiators opted for a more 
nuanced approach, striving for changes within regimes as far as their core normative 
components endure. Case studies with different combinations of explanatory factors 
demonstrate that while Brazil did not question the foundations of the ongoing order, it 
expected to alter specific rules of governing structures. I postulate the concept of 
foreign policy inertia to explain how Brazil’s multilateral activism was possible even in 
a scenario of mounting economic crisis, lack of presidential diplomacy and reversal of 






DEVELOPING POWERS AND GLOBAL ORDER: THEORETICAL INPUTS 
 
 This chapter provides theoretical and conceptual justifications for the research 
question that motivates this thesis, which is how developing powers interact with the 
normative and operational foundations of multilateral regimes.10 The aim is to set the 
basis for the creation, in the second chapter, of an analytical framework that will be 
applied to the three case studies revolving around Brazil’s foreign policy: climate 
change, peace and security, and food security. Throughout the next sections, I engage 
with concepts and theories related to the most representative traditions of thought in the 
field of International Relations, highlighting their contributions and insufficiencies. The 
effort is to underpin subsequent empirical work.  
 Two objectives motivate this chapter: demonstrate how the global order is 
structured and examine the behaviors of developing powers in this setup. With respect 
to the structure of the global order, it is evaluated with the help of theoretical and 
conceptual tools provided by the literature on multilateral regimes. I argue that the 
existing liberal order relies on principles and norms, what I later call normative 
foundations, and on operational elements, or rules and decision-making procedures. 
Together, they bound and enable the individual actions of states. As developing powers 
maneuver them differently in their rise, making this distinction proves crucial. 
Regarding their behaviors, I demonstrate that, by and large, these players do not aim to 
alter prevailing normative foundations, but to promote ad hoc and gradual changes in 
the more procedural aspects of global governance. In order words, they expect changes 
within the order, but not of the order.  
Next sections are divided as follows: the first (i) centers on the regime literature 
and discusses the notions of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, 
																																																								
10 I use the term developing powers rather than rising or emerging. When it comes to rising, I sustain that 
it locks-in a condition that is not necessarily accurate. Recent political and economic troubles in Brazil, 
South Africa, and Turkey, not to mention others, have raised questions on whether they are truly rising, 
and, if so, based on what parameters. As many authors rely on material factors (i.e. economic growth) to 
attest rise, this creates a conceptual problem, since a state can be rising in one moment and not rising in 
the following. In regard to emerging, I follow Nye’s (2015: 76) view that “the rise of China is a 
misnomer; recovery is more accurate”. The same applies to India and to other states, which could be 
labeled re-emerging. Both categories are context and issue-dependent, being marked by ambiguities and 
overlaps. I also remember that terms like emerging regional powers, middle range powers and emerging 
middle powers are far from consensual. For such reasons, I opted to use a less disputed term, describing 
such countries as developing powers or developing states/countries. Many works tackle this complex and 
still ongoing conceptual discussion. See, for instance, Alexandroff and Cooper (2010), Buzan and Waever 
(2003), Hurrell (2006), Nolte (2010), Schirm (2010), and Schweller (2015). 
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relating them to the current global order.11 The second (ii) departs from that to study the 
relative emergence of developing countries. It analyzes their overall behavior as regards 
the existing order, what brings them together and sets them apart. The third (iii) 
concentrates on how much change are these powers expecting to produce. The last (iv) 
summarizes, giving way to the following chapter.  
 
I.1. Theory talks: regime theory and the foundations of the global order  
The scholarship of international regimes surged in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
authors highlighted that mainstream theories could not predict the end of the Cold War. 
On the one hand, realist thinking suffered attacks for neglecting domestic dynamics, for 
considering states as “billiard balls” and for reifying behavior. Most works attached to 
this theoretical paradigm affirm states attempt to maximize power or to minimize 
insecurity, focusing on relative gains in a context of anarchy.12 Apart from its numerous 
contributions to the field, this theoretical perspective minimizes the importance of 
interstate cooperation and gives much weight to security imperatives.13  
On the other hand, liberal perspectives centered on the study of the possibilities 
of cooperation, mostly when it comes to economic factors, leaving aside geopolitical 
tensions that reignited at the outset of the 1980s. Whenever criticizing realism, they 
devoted efforts to craft a benign view of cooperation in which states seek absolute gains 
(Legro and Moravcsik, 1999). As happened with the object of their criticism, this 
detachment from reality plagued liberal views regarding global order. 
As far as I understand that the theoretical underpinnings behind the concept of 
regimes are closer to liberalism,14 especially in its institutionalist façade, than to 
																																																								
11 For Bull (1995: 3-4), order is a pattern that leads to a particular result, “an arrangement of social life 
such that it promotes certain goals or values”. Hurrell (2007: 1) develops an extensive discussion on the 
concept of order, which he defines as “patterns of governance and institutionalization in world politics”. 
Throughout this thesis, I use the terms “global order”, “world order”, and synonyms. In all these 
instances, except when explicitly mentioned, I speak about the Western-led order, which was established 
and kept by Western powers, although facing changes with the progression of time. For a compelling 
work on distinctive non-Western types and views on the global order, see: Kissinger (2015). Acharya 
(2014), Alagappa (2003) and Tickner and Waever (2009) also deal with the topic. 
 
12 What later would be defined as offensive and defensive realism. See: Mearsheimer (2001). 
 
13 More recently, novel perspectives were brought into the realist field, for instance, the approaches of 
neoclassical realism to foreign policy analysis. For a comprehensive view, see: Lobell, Ripsman and 
Taliaferro (2009). 
 
14 Underdal and Young (2004), for instance, contend that regimes opened an important research agenda 
for those interested in the roles that institutions play in international affairs.  
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realism, I concede that regime theory gained strength to supplement gaps and build 
bridges between realist and liberal traditions of thought. In the same view, Haggard and 
Simmons (1987: 492) argue that the regimes literature can be viewed as an 
“experiment” in reconciling diverging traditions of thought. According to Krasner 
(1982), regimes can be endorsed – with different levels of degree and passion - by both 
theoretical schools, as it creates channels of dialogue between them.15  
As regards constructivism, my position, similar to the ones of Puchala and 
Hopkins (1982) and Young (1982), is that regimes make way for behaviors that are not 
solely based on instrumental calculations of costs and benefits. The puzzling 
relationships between state agency and the structural buffer provided by multilateral 
institutions fit well with this view, since constructivism can be understood as a “kind of 
structural idealism” (Wendt 1999: 1), with idealism here referring to the realm of ideas 
and knowledge and not to idealism in a Wilsonian sense. In his holistic view of 
international relations, Wendt values how the structural level of analysis can 
substantiate interstate interactions, providing a background for reciprocal exchanges 
that end up in constructing state interests and identities. The systemic context, which 
can take the form of norms, rules, or institutions, therefore defines expectations and 
affects behaviors.16  
The work of Krasner (1982: 1) is one of the first and most representative 
endeavors to outline the concept of regimes. According to his classic definition, regimes 
are “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors 
expectations converge in a given issue-area”. Krasner’s definition is based on a two-step 
approach. The first revolves around the components of the concept and centers on the 
idea of regimes involving “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures”, 
providing its central meaning and composing the core of what he identifies as a regime. 
This core is subdivided in normative components – principles and norms – and 
																																																								
15 Krasner (1982) affirms that while liberals and Grotians tend to see regimes as the normal state of 
international relations, realists assume they are difficult to create. When that occurs, they assume a life of 
their own. Wendt (1999: 5) points out the existence of an ontological coherence between neorealism and 
neoliberalism, since both branches of theory have a materialist ground and bear more similarities than 
differences. For him, whilst “neorealists see the structure of the international system as a distribution of 
material capabilities”, neoliberals “see it as capabilities plus institutions because they have added to the 
material base an institutional superstructure”. 
 
16 Similarly, Levy, Young and Zürn (1995) define regimes as social institutions that influence the 
behavior of states and their subjects. The distinction between regimes and international organizations or 
institutions, though, is that regimes lack the capacity to act (Keohane, 1988). 
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operational elements – rules and decision-making procedures. Together, they are the 
static part of the definition.17 
The second part of the concept brings its dynamic element, or the convergence 
of actors’ expectations in a given issue-area. It is dynamic because it puts into motion 
the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Without the foreign 
policy behaviors of actors – here chiefly designed as states – the conceptual core of 
regimes loses its explanatory power. Deprived of interstate interaction, regimes are 
much more a descriptive category than a concept that can be applied for studying 
international affairs. As Ruggie (1992: 573) points out, “the concept of regime 
encompasses more of the ‘how’ question than does the concept of order”. Whereas the 
former encompasses a dynamic sense, the latter depicts a static snapshot of reality.  
The notion of convergence brought about by the concept could give room to 
interpretations that it emphasizes too much state agency. This is partially true, since the 
concept underscores that states’ expectations do not “float in space”, but are constrained 
and enabled by principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. The practical 
implication of these elements can be seen in two ways. On the one side, normative and 
operational elements substantiate individual behaviors, as a state can propose, for 
instance, new norms and rules when defending a specific course of action. 
Alternatively, they provide structural limitations that constrain and sanction deviating 
behaviors.18  
The concept of regimes carries an inner contradiction that much reflects the 
present tensions between developed and developing countries. It deals with the 
plausibility of change, reinforcing the possibility of states to act when their expectations 
are not met, which can be associated with the behaviors of China, India, Brazil, not to 
mention others. But then, regimes also circumscribe change to a controlled setting, 
which can be understood as a conservative way to approach the likelihood of novelty.19 
Under this reasoning, whenever a country expects to alter some aspect part of the 
																																																								
17 Keohane’s (1984) view is instrumental and game-theoretic, as he affirms regimes lower transaction 
costs and provide a framework of rules, making it cheaper for governments to negotiate agreements. 
There is a wide array of works on the concept of regimes. See, for example, Drezner (2009); Gehring 
(1996); Haas (1989); Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1996; 2000); Rittberger (1995); and Young 
(1982). 
 
18 “Patterns of state action are influenced by norms, but (…) such norm-governed behavior was wholly 
consistent with the pursuit of national interests” (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 492). 
 
19 “Regimes provide some stability in a moment power is more widely dispersed” (Krasner, 1982: viii). 
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ongoing order, it would have to deal with a scenario that is inflexible to greater change. 
History has shown that creating a regime is more feasible than terminating one. In fact, 
regimes hardly ever cease to exist, instead being kept dormant, which can happen in 
reason of sunk costs and institutional bureaucracies refractory to change. Although 
possible, comprehensive change is scarcely seen in a rule-based and normative-infused 
architecture. In place of changes in substance, what we commonly see are procedural 
and minor shifts. This says much about how pluralist is the current order. 
Krasner (1982) does not accurately define regimes’ main components. He only 
provides a broad perspective of what principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures would be. The lack of precision in the build-up of a concept stretches its 
meaning, which can end up minimizing its ability to explain real events (Brady and 
Collier, 2010; Strange 1982). This is not to say, however, that the usefulness of regimes 
as a concept is decisively harmed. Krasner’s work contributed to the setting of a new 
research agenda, one that is not fully studied still today.  
For Krasner (1982: 2), principles are “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude”. 
Norms involve “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”, 
whereas rules are “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action”. Decision-making 
procedures are “prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”. 
Whilst principles and norms provide the “basic defining characteristic of a regime”, 
rules and decision-making procedures supplement such feature. This separation creates 
a two-step approach in the conceptual definition of regimes. As far as Krasner reckons 
this division, he does not explore it deeper. In my view, carefully considering the inner 
elements of regimes proves a meaningful way to explain the behavior of developing 




Figure 01. Conceptual tree of regimes. Based on Krasner (1982) and Goertz (2006) 
 
Figure 01 contains the conceptual tree of regimes.20 Considering the work of 
Krasner (1982), I contend that the secondary layer of the concept is composed by 
normative elements and operational elements. The two dimensions interact. Saying 
differently, normative elements are operationalized and further implemented, as well as 
these operational elements are related to normative-infused components. In some cases, 
the normative basis has a temporal antecedence over its operationalization, since 
countries establish norms and principles as guidance for action, which are then 
translated into rules and decision-making procedures. The contrary can also occur, for 
the fact that states can define a specific rule and then attribute some normative meaning 
or value to it.  
Principles and norms substantiate – or should substantiate, as they carry a 
normative trait – the behaviors of international actors. Principles are mostly seen in the 
preambles and initial paragraphs or chapters of treaties and conventions. They provide 
																																																								
20 Following the work of Goertz (2006), the concept of regimes has secondary and tertiary layers. The 
secondary layer comprises the dimensions of the concept, what I call the normative elements and the 
operational elements. The dimensions hold an ontological interplay, not having causal antecedence over 
one another. There is no causation in the conceptual definition of regimes. The tertiary layer includes the 
indicators: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. The relationship between the two 
dimensions is one of necessity, as a regime only exists if both are present. It makes, therefore, a “logical 
AND” conceptual relationship and not one of “family resemblance”. Under this ideal type, the two 
dimensions have equal weight in the configuration of the concept, not being subject to substitution. 
Beyond the debate of conceptual accuracy, I assume that in real life one dimension may have prominence 
over the other. This happens because, as far as principles and norms matter, states tend to focus on the 
rules and decision-making procedures that operationalize the former. It is within such a practical 
dimension that they attempt to exert influence. On the establishment of conceptual exactness, also see 
Sartori’s (1970; 1984) classical works on conceptual stretching and traveling. 
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guidance and convey the core orientations of jurisdictional documents. Treaties creating 
multilateral organizations are normally explicit in mentioning from which foundational 
principles they derive. The UN Charter, for instance, has seven principles found in 
article 2. The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) conveys 12 
principles in article 5, while the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) brings two main principles in the preamble.21  
Multilateralism is an implicit principle of the current order.22 It operates as an 
institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states “on the basis of 
generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct 
for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties” 
(Ruggie, 1992: 571). According to the definition, a regime is not necessarily multilateral 
and/or global. Nonetheless, even though it is possible that few states in a specific 
geographic region define exclusive principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures, this is hardly seen in an interdependent world. As virtually all domains of 
human interaction are codified in the form of treaties, conventions, and international 
customs, non-multilateral regimes are exceptions. The three case studies part of this 
thesis – climate change, peace and security, and food security - have universal or near-
universal membership. 
I interpret this emphasis on multilateralism in two ways. First and foremost, as 
an ideal that should embody interstate relations. By this reading, multilateralism is an 
arrival point to all accords governing specific topics. Multilateralism would have a 
normative connotation, as states embrace it when engaging with others. Second, 
multilateralism can be understood as an instrument through which actors push forward 
their interests. More pragmatic, this interpretation posits multilateralism as a foreign 
policy option that lowers transaction costs and enhances transparency and 
accountability, making cooperation more feasible. Beyond more pragmatic, this view is 
intertwined with liberal conceptions of world order, as it highlights the importance of 
absolute gains.23 
																																																								
21 It is also worth mentioning pacta sunt servanda, a principle of International Law through which states 
should comply with what they agreed to. 
 
22 “Multilateralism and the quest for domestic stability were coupled and even conditioned by one 
another”, reflecting the “shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the industrial world had 
moved” (Ruggie, 1982: 398). 
 
23 Keohane (1986) defines two corollaries to multilateralism: indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. On the 
concept, also see: Caporaso (1992), Kratochwil (1993) and Ruggie (1993).  
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Other principles compose the bulk of the post-1945 order, for instance, 
refraining from the threat or use of force, relying on cooperative measures, and 
respecting the non-interference in domestic affairs of other states. According to the UN 
Charter, the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms should also guide 
interstate relations. The document reassures the importance of a “larger freedom” and of 
the “fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions” (United Nations, 1945: 3). 
These original provisions were complemented by legal instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the International Pacts on Human 
Rights of 1966 and their additional protocols; the Rome Statute of 1998; not to mention 
a plethora of regional accords.  
Norms stand in the same analytical realm as principles, as they reflect states’ 
“shared understandings” and “intersubjective knowledge”, explaining how actors are 
constituted (Hurrell, 2002:193). For Hurrell, norms can “be understood as expressions 
of what states are, where they belong and the kinds of roles they play”, not only 
constraining, but also enabling and empowering action. According to him, norms help 
us “make sense of the identity of actors and hence of the source of their preferences”. 
Ultimately, norms would embody material behavior, providing a bridge between what 
constitutes a state – and therefore prompts it to act – and the translation of preferences 
into actions. When it comes to examples, Bull (1995) identifies sovereignty as an 
international norm, whereas Ruggie (1992) mentions collective security.  
The study of norms regained importance with the constructivist and the post-
positivist turns in the scholarship of International Relations. Works of, for example, 
Adler (2005), Axelrod (1986), Cox (1981), Finnemore (1996) and Kratochwil (1989) 
brought new insights on the issue, an agenda students of regimes did not develop 
deeper.24 Not much has been said, however, on how norms are interrelated with state 
behavior. As is the case with principles, they tend to remain in the realm of ideas, being 
manifested in a prescriptive, ought to, manner. It is therefore important to understand 
the way countries interpret existing norms as well as attempt to develop new ones better 
reflecting their interests.25  
																																																								
24 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888) affirm that the scholarship of regimes opened the way for a “more 
sweeping ‘ideational turn’”, within which norms exert more influence. Central to liberal thought, “norms 
and normative issues” remained residual during the dominance of realism, later regaining significance.  
 
25 Such is the leitmotiv of recent works attempting to tackle the rise of developing powers and its 
relationship with preexisting normative frameworks. See, for instance, Abdenur (2014), Albuquerque 
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The UN Charter does not make direct reference to norms. The same occurs, just 
to mention some examples, with the OAS Charter, the Statute of the Council of Europe 
and the Lisbon Treaty. That illustrates the existence of a disparity between legal texts 
and the study and practice of international relations. Norms are subjacent to 
international life and present in the rhetoric of leaders and members of civil society, but 
not so frequently seen as such in jurisdictional documents.  
One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that there exists great confusion in 
distinguishing principles and norms. Caporaso (1992: 602) defends that generalized 
principles of conduct “usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not 
universal modes of relating to other states”. Hurrell (2002: 188) goes in another 
direction, arguing that normative theory should concentrate “on the principles of 
prudence and moral obligation and the consensus of shared values” part of international 
society. The two examples demonstrate the difficulties of establishing ontological 
antecedence. Whereas norms can embody principles, they can also derive from them. In 
the end, it is fair to say that they bear a similar value-based origin without clear 
conceptual boundaries. Acknowledging the problem and coming back to figure 01, I 
opted to emphasize their commonalities, reuniting principles and norms as “normative 
elements”. 
Ideally, principles and norms should be taken into consideration when states 
formulate foreign policies. They function as parameters, sanctioning deviant behavior 
and providing direction. Furthermore, principles and norms embody goals that actors 
ought to achieve. Their character, however, is loose, which makes them at risk of being 
considered as words in the wind. Rules and decision-making procedures, or the 
operational elements composing regimes, come into play to minimize these 
insufficiencies.  
Pointing to the same direction, Cortell and Davis Jr. (1996: 452) affirm “rules 
constitute specific applications of norms to particular situations” or, as mentioned in 
previous paragraphs, “proscriptions for action” (Krasner, 1982: 2). More concrete, rules 
are the means through which normative contents are revealed and perceived by actors. 
By limiting their scope and assuring predictability, rules put in motion abstract 
meanings. With the existence of rules, boundaries can be set and the wide-ranging sense 
																																																																																																																																																																		
(2016a), Bloomfield (2016), Destradi and Jakobeit (2015), Hart and Jones (2010), Hurrell and Sengupta 
(2012), Stuenkel (2015), Terhalle (2011), Vieira (2012a), and Vieira and Alden (2011).  
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of principles and norms can be controlled into feasible setups, in which states negotiate 
and bargain.  
Rules are more “palpable”. Instead of discussing principles and norms, states 
dispute more assertively the formulation and transformation of rules. To the writing of 
this thesis, there is contestation but no clear alternatives to the principles and norms 
making the global order. The same does not happen with its rules. As they set limits and 
are visible in treaties, official documents and bilateral agreements, their definition is 
subject to constant argument. Take any multilateral arrangements. They are the results 
of conflicts over details that can range from the division of responsibilities to the 
clarification of what topics are to be further deepened. In most negotiations, single 
words can alter the complete meaning of a treaty, being subject to clashes. From climate 
change to nuclear non-proliferation, states do not primarily argue over principles and 
norms. Their ranging positions can be seen, in contrary, when it comes to the 
operationalization of normative components.26  
Decision-making procedures are, as Krasner (1982) points out, practices for 
making and implementing collective choices. They are related to day-to-day routines of 
international organizations such as electing members for an institutional body. Under 
this reading, decision-making procedures ensure that an organization properly exerts its 
mandate, assuring that things occur as agreed upon. The functioning of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), with its permanent and non-permanent members and their 
differentiated voting weight, is an instance of how decision-making procedures appear 
in reality.27  
Decision-making procedures reflect power distribution. Pressures to enlarge the 
UNSC and include more developing countries as well as disputes at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for reformed quota shares are attempts to 
influence current and future decision-making procedures. By sitting at the high table, 
countries have more means to push forward preferences and affect outcomes. Decision-
																																																								
26 Trade is one of the arenas in which rules are easy to identify. The Annex 2 of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreement, for instance, is named “Understanding on rules and procedures 
governing the settlement of disputes”. See: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm, 
accessed on 4 November 2019. Article 7 of the climate convention is another example of how rules 
appear in legal texts. See: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf, accessed on 4 November 
2019.  
 
27 As another example of how decision-making procedures appear in legal texts, article 72 of the UN 
Charter reads that: “the Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, 
which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members”. 
See: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf, accessed on 4 November 2019.  
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making procedures are also visible in technical discussions in international 
organizations and in experts’ meetings. Knowing well these procedures is crucial for a 
country to validate its interests and/or halt unwanted initiatives. Moreover, by having 
technical expertise, states are able to more easily maneuver principles, norms and 
rules.28  
For putting principles and norms into motion, decision-making procedures rest 
alongside rules in the conceptual tree of regimes above presented. They compose what I 
defined as the operational elements. Rules and decision-making procedures are closer to 
day-to-day politics, being easier to notice in interstate interactions. Furthermore, 
countries tend to engage in negotiations aiming at short and medium term results rather 
than in normative discussions that hardly ever produce tangible results. Rather than 
discussing the nature and the content of the notions of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of threat or use of force, for example, states debate how these principles take 
place in real situations. These are manifested through rules and decision-making 
procedures.  
Analyzing how regimes’ normative and operational elements interact is 
essential. As developing powers have gained more means to manifest their preferences, 
they endeavor to shape multilateral paradigms. From trade to climate change, states 
such as China, India, and Brazil expect to alter not the main principles and norms, but 
rather the operational elements governing them. As I further discuss in this chapter, 
these states expect to either frame new rules, or to make the existing ones reflect their 
prerogatives. They also aim to partake in multilateral decision-making instances.  
 
I.2. Developing powers and multilateral regimes: setting the issue 
The order that the world came to know after the rubbles of the League of 
Nations and the horrors of the Second World War was not created in the void. It carries 
components of the Westphalian system, which was established in the aftermath of the 
Thirty Years War and still today bounds several parameters of international relations 
such as the idea of sovereign equality of states. At the same time, the contemporary 
order is infused with liberal premises, or new interpretations of how interstate 
																																																								
28 Following Haas (1992: 3), what bonds members of an epistemic community is their shared belief or 
faith in the verification and the “applicability of particular forms of knowledge and specific truths”. The 
definition is closely related to Kuhn’s (1970: 175) conceptualization of paradigm: “an entire constellation 
of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community”. Manipulating such 
truths and techniques can be crucial for a state to advance its interests in multilateral negotiations. 
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interactions should occur, which occasionally clash with the diplomatic protocols and 
nineteenth-century views established by the ruling powers of that period. Characterizing 
the contemporary order is not a simple task. Its novelties contradict and complement 
preexisting parameters.29 On the one hand, the ongoing order still endorses entrenched 
principles part of the European mindset, as is the case with the balance of power. On the 
other, it brings into the equation ideas that sometimes are at odds with the old state of 
affairs.30  
The present order perpetuates a tension between its foundations and how power 
relations operate. Most principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures were 
determined in a top-down manner. This architecture set the boundaries in which 
interstate relations occur, but was not able to guide individual behaviors. From time to 
time, it is questioned by states attempting to insert their own views in the shape of 
things to come. When not ignored, these endeavors are normally seen as sources of 
instability.31  
 The relative rise of developing powers confirms this tension. For their colonial, 
revolutionary or peripheral condition, they were excluded from the creation of the 
current order. In most issues, ranging from trade to nuclear non-proliferation, rules were 
defined by a group of states interested in securing privileges. Indeed, past attempts to 
promote change were met with discomfort, only achieving minor successes. During the 
Cold War, for example, the so-called Third World took part in Bandung and Belgrade 
conferences and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to fight what they saw as an 
unjust order. The proposal of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) followed the 
same reasoning of shifting established parameters. By and large, these movements 
																																																								
29 Succinctly, Patrick (2017) points out that the current liberal order is founded upon the pivotal role 
played by international law, institutionalism, multilateralism, self-determination, free trade and domestic 
liberty. The ultimate goal would be sovereign states achieving cooperative means in their relations. 
Together, these elements compose what he calls an open world. One that replaces an outmoded and failed 
European world order, which was marked by the existence of spheres of influence, protectionism and 
autarkic rules deprived of popular representation. I remark that hierarchy is a trend permeating both 
orders. Although the liberal order poses as open and democratic, reality proves more complex. The idea 
of a condominium of great powers continues to take place, as the UNSC inherited practices developed 
previously. 
 
30 Considering human rights and democracy as paragons, for example, can conflict with the Westphalian 
principle of non-interference in states’ domestic affairs and open space for reinterpretations of state 
sovereignty. 
 
31 Turner and Nymalm (2019: 410) talk about a “disruption from the non-West amidst a fundamentally 
moral Western order that represents civilizational progress”. Ordering narratives, therefore, are 
“problematic and unreliable descriptors of the actors and behaviours they are designed to explain”.  
	 24	
contested the persistence of colonialism and the dominant rules perpetuating 
imbalances.  
Although alluring, these demands could only achieve minor gains, as is the case 
with part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which secured 
special and differential treatment to developing countries. Discontent voices in forums 
like the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) received lukewarm support from the established powers, 
subsequently losing momentum. Amid the discussions of the NPT, for example, 
Argentina, Brazil and India were unable to revert what they saw as a hypocritical 
agreement. In essence, these moves were seen as empty rhetoric.  
In addition, coalitions of discontents lacked consistency during the Cold War. 
On the one side, they were plagued by internal rivalries, which were stirred by the two 
major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other, developing 
countries were more focused on criticizing the bipolar division than in bringing about 
feasible solutions. In rare moments, as during the discussions of the principle of self-
determination, a group of countries was able to reunite and actively influence the 
international agenda. In several cases, their claims were only legitimized afterwards, 
when considerable international support was assured and risks of disturbing the status 
quo were diminished. Many of the proposals pushed by developing countries only 
reached the top of the agenda when validated by the states controlling it.  
Currently, developing powers have more means to act. Several factors account 
for this shift. Firstly, states such as China, India and Brazil sustain more material 
capabilities than in previous decades. In reason of the promotion of domestic reforms, 
diffusion of economic power and growing economic interdependence, these states face 
renewed opportunities to exercise influence. Ranking among the major economies, they 
integrate global supply chains and are able to direct investments towards other 
developing countries, so as to their developed peers. In general terms, this economic 
leverage provides a basis for more ambitious political endeavors, being China the most 
illustrative case.  
Secondly, for being the major powers in their regions, their foreign policies 
impact their neighborhoods. This is not to say, of course, that they are unmistakable 
regional leaders. Many works (i.e. Burges, 2005; Flemes and Wehner, 2015; Malamud, 
2011) show that their neighbors contest this supposed leadership, with this condition 
being more self-given and exogenously determined than reality. Also, bearing the 
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burden of leadership is costly and can hinder attempts to global rise, which can lead to 
reluctant behavior (Destradi, 2016). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that China, 
India and Brazil are normally pointed out as regional leaders by the established powers 
and by international organizations. Benefits and expectancies are attached to this status.  
Thirdly, in comparison with previous times, developing countries have a more 
prominent role in international institutions. While their quest to occupy the decision-
making instances of intergovernmental bodies remains on track, they have more means 
to question the norms, principles and rules of such arrangements.32 Examples abound. 
In recent years, they have gained more voting power with the approval of a long-
pending reform of the IMF quota system. At the UNSC, they criticized North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Libya. In the climate change regime, 
China, Brazil and India rank among the top global emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), 
which makes them necessary stakeholders in climate talks.  
This more pragmatic involvement with international institutions is manifested 
by means of active criticism of ongoing practices. Disapproval appears in official 
statements, in calls for new operational provisions and in alternatives to traditional 
bodies. The New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa), although not aiming to substitute or openly confront the World 
Bank, shows that its founders are not entirely comfortable with the global financial 
architecture. The financial G-20 is another example of how developing powers can, 
from time to time, exert pressure on the Bretton Woods system.  
Coalitions also changed their character. Whilst groupings such as the NAM 
achieved not as expected in discussions on international trade, non-intervention and 
socioeconomic development, current coalitions are able to accomplish more. An 
illustrative example is the commercial G-20. Formed at the 2003 WTO ministerial 
conference in Cancun, it altered the landscape of trade talks, including Brazil and India 
at the high table alongside the United States and the EU. These developing countries 
enhanced the centrality of issues such as agricultural subsidies, market access and 
special safeguards. They also partook in decision-making processes, making discussions 
																																																								




less unbalanced. Ironically, the formation of the WTO’s G-4 is one of the reasons for 
the stalling of the Doha Development Round.33  
The forming of coalitions provoked new configurations of power in several 
international organizations. Grouping together is a strategic move, as it provides more 
leverage to forward common ideas and grants more bargaining tools to counter rival 
proposals. In climate change talks, for instance, the crafting of the BASIC (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) at the 2009 Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was pivotal for 
an agreement to be reached. Developing states similarly coupled positions in the 
definition of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and in recurring 
conferences on financing for development. 
As previous paragraphs demonstrate, developing powers have more means to 
influence multilateral discussions. Different from past times, they can combine rhetoric 
with practice, actively proposing new readings on the functioning of the global order. 
Indeed, the distinctive characteristic of present times is that developing powers have 
more conditions to substantiate what they voice, leaving a situation of being mere critics 
to actually affecting the way interstate relations are conducted. While such countries 
denounce present imbalances, they also bring new visions on how power should be 
shared, proposing their interpretations on principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures. They do so by following a series of strategies that stem from their new 
stand in global affairs. 
Perspectives on these dynamics are far from consensual. A first group of authors 
has a pessimistic view, understanding that newcomers tend to disturb the structures of 
global governance. Their argument is straightforward: inasmuch as developing powers 
gather material capabilities and, more importantly, apply such competences in their 
external engagements, conflicts tend to arise (Lemke, 1997). Cooperation, although 
possible, is instrumental and limited, as demonstrates Glaser (1994). Mearsheimer 
(2001), for example, maintains that states endeavor to maximize their share of power 
and minimize existential threats, which can prompt a return to great-power 
confrontation. Owing to the fact that developing powers are not fully satisfied with the 
global liberal order, their positions will necessarily clash with those of the established 
																																																								
33 Narlikar (2015) affirms that while developing countries started to exercise greater voice, multilateral 
processes deadlocked and developed countries transferred their negotiating efforts to alternative forums. 
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powers (Schweller, 2015).34 China’s policies towards the South China Sea illustrate the 
argument.35  
A second group of authors, among them Nye (2015), minimizes the possibility 
of turmoil and holds a more restrained position. For them, the liberal order can evolve 
and adapt to the rise of developing countries, integrating different views and moving 
towards an inclusive and more cooperative international architecture in which shared 
leadership is possible. Ikenberry (2015: 453) defends that despite the existence of 
transformations in the distribution of power, the current scenario is one of “more 
continuity, integration, and evolution in the existing order – rather than abrupt 
upheavals, revisionist agendas, and deep struggles over principles”. His perspective 
underscores that international organizations are resilient and adaptable enough to 
include states with contrasting standpoints.36 Keohane (2001: 5) embraces an equivalent 
standpoint, but reinforces the notion that the status quo should be kept by the countries 
now controlling the agenda. For him, “institutions, whether emphasizing coordination 
or collaboration, necessarily institutionalize bias, in favor of groups that have agenda 
control or wish to maintain the status quo”.  
A third group of authors stresses concepts such as socialization to point out how 
developing powers can comply with existing parameters. According to this perspective, 
ideas play a prominent role in the creation, diffusion and internalization of norms into 
domestic systems (Checkel, 2005).37 In the long run, states such as China, India and 
Brazil would face normative and operational boundaries and be socialized, which 
approximates this point of view to previous works advocating for the continuity of the 
status quo. Epstein (2012) questions the idea of socialization, arguing that it can 
infantilize the ones being socialized – in this case the developing powers - and silence 
																																																								
34 “Successful engagement of the rising power is the preferred policy outcome. In contrast to containment 
and the associated great power tension and risk of war, successful engagement enables pre-existing great 
powers to preserve their vital interests without incurring either extensive short-term costs of heightened 
tension or the future costs of international instability and hegemonic war. Nonetheless, successful 
engagement is, at best, rare” (Johnston and Ross, 1999).  
 
35 In the view of Turner and Nymalm (2019: 413), these narratives are “discriminatory and 
autobiographical”, as they “rarely accommodate concern for the disruptive, violent and arguably immoral 
processes that brought the ‘Western order’ about. The concern is instead only about its potential demise 
and of who and what may follow.” 
 
36 “The post-war Western order” is “hard to overturn and easy to join” (Ikenberry, 2008: 28). Similarly, 
Paul (2016) forwards the idea of accommodating developing powers.  
 
37 Wendt (1999: 5) argues that the structure of the international system is defined by the “distribution of 
ideas”, which form the core of his constructivist lens.  
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their views. Bloomfield (2016) similarly argues that this perspective is too linear, 
treating actors as passive norm followers. Benner (2013) contends that the lack of trust 
among developed and developing powers makes it harder for diffuse reciprocity to 
function.  
Fourthly, works of Acharya (2004), Terhalle (2011) and Wiener (2014) put in 
perspective this one-way view, arguing that developing powers can transform the rules 
of the game, refusing being socialized and acting as agents of socialization. As stated by 
Xiaoyu (2012), socialization is not just a one-directional process through which non-
Western powers uncritically learn and internalize the existing norms and rules, but a 
means through which they shape the evolution of international society, bringing more 
pluralism to it.  
Apart from their ontological and epistemological differences, these branches of 
theory attempt to understand to what extent the pillars of the liberal international order 
can adapt to challenges posed by states with diverging interests. The effort is much 
needed, as developing powers currently have more chances to combine discourses with 
practices, behaving more consistently than during the Cold War.38 Their will to project 
influence is nonetheless not automatically translated into recognition or endorsement, 
which minimizes the pertinence of views defending the existence of cooperative 
interaction and two-way socialization. As difference is not entirely met with 
enthusiasm, what is presently in play is a continuous struggle between traditional and 
novel interpretations of order and ordering.39  
Providing that the basic foundations of the liberal international order are still in 
place, ad hoc adjustments have occurred in specific issue-areas, which is partially a 
consequence of the rise of developing countries. These incremental changes have not 
been sufficiently comprehended, with analyzes missing to explain how these states 
actually behave and whether or not they are creating something new. Most works 
dealing with their relative ascensions tend to focus on static categorizations of these 
																																																								
38 Aside from all the rhetoric, developing powers are not promoting drastic upheavals against the 
established principles and norms, nor, in most cases, formulating openly confrontational foreign policies. 
Cooperation with these players continues being an underlying factor of global governance. Among the 
many examples, I mention the setting up of peacekeeping operations and the multilateral response to the 
Ebola outbreak in mid-2014. Drezner (2014) discusses the joint initiatives of the financial G-20 in the 
context of the 2008 crisis. 
 
39 “The transformationist rhetoric about ‘post-Westphalia’ substantially overstates the degree to which we 
have in fact moved beyond a state – and sovereignty-bases order – in terms of politics, law, and morality” 
(Hurrell, 2007: 9).  
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players as (soft)-revisionists, partners, balancers, free-riders, spoilers, challengers, 
reformists and bandwagons, without mentioning what exactly they are engaging with 
and how much change they are causing. As mentions Johnston (2003: 8), “definitions of 
status quo and revisionist”, the two poles comprising these categories, “are not only 
vague but also undertheorized”.40 
Beyond being ambiguous, these categories minimize agency, attaching the 
foreign policies of developing powers to predefined types of behavior. On the contrary, 
these countries, as happens to their developed peers, can enable a series of contradicting 
conducts, not composing a unison group of challengers or supporters of the ongoing 
order.41 Moreover, a state can act dissimilarly within the same regime, sometimes 
engaging with its developing peers and on other occasions going alone or seeking 
support from the developed powers. The same country can question existing normative 
and operational foundations and, in other circumstances, endorse them.  
Throughout this work, I advocate that, generally, developing powers are 
participating and contributing to existing multilateral institutions, which is a clear 
indicator of a non-revisionist orientation. Commonly, they expect ad hoc, specific 
changes in regimes’ operational elements without calling into question ongoing 
normative foundations. By disaggregating the core normative dimension of regimes 
from the operational one, I contend that developing powers are focusing on the latter 
aspect and relying on a more nuanced and procedural approach. This analytical angle 
makes sense of these players’ policies in several fields of global governance, policies 
that are contesting certain rules and decision-making procedures, but not expecting to 
challenge the global order in its entirety. 
This middle-ground position incorporates some features of the mentioned 
theoretical contributions, identifying the behavior of developing powers as process-
oriented (Stefan, 2016). On the one side, they would strive for changing the decision-
making instances and political agendas of multilateral institutions, making them reflect 
the current distribution of power. Also, they expect to alter rules considered 
																																																								
40 Gilpin (1981) relies on three components to define what would be a revisionist or a pro-status quo state: 
the distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige and the rights and rules that govern or influence the 
interactions among states. While a revisionist country would want to alter these three elements, a status 
quo state would attempt to keep them in place. Discussing whether China is a status quo or revisionist 
power, Johnston (2003) brings five indicators accounting for this type of behavior. 
 
41 As argue Mazarr et al. (2018: 14), “states can theoretically be revisionist in one issue area (i.e. 
economics) while retaining status quo inclinations in another (i.e. geopolitics)”. 
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anachronistic, hypocritical and unjust. 42  On the other side, they do not want to 
overthrow existing normative frameworks, which could characterize them as spoilers 
and irresponsible stakeholders. Nevertheless, they attempt to control the putting into 
practice of some principles and norms, controlling their operationalization and avoiding 
situations in which norms-based claims could lead to consequences contrary to their 
interests. Although I reckon that incrementalist approaches towards rules and decision-
making procedures and defensive stances towards principles and norms can eventually 
result in normative transformation and/or substitution, I understand it is not a general 
trend in current international relations.43  
In the next section, I argue that in place of expecting changes of regimes, 
developing powers hope for changes within regimes. Mostly, they are focusing less 
energy on principles and norms and looking forward to bringing changes to the rules 
and decision-making procedures that operationalize principles and norms (Harig and 
Kenkel, 2017). Applying varied foreign policy strategies, these countries endeavor to 
construct what they see as a more balanced order. This argument is further tested with 
the analysis of Brazil’s behaviors in the regimes of climate change, peace and security 
and food security.   
  
I.3. The degree of change: developing powers in multilateral regimes 
The importance of this section to the overall thesis is that it questions, with 
empirical examples, perceptions that developing powers are attempting to promote 
thorough normative changes, which could lead to new configurations of order. Two 
main positions are defended here: (i) that developing powers do not want to alter the 
normative foundations of the global order and (ii) that they cannot do so. The last part 
(iii) talks about the degree of change and presents a framework summarizing the 
discussion. 
First (i), there is no clear indication that developing countries are actively aiming 
to alter the normative foundations of the global order.44 Following previous theoretical 
																																																								
42 Also see Buzan (2010) and Xiaoyu (2012).  
 
43 Accordingly, Ikenberry (2015: 452) argues that developing powers are “not seeking a ‘post-liberal’ 
order based on closed blocs, economic spheres of influence, or neo-imperial groupings.” 
 
44 “It is incorrect to imply that the rising powers aspire to create a radically different world order. Visibly, 
for the majority of the international community – rising powers included – the real issue is one of 
compliance by all with existing rules, without unilateralism, and with expanded opportunity for 
participation in decision-taking” (Patriota, 2017: 5). 
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debates, I contend that the bulk of the global liberal architecture is still in place and that 
the most representative instances of it like the UN and the Bretton Woods system have 
not been effectively challenged. Up to now, new normative provisions have not 
substituted basic interstate principles such as the prohibition of threat or use of force, 
non-intervention, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, just to mention three.  
One could argue that this happens because these countries were the greatest 
winners of a more interdependent and globalized world.45 In reason of upholding a 
developing condition, they could benefit from non-reciprocity clauses in multilateral 
treaties, which allowed them to opt out or delay the fulfillment of compulsory 
obligations, a situation that was established in the past and persists today. Documents 
such as the GATT, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UNFCCC 
presuppose divisions of responsibilities reckoning the existence of imbalances between 
developed and developing countries. GATT’s 1979 Enabling Clause, for example, 
divided parties in graduating categories and guaranteed non-reciprocity, which is 
formally an exemption from the most-favored nation clause, the fundamental principle 
of the multilateral trading system. 
Since the main jurisdictional documents did not accompany shifts in the 
distribution of power between developing and developed states, detachment between 
written law and reality became commonplace. For this disparity, developing countries 
can sustain legalistic positions and reinforce the original provisions of treaties and 
accords, avoiding or at least delaying the assumption of additional responsibilities. By 
doing so, they can counter accusations of possible inaction with the argument that they 
are abiding by the rules of the game.  
Another sign that developing countries pursue compliant conducts is the fact 
that the institutions they create, which are up to now mostly noted in the financial realm, 
do not harm current principles and norms. In contrast, these new institutions – many of 
them with a regional basis - reinforce existing normative frameworks. Neither the 
Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) nor the New Development Bank (NDB) of the 
BRICS effectively challenges the Bretton Woods system. The CRA, for instance, is 
based in US dollars. The NDB aims at “complementing the existing efforts of 
																																																								
45 Chan, Hu and He (2018: 614) mention that the rise of countries like China “gives it an increased stake 
in the international order that has permitted its ascent thus far. As a result, it should have less incentive to 
upset this order even though it now has more capability to challenge it”.  
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multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development”.46 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), for its turn, defends the principle of 
non-interference, which replicates paradigmatic article 2 §7 of the UN Charter. These 
and similar examples helped pluralize global affairs and provided space for its 
constituents to exert influence, but did not erode the components of the global liberal 
order. 
Coupled to this, comes a notion shared by developing states that the ones not 
following current normative foundations are their developed peers.47 According to this 
vision, when their interests are at stake, developed powers override or ignore normative 
and operational parameters, opting to bypass and forego historically grounded 
frameworks, most of which they originally established. These breaches are visible 
through direct disrespect of established rules or by crafting dubious resolution texts that 
leave room to further violations of international law. The US-led intervention in Iraq in 
2003 is a clear example. It lacked consistent diplomatic support and legitimacy, being 
based on debatable UNSC resolution 1441. While the document allowed UN member 
states to “use all necessary means” against the Iraqi regime and gave it a “final 
opportunity” to comply with its disarmament obligations, the resolution did not 
authorize noncompliance with article 2 §4 of the UN Charter.48 Furthermore, the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction, which supposedly was the main reason 
behind hawkish voices calling for intervention, was not entirely proven (Puri, 2016).49 
In the occasion, the principle of prohibition of threat or use of force was bypassed in 
response to other foreign policy imperatives.  
The argument that the ones confronting the basics of the global order are the 
developed powers is frontally opposed to the idea of irresponsible stakeholders, crafted 
by Patrick (2010). He affirms developing powers have enhanced their status and, for 
this reason, they should assume more obligations. His position confirms a 
misperception that is commonly shared by Western scholars. First of all, it assumes 
																																																								
46 For the NDB’s agreement, see:  
http://ndb.int/download/Agreement%20on%20the%20New%20Development%20Bank.pdf, accessed on 
7 November 2019.  
 
47 Schweller (2015) affirms that hegemons are best positioned and most motivated to be revisionist 
powers. For a discussion on the concept of hegemony, see Prys (2010).  
 
48 See: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf, accessed on 8 November 2019.   
 
49 Also see Amorim (2017).  
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developed powers as the keepers of the ongoing order, exempting them from any 
deviant behavior and considering that they are already undertaking the heavier share of 
the burden. Second, for directing the assumption of responsibilities towards developing 
powers, Patrick remarks that these countries are not fulfilling their roles. At best, these 
would be seen as opportunistic free-riders. At worse, as spoilers or challengers, which is 
not entirely true. Third, such simple definitions create morally oriented categories of 
friends and foes of the ongoing order, which is intrinsically problematic. Fourth, the 
argument ignores that developing powers also contributed to its formation and 
continuation.50  
Since I do not follow this reading of “who should do what”, I understand things 
differently. I base my argument on the main legal texts and customary international law 
to then interrogate whether countries comply with them. Having said that, I contend that 
there is no clear evidence that developing powers are attempting to override the current 
order. I assume that the notion of responsibility is to be treated not with reference to 
future action, but along the lines of present behavior. UNSC resolution 1973 that guided 
NATO’s no-fly zone and subsequent regime change in Libya, for instance, echoes that 
transgressions of international law do not solely occur due to the foreign policy 
behaviors of developing powers. Same reasoning can be said in the climate change 
regime, another case study of this thesis. Of course, I do not mean that non-compliance 
is mostly or solely due to developed powers’ actions or inactions. If I did so, I would 
reproduce the already criticized prescriptive vision of responsibility. 
Second (ii), if developing powers expected to promote new configurations of 
global order, they would not have the means to do so. To begin with, considerable 
division exists between them, which presents a clear impeditive for joint engagement in 
the promotion of change. This situation opposes the idea of a unified global South that 
would speak with a common voice and rely on shared values. As much as such rhetoric 
gained force amid a bipolar dispute that relegated them to a Third World condition, its 
roots continue to echo today in their bureaucracies though with debatable results. The 
meetings of the BRICS, for example, commonly cast a collective sense and call for mild 
revisions of contemporary governing structures. Similar happens with regional meetings 
																																																								
50 Works on role theory and status also defy attaching predefined categories to the behavior of developing 
countries. See, for instance, Gaskarth (2017), Loke (2013), Stuenkel (2014), Ward (2017) and Wehner 
and Thies (2014). 
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involving these countries. Different interests nonetheless difficult the formation of 
cohesive blocs and weaken the prospects of coordinated initiatives (Schirm, 2009). 
Their foreign policies can greatly vary according to factors such as the issue-
area in question, the (regional) groupings they are attached to and their domestic 
contexts. Rhetoric apart, the way they view principles and norms is not the same and 
that can affect the possibilities of cooperation (Albuquerque, 2016a; Hochstetler and 
Milkoreit, 2015). In the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Brazil, China and 
India do not uphold similar readings of the NPT, emphasizing disarmament and non-
proliferation in dissimilar fashion. In the climate change realm, however, their positions 
convey in the defense of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. By and large, the absence of concerted behavior diminishes the 
ability of these powers to alter the underlying mechanisms of global politics.  
Furthermore, developing powers could not alter the fundamental components of 
the existing order because that would be considerably costly. Imagine a scenario in 
which a rising country attempts to substitute the basic elements governing interstate 
relations, creating something from scratch. In such a hypothetical situation, it would 
face limitations posed by a plethora of treaties, rules and norms, and the objection of the 
ones profiting from the present state of things. Pro-status quo states would delegitimize 
calls for change or, in a more “realist” scenario, resort to the use of force.  
Speaking about the degree of change (iii), I do not ignore that renewed readings 
of present normative and operational elements are being pushed forward, as it occurs 
with debates on international cooperation, internet governance and human rights within 
and outside the UN. My view, however, is that developing powers intend to 
complement and adapt norms rather than promote radical shifts. Building upon a 
previous background, they introduce novelty without undermining old paradigms 
(Ikenberry, 2015). To some extent, that contributes to make regimes more flexible and 
with a broader pool of norms and rules, something Keohane and Victor (2010) call 
regime complexes. 
The major goal of developing powers is to alter regime’s operational elements, 
or rules and decision-making procedures. Such a perception is directly related to their 
foreign policy actions and diplomatic discourses. Ad hoc changes in specific issue-areas 
of global governance are seen as less dramatic and more feasible than the promotion of 
sweeping normative transformations. As figure 02 shows below, more than substituting 
	 35	
regimes that do not correspond to their interests, which would account for changes of 
regimes, developing powers look for gradual, step-by-step changes within regimes.51  
As they rise, developing powers battle for more representative multilateral 
decision-making instances and hope to have more opportunities to voice preferences. 
Although they are involved in discussions on principles and norms, these states are 
more interested in arguing over how to operationalize them. In my view, acting as such 
does not characterize a country as revisionist or reformist. Otherwise, all states – 
developed and developing - doing so could be labeled in a similar manner, which 
reinforces my point that these concepts are often employed carelessly.  
 
 
Figure 02. Developing powers in multilateral regimes 
 
Figure 02 portrays a chain of events that starts with the formulation of foreign 
policy strategies and ends with the type of change they may engender. I anticipate two 
possibilities of change, one radical – a change of regimes - and the other procedural or 
nuanced – a change within regimes. I understand, however, that developing powers 
might also want to avoid transformation and keep the status quo. They can even expect 
to alter a specific element of a particular regime for the sake of keeping possible 
privileges and/or to exclude them from rivals.52  
																																																								
51 Similarly, Ikenberry (2015: 452) defends that the power transition of today is not triggering a 
“fundamental struggle over the deep principles of order, even as it diffuses power and authority away 
from the West”. He does not go deeper, however, into the distinction between normative and operational 
elements. Also see Ikenberry (2011). 
 
52 I acknowledge that a series of consistent changes within a regime can eventually lead to change of that 
regime. Most authors raising this point work on China. Kinzelbach (2012), for example, affirms China’s 
human rights diplomacy at the UN contests implications of human rights rather than the norms 
themselves. She argues that although China has not provided an alternative normative frame to human 
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As next chapter demonstrates, when interacting with normative frameworks, 
developing powers employ a series of foreign policy strategies, which can involve the 
promotion of alternative principles and norms, attempts to control their implementation 
by resorting to novel rules and reformed decision-making procedures, the maintenance 
of the status quo, a broader engagement with multilateral regimes, or a combination of 
the above.53 Diplomatic expertise proves critical, as a country needs to convince others 
and overcome the mistrust of the ones controlling the agenda. These gatekeepers not 
only hinder opposing views, but also selectively choose which proposals and concepts 
to legitimize.54  
Most developing states have a hard time to promote their interests. When they 
have the means to voice preferences and exert influence in multilateral negotiations, 
they need to deal with possible resistance coming from the ones controlling the 
decision-making instances, as is the case with the five permanent members (P5) of the 
UNSC, the nuclear weapon states part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the 
chief trading countries of the WTO. Also, the system itself was made to avoid thorough 
or swift shifts.55 Today’s multilateral “spaghetti bowl” of normative and operational 
elements operates as a force that enables and halts new ideas and proposals.56  
 
I.4. Final remarks  
 This chapter primarily engaged with theoretical and conceptual contributions. I 
explored the components of the concept of regimes, dividing them in normative and 
operational elements. Afterwards, I located developing powers in this setup, asking 
																																																																																																																																																																		
rights, it can end up eroding existing normative elements. For another perspective, see Okano-Heijmans 
et al. (2018). 
  
53 According to Ikenberry (2015: 454), these are states “pursuing various sorts of ‘stakeholder’ strategies: 
pushing for more multilateralism, influencing world politics through agenda setting, bridge building, and 
coalition diplomacy. Seen from this wider angle, the global order is witnessing an expansion in the 
constituencies and supports for a reformed and updated liberal international order”.  
 
54 Hurrell (2007: 9) argues that the aspirations of this normatively ambitious international society remain 
“deeply contaminated by the preferences and interests of powerful states”. 
 
55 Last decades experienced an “enormous expansion in the range of issues and problems that are subject 
to regulation and institutionalization” (Hurrell, 2007: 6). This expansion, nevertheless, was more 
conservative than inclusive when it comes to the interests of the countries outside the “core” of the 
Western-led order. On the expansion of the international society and the views of the English School, see 
Bull (1995), Buzan (2014) and Watson (1992). For a critique, see Keene (2002). 
 
56 I borrow the term from Bhagwati (1995).  
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whether they can be identified as agents of change and questioning what exactly they 
are expecting to alter. I argued that these players do not endeavor to promote radical 
transformations or revise the core presupposes of the ongoing liberal order. More than 
changes of regimes, I understand that these players expect changes within regimes. In 
my view, portraying them as revisionist countries without specifically identifying how 
they approach existing frameworks is misleading. The following chapter recaps such 
discussions and introduces a framework of analysis to be tested with Brazil’s 





METHODS, CASE STUDIES AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter presents the methods, case studies, and analytical framework part 
of this thesis. The idea is to support previous theoretical and conceptual discussions 
with the methods of process tracing and the comparative method, allowing the study of 
relations between explanatory factors, causal sequences, causal mechanisms, and 
outcomes.57 I explain in greater detail what strategies of research were chosen and how 
theoretical knowledge can be applied comparatively.  
The chapter is divided in four sections. The first (i) centers on the two 
qualitative methods, the comparative method and process tracing. It debates how they 
can be combined to produce within-case knowledge that is also comparable. In the 
pathway between explanatory factors and outcomes I investigate causal mechanisms, 
here treated as foreign policy outputs or manifestations of strategic courses of action. 
The second (ii) presents the analytical framework, which comprises three explanatory 
factors – regime structure, domestic assets, and domestic decision-making procedures -, 
causal mechanisms, and outcomes. This last component reveals how states interact with 
the normative and operational elements making regimes and directly engages with the 
research question of this thesis. The third (iii) discusses the selection of the three case 
studies: climate change, peace and security, and food security. The last section (iv) 
summarizes. 
 
II.1. Qualitative methods  
 This work is built upon a qualitative methodology, combining the comparative 
method with process tracing. The comparative method is useful to outline contrasts and 
similarities, eliminate hypothesized explanatory factors, and attest their relative 
weight.58 Process tracing is a clever way to trace causal paths and attest how the 
																																																								
57 With regard to nomenclature, Collier (1993: 107) separates the “case study method” from the 
comparative method, which involves the “systematic analysis of a small number of cases”. As he 
acknowledges, however, case studies can be brought implicitly or explicitly into the comparative method. 
I will use case studies in plural and/or comparative case studies to refer to more than one case (small-N) 
and comparative method when making reference to the method itself. Process tracing alludes to within-
case analyzes.  
 
58 I use the terms explanatory/causal factors and outcomes, which are present in the methodological 
literature on process tracing and the comparative historical analysis, rather than independent and 
dependent variables, which are commonly associated with quantitative methods. The term variable 
implies that something should vary. In some cases, however, outcomes and explanatory factors may not 
	 39	
interrelations between explanatory factors and outcomes occur. For its preoccupation 
with causal mechanisms and alternative routes to the same results, process tracing 
supplements gaps inherent to the comparative method.  
 
II.1.1. The comparative method  
The goal of the comparative method is to discover empirical relationships 
between a particular explanatory factor and the outcome, while other possible causal 
factors are kept constant. Akin to the statistical method, the comparative method has the 
underlying objective of providing scientific explanations for complex phenomena. The 
crucial difference, clarifies Lijphart (1971: 684), is that the comparative method “should 
be resorted to when the number of cases available for analysis is so small that cross-
tabulating them further in order to establish credible controls is not feasible”. The 
number of cases, therefore, is small enough (small-N) that it precludes statistical 
analysis. Furthermore, the comparative method requests more data and is more time 
consuming than the statistical method. These approaches can be nonetheless combined, 
with the comparative method identifying hypotheses and the statistical method carrying 
out the analysis of a larger sample. 
Comparison is normally employed to generate hypotheses, test existing theories 
and build new ones.59 Hypotheses generating case studies formulate hypotheses; theory-
testing case studies assess prevailing theoretical knowledge; and theory-building case 
studies aim to improve theories. Being ideal types, these categories do not reflect the 
fact that most cases are not limited to one purpose. Drawing a line between hypotheses 
generating, theory testing and theory building is misleading. Empirically, the analysis 
can start with the examination of mainstream theories and, in case they do not 
satisfactorily explain a puzzle, forward novel views.60  
																																																																																																																																																																		
vary. In others, the researcher may be more interested in evaluating the intermediate elements between 
explanatory factors and outcomes, or the causal mechanisms.  
 
59 Lijphart (1971) defines four types of case studies. Both theory confirming and theory infirming case 
studies have the ultimate goal to test theories. He identifies two other types of case studies: atheoretical 
and interpretive. I question purely atheoretical case studies because even when one does not rely on 
existing theories or merely intend to describe phenomena, previous knowledge inductively guides the 
analysis.  
 
60 Seawright and Gerring (2008) identify seven types of case studies: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, 
influential, most similar, and most different. Deviant cases are linked to theoretical anomalies and are 
poorly explained, which can open room for new interpretations and novel theories. Typical cases are 
representative of the overall population of cases, being useful to prove causal mechanisms and to 
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The comparative method has advantages. The researcher can focus on a specific 
explanatory factor, attesting its relative importance to the overall study. That process 
can prove necessary in analytical frameworks with many explanatory factors and a 
small number of cases.61 With this focused investigation, one can meticulously infer 
patterns of correlation not only among the hypothesized causal factors, but also between 
them and the outcomes. The exercise ensures a more approximate picture of which 
factors truly matter. Subsequent empirical investigation may confirm previous theorized 
relationships.  
The comparative method derives from Mill’s (1974 [1843]) classical work on 
the methods of difference and agreement. While the method of difference compares an 
instance in which the outcome is present with another in which it is absent, the method 
of agreement compares different instances in which the phenomenon occurs, 
eliminating any potential explanatory factors that are not shared by the cases (Collier, 
1993). In other words, whereas the same outcome Y is present in the cases studied 
through the method of agreement, the same does not occur with the method of 
difference. According to Falleti and Mahoney (2015: 332), the comparative method has 
a similar logic of “eliminative procedure”, as it rejects factors that do not account for 
the outcomes.62  
The aim of the comparative method is to study cases in which the factors of 
interest are present, ensuring that the analysis is congruent and feasible. Through 
comparison, one can assess rival explanations leading to the same results. Moreover, 
relying on more than one case is useful because it guarantees parallel examination of a 
theory or group of theories. As cases have individual features, “showing that a particular 
model or set of concepts usefully illuminates these cases” is a central goal of the 
comparative method (Collier, 1993: 108).  
																																																																																																																																																																		
disconfirm deterministic arguments. The authors reckon that the status of a case may change during the 
investigation: an exploratory case can end up being confirmatory and vice-versa.  
 
61 Lijphart (1971) presents remedies to this issue, such as: increasing the number of cases; reducing or 
combining the initial explanatory factors; and focusing the analysis on comparable cases.  
 
62 Przeworski and Teune (1970: 32) develop the notion of most similar and most different systems 
designs. Whereas the most similar systems design is based on the idea of systems – or cases - as similar 
as possible, the most different systems design is based on a group of cases that presents distinct 
characteristics. Seawright and Gerring (2008) show that, in most similar systems design, cases are similar 
in all measured explanatory factors, except in the factor of interest (i.e. factor X1). 
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Collier also argues that explanatory factors do not operate autonomously for the 
fact that processes of change take place in different ways and in accordance with 
specific contexts. Suitably, the comparative method admits diachronic exploration, 
which increases the number of observations and allows the researcher to compare 
specific traits of a country in different time frames, being then able to match such 
features with the ones of other states.  
 The comparative method suits this research because I could not answer how 
Brazil’s foreign policy materializes in multilateral arenas by just looking into a single 
case. Without analyzing more cases, the explanation would be insufficient to address 
the research question. Three cases were therefore chosen, composing a small-N that is 
far from the formal requirements for the statistical method, but a group that can be 
compared in greater detail. Likewise, the comparative method is valuable for research 
designs with varied explanatory factors, which is the case of this work.  
One insufficiency of the comparative method is that it does not clearly answer 
the how question. It is good to describe correlations and ascertain which case(s) may be 
different. This is a great starting point. What is missing is in what way explanatory 
factors and outcomes relate and what causal explanations are transported from one end 
of the analytical framework to the other. Attesting deeper meaning for each case and 
demonstrating how static correlations are transformed into dynamic interactions become 
harder if one does not look for causal mechanisms and rival explanations.  
For the mentioned reasons, the comparative method enhances its explanatory 
power when combined with process tracing.63 Initial findings of the comparative 
method can be tested and complemented through careful, step-by-step techniques 
provided by process tracing. These posterior conclusions can validate the initial ones, in 
an iterative methodological progression (Collier, 1993). In many comparative analyzes, 
the connection between explanatory factors (X) and outcomes (Y) is described to be 
independent mediating elements. The linkages between X and Y, nevertheless, are 
neither given nor direct. Instead, they are populated by several interplays that take place 
chronologically and analytically between factors and intermediate elements and 
																																																								
63 Other method of within-case analysis is pattern matching (Campbell, 1975). Counterfactual analysis is 
also commonly mentioned (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). 
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between these and the outcomes.64 One way to minimize this limitation is to introduce 
greater analytical richness with process tracing and its focus on internal comparison. 
 
II.1.2. Process tracing  
Process tracing is a “fundamental tool of qualitative analysis” that is valuable for 
analyzing singular or recurring events. It gives attention to description “as a key 
contribution, and emphasizes the causal sequence” between explanatory factors and 
outcomes as a greater means to evaluate causal claims (Collier, 2011: 823). With 
process tracing, each element of a study carries a potential causal weight that is pushed 
forward with the progression of events. When uncovering a chain of causality, the 
researcher attaches meaning to the complementary phases that together explain how a 
phenomenon took place. 
Employing process tracing involves two stages. First, the researcher describes 
phenomena, paying attention to explanatory factors, causal mechanisms, and outcomes. 
Description is made without further consideration to the interrelations between 
explanatory factors and the possible causal claims associated with them. As contends 
Collier (2011: 823-834), “the descriptive component of process tracing begins not with 
observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good snapshots at a series of 
specific moments”. For him, the process of describing is a “crucial building block”.65 
Second, the researcher delves into a more dynamic stage, exploring trajectories of 
change and causation, which goes against deterministic arguments that X is to 
unavoidably cause Y.66  
Collier (2011: 824) distinguishes four main advantages of process tracing: (i) 
identifying new political and social phenomena; (ii) providing leverage to quantitative 
analyzes; 67  (iii) assessing causal mechanisms; and (iv) evaluating prior defined 
																																																								
64 “The in-depth analysis of a single unit is useful in elucidating causal mechanisms because its 
characteristic style of evidence-gathering – over-time and within-unit variation – is likely to provide clues 
into what connects a purported X to a particular Y” (Gerring 2004: 349). 
 
65 “To characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn 
permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Collier, 2011: 824). 
 
66 For a good example of how process tracing should be employed, see Tannenwald’s (1999) work on 
why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. She discusses a normative prohibition on the use of 
nuclear weapons, which she calls nuclear taboo.  
 
67 Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 48) affirm there are “sound reasons to believe that both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are valuable and complement one another”. 
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hypotheses, discovering new ones, and weighing novel causal claims. The last two are 
the ones most connected with this thesis’ methodological aspirations. To inquire how 
developing powers interact with the normative and operational foundations of 
multilateral regimes, I started the analysis by examining mainstream theories of 
international relations and their related hypotheses to then consider alternative readings 
on the behaviors of these powers. The means through which they act - the 
manifestations of their foreign policies - are directly related to the notion of causal 
mechanisms.  
Causal mechanisms can be defined as the intermediate steps connecting causal 
factors and outcomes (Van Evera, 1997). Each of these elements is revealed by 
observable pieces of evidence located in time that allow the investigator to compose a 
detailed analytical picture. Beach and Pedersen (2011: 4) argue that the study of causal 
mechanisms “enables the researcher to make strong within-case inferences about how 
outcomes come about”.  
Beach and Pedersen (2011) classify three versions of process tracing: theory-
testing, theory-building, and explaining outcome. Their classification is centered on the 
evaluation of causal mechanisms. The variants unveil how process tracing is linked to 
the comparative method because with both methods researchers can test the existing 
knowledge or, in case it proves insufficient or inaccurate, propose novel interpretations. 
Whereas theory-building process tracing pertains to the inductive side of knowledge 
production, theory testing process tracing follows a deductive path.  
Theory-testing process tracing uses existing theories to investigate whether a 
hypothesized causal mechanism appears in a single case. Theory-building process 
tracing produces a causal mechanism by means of which X is linked to Y. Data is 
collected with respect to the case in question and used to produce conclusions that can 
be further tested with other cases. Theory-building process tracing should be used, for 
instance, when a correlation between X and Y is known, but “we are in the dark 
regarding the potential mechanisms linking the two”, and when Y is identified but 
possible causative X(s) are not. The created causal mechanism is more general than the 
one present in the theory-testing variety of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 
16).  
In contrast to theory-building and theory-testing process tracing, explaining 
outcome process tracing does not attempt to generalize the findings of an individual 
case to other cases. The idea is to neither test an existing theory nor produce a new one. 
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The goal is to evaluate non-systematic and located explanations for an individual 
phenomenon. With explaining outcome process tracing, the objective is to “craft a 
minimally sufficient explanation” for studies on, for example, why the Vietnam War 
happened or the fall of the Berlin Wall (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 3). 
Explaining outcome process tracing aims to develop case-specific mechanisms. 
Its combination of explanatory factors, causal mechanisms, and outcomes is case-
tailored. In some situations, however, explaining outcome process tracing can be seen as 
a “theory-guided empirical research” with “ambitions that reach beyond the single 
cases” (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 22). Some accounts of explaining outcome process 
tracing can be consequently nested within small-N methodological designs such as the 
comparative method and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).  
Unlike Beach and Pedersen (2011), who see process tracing as a threefold 
method, Gerring (2007) considers it a single deductive method. I agree with him that 
process tracing should be seen as an individual method, but not as a deductive method. 
In my view, Beach and Pedersen center their analysis on three ways of looking into 
causal mechanisms rather than on three independent methods. When it comes to 
Gerring’s point on deductive reasoning, I find it difficult to clearly box process tracing 
in such logic of inference because one can combine, for example, theory-testing and 
theory-building approaches. In this respect, I agree with Falleti and Mahoney (2015: 
336), who affirm that when formulating new theories and building sequential 
hypotheses, “the process tracing researcher might be best served by not deploying too-
strict theoretical expectations that could act as blinders and straightjacket the 
interpretation of the process under study”. 
In the same vein, figure 03 illustrates that knowledge production should not be 
defined by sharp separations of inductive and deductive modes of thinking. The 
interconnections between these logics appear not only in works that rely on process 
tracing, but are also present in the rationale of the comparative method. It is precisely 




Figure 03. Logics of reasoning 
 
Some authors mention four process tracing tests to verify causal inference: 
straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive. These tests help to 
ascertain necessity and/or sufficiency, also being useful to strengthen, weaken, or 
eliminate rival hypotheses.68 A straw-in-the-wind test is the least accurate of the four, as 
it can raise doubts about the validity of a hypothesis, but not individually eliminate it. 
For example, it can show that a given explanation is more circumstantial than 
contributing to the outcome. Straw-in-the-wind tests indicate “neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient criterion for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis”, only slightly weakening 
rival hypotheses (Collier, 2011: 826). Hoop tests provide a stronger basis for accepting 
an explanation, since they can eliminate a hypothesis, but not confirm it. In sum, hoop 
tests establish a criterion of necessity, but not of sufficiency. Smoking-gun tests operate 
in the opposite way. They offer a sufficient but not necessary criterion for accepting 
causal inference. Doubly decisive tests are somewhat rare, since they provide robust 
inferential leverage, confirming a hypothesis that meets necessary and sufficient 
standards and eliminating rival hypotheses (Van Evera, 1997). 
Beach and Pedersen (2011) admit that there is considerable confusion about how 
process tracing should be conducted. Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 96) agree that it is 
																																																								
68 “There is an inherent connection between process tracing tests, generalizations about necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions, and the use of specific within-case observations” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 93). 
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easier to use these tests to eliminate hypotheses rather than to “convincingly support a 
hypothesis”. In fact, when applying process tracing, authors rarely rely on the four tests, 
mostly focusing on hoop and smoking-gun tests (i.e. Schenoni, 2018). In Collier’s 
(2011: 828) view, “these tests are not always easy to apply”, which makes them more 
points of reference in relation to necessity and sufficiency than empirical guides to 
process tracing operationalization. Furthermore, if process tracing is combined with the 
comparative method, the elimination of a hypothesis in one case will not necessarily 
mean the same to the other cases. A good solution would be to conduct process tracing 
in all individual cases and evaluate the results comparatively.  
Instead of giving too much attention to the mentioned tests, Collier (2011) 
defends that process tracing should be seen as results-oriented research strategy. He 
argues that researchers should explore causal ideas embedded in sequential narratives, 
pondering the weight of different hypotheses, and treating the different pieces of 
evidence that matter for the study. By doing so, one can check if causal factors are 
missing and whether they truly matter. Process tracing as a method matters for its 
concern with improving causal analysis, and for the fact that it is an iterative method, by 
way of which one can trace how an outcome came about. 
 
II.1.3. Causal mechanisms, equifinality and counterfactuals 
As previously discussed, one of the key goals of process tracing is to trace 
causal mechanisms (Checkel, 2008). Confusion exists, however, with the differences 
between causal mechanisms and intervening variables. On the one hand, intervening 
variables are self-serving entities that interact but are not dependent on X and Y. On the 
other hand, causal mechanisms do not exist independently of explanatory factors, being, 
instead, “integral parts of a 'machine’ that produces Y” and systems that transmit causal 
forces from X to produce Y (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 8). Hence, causal mechanisms 
and intervening variables are not synonyms. Rather than simply playing a relational role 
between X and Y, causal mechanisms push forward the path of causation, attesting how 
causal forces are transmitted through a series of interlocking parts (Beach and Pedersen, 
2012). Schimmelfennig (2001), for instance, relied on the mechanism of rhetorical 
action, that is, the strategic use of norm-based arguments to explain why the EU decided 
to expand to Central and Eastern Europe. Others (Checkel, 2005; Risse, Ropp, and 
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Sikkink, 1999) focused on how socialization and its diverse aspects operate in 
practice.69 
In the process of defining the causal mechanism of interest, one can consider 
alternative mechanisms that may lead to the same outcome. This exercise can prove if 
the mechanism being tested is sufficient or necessary. The reasoning is similar to Mill’s 
methods of comparison and to process tracing tests, as researchers attest the degree of 
sufficiency and necessity of a factor by means of evaluating their pertinence to specific 
cases. In some cases, alternative causal mechanisms may be more decisive for the 
outcome than the original mechanism. In other cases, a combination of causal 
mechanisms may be required. Moreover, a causal mechanism can develop throughout 
time, acquiring distinct traits that contribute to its final form.70 
Figure 04 shows that the same combination of explanatory factors operating 
with different causal mechanisms may result in equivalent outcomes, which undermines 
the strength of the initial causal mechanism and requires the author to proceed with 
further tests. In this situation, it is unclear which of the two causal mechanisms was 
more relevant. Alternatively, the same explanatory factors can produce a distinct 
outcome if mediated by a different causal mechanism.  
 
																																																								
69 Checkel (2005) identifies three causal mechanisms: strategic calculation, role-playing, and normative 
suasion. In another work (Checkel, 2014), he surveys how international institutions influence state-level 
action through several processes and mechanisms.  
 
70 Parker (2010: 1084) calls “fingerprints” the processes in which the later stages of the mechanism have 
dissimilar features in comparison to the earlier stages. Fingerprints would be “distinctive spatial and 




Figure 04. Causal mechanisms and causal paths 
 
 Figure 04 illustrates that multiple paths of causation can lead to the same 
outcome, which alludes to the notion of equifinality. According to Goertz and Mahoney 
(2012: 59), “in practice, qualitative causal models designed to accommodate more than 
a small number of cases often include both conjunctions of causal factors and 
equifinality”.71 Considering the same explanatory factors and causal mechanisms, one 
can first look for possible traces of equifinality within each case.72 Then, cross-case 
comparisons may show that some explanatory factors and causal paths are matching, 
which enhances comparability and helps to identify crucial causal factors or 
combination of factors.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that mainstream theories of international 
relations often do not explicitly expose the elements connecting explanatory factors and 
outcomes. Rather than carefully explaining how things happen, their focus is on 
																																																								
71 In set theory, necessity and sufficiency are expressed by the * sign and the logical AND. Goertz (2006) 
exemplifies that type of logic using a necessary and sufficient condition concept structure in which X1 * 
X2 causes outcome X. At the same time, X1 and X2 alone do not cause X, which means they are not 
sufficient conditions. Following Amorim Neto and Rodriguez (2016) and Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu 
(2009) X1 and X2 would be INUS conditions, or necessary parts of a combination that is sufficient for 
outcome X to occur. The family resemblance structure is represented by the + sign and the logical OR. 
Using the same example, Goertz (2006) explains that X1 OR X2 OR a combination of X1+X2 leads to 
outcome X, which means that both X1, X2 and X1+X2 are sufficient for the outcome. Also see: P. Mello 
(2019) and Ragin (2008). 
 
72 In reality, equifinality may always occur in Social Sciences. As far as we try to trace all relevant 
explanatory factors, causal mechanisms, and outcomes, it is virtually impossible to explore them with the 
same level of attention. Missing factors may be playing a relevant and unknown role.  
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establishing broad models of analysis that can be applied to a multitude of cases. I 
understand that possible causal mechanisms can be directly associated with existing 
theories. In the case of the realist school of thought, defensive and offensive foreign 
policy behaviors such as military buildup, placement of economic sanctions, and the 
construction of rival regional orders can mediate the interaction of explanatory factors 
and outcomes (i.e Mearsheimer, 2001; Walt, 1991; Waltz, 1979). As for liberal-
institutionalism and its variants, I mention economic interdependence, institutional 
influence, and spillover effects (i.e. Easton, 1965; Haas, 1958; Keohane and Nye, 1977; 
Nye, 2004; Risse, 2005). When it comes to constructivism, mechanisms normally 
revolve around norm socialization, learning processes, and social change (i.e. Checkel, 
2001; Cortell and Davis Jr., 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; March and Olsen, 
1998). 
In addition to causal mechanisms, counterfactuals may prove useful. 
Counterfactual reasoning means reconstructing a case with an imagined intervention 
(Gerring, 2004). A counterfactual assumption would be one in which “without X, Y 
would be different”. By looking for “what if” scenarios, one can certify whether Y 
would still occur in the absence of X. Counterfactual reasoning uses hypotheticals and 
inquires for necessity in order to confirm whether X is needed for Y to happen. 
Nevertheless, counterfactuals do not guarantee causality. Applying this research 
strategy to works with several cases may not be feasible, as values of X can vary across 
cases, which makes it harder for the researcher to control the impact of the absence of 
the factor of interest on the outcome.  
I further demonstrate that my analysis departs from a specific causal mechanism, 
which is Brazilian-led multilateral proposals. It involves, for example, novel ideas and 
concepts that may affect regimes’ existing normative and operational foundations.  
 
II.1.4. Bridging process tracing with the comparative method 
Methodologically speaking, this thesis is based on a combination of the 
comparative method with process tracing. This was my choice for a series of reasons. 
Firstly (i), because it ensures that cross-case and within-case pieces of evidence are 
brought together, facilitating the establishment of causal inferences. Merely affirming 
that a connection between X and Y exists is insufficient. More information is needed on 
why they are interrelated and how the causal forces are pushed forward (Falleti and 
Mahoney, 2015). Levy (2008: 11) sustains that within-case methods like process tracing 
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supplement Mill’s methods because they “rule out spurious inferences” and enable 
complex causation. More than that, joining the comparative method with process tracing 
makes it easier to determine how a shift in the value of a given X affects the content of 
Y (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). 73  Process tracing complements and deepens the 
comparative method, as it allows one to “peer into the box of causality to locate the 
intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect” 
(Gerring, 2007: 45). 
Secondly (ii), attesting that an explanatory factor is sufficient and/or necessary is 
not enough. A research that stops there adds to the general scholarship, but does not 
innovate in methodological aspects. That is why this thesis goes beyond the study of a 
single case. More recently, some works (i.e. Goertz, 2017) call for integrated 
approaches not only between quantitative and qualitative analyzes, but also among 
multimethod qualitative methodologies. Amorim Neto and Rodriguez (2016), for 
instance, demonstrate how the association of comparative historical analysis with 
process tracing operates in practice. 
Thirdly (iii), both the comparative method and process tracing devote attention 
to context. Whereas quantitative analysis is based on data-set observations, qualitative 
research relies on causal-process observations, which are “an insight or piece of data 
that provides information about context or mechanism”, contributing to causal inference 
(Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2010: 2). The study of two or more cases depends on the 
previous definition of which contexts they are embedded in (Collier, 1993).  
Fourthly (iv), the comparative method is useful to outline parallels and contrasts 
between causal mechanisms. By doing a comparative analysis, one can test if the same 
causal mechanism is suitable for more cases, which enhances the generalizability of the 
study. Process tracing alone cannot do so. For example, if causal mechanism M1 works 
for case A and mechanism M2 for B and C, the researcher can see if M2 also operates 
for case A. This process of carefully looking into causal mechanisms is analogous to 
checking which explanatory factors are sufficient or necessary.  
Fifthly (v), both methods have components that can be nested within Venn 
diagrams of necessity and sufficiency. While process tracing relies on the four tests to 
check for sufficiency and necessity, the comparative method comparatively weights 
																																																								
73 For Goertz and Mahoney (2012), within-case methodologies are the main sources of analytical 
leverage, with cross-case comparisons exerting a supporting role.  
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what explanatory factors relate to the outcomes and are present in the studied cases. The 
combination of both methods can show that an explanatory factor does not function 
individually, needing to engage with other factors to produce an effect.74  
Sixthly (vi), the two qualitative methods follow a similar logic of causal 
inference. Both attempt to ascertain “causes-of-effects”, a logic of reasoning that starts 
with an outcome and then goes back to check what factors account for it. The opposite 
approach, “effects-of-causes”, is closer to quantitative methods and investigates what 
known X(s) produce an effect on Y (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012).75  
Lastly (vii), the combination of the comparative method with process tracing 
allows one to carry out theory testing and theory building exercises (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2011). When existing theories cannot rightly explain the phenomena under 
study, these qualitative methods contribute to integrative theory building endeavors. 
Figure 05 shows that one can first comparatively test theories and, by knowing that they 
do not apply to the cases under study, engage with within-case theory-building. 
Subsequently, the theoretical contribution of an individual case can be tested with the 
broader group of cases.   
 
Figure 05. Bridging the comparative method with process tracing 
 
Briefly, the comparative method allows one to explore the interrelationships 
																																																								
74 Both comparative historical analysis and QCA stem from set theory and work with combinations of 
explanatory factors (or conditions). Briefly, comparative historical analysis seeks “large-scale and often 
complex outcomes of enduring importance (i.e. state building, democratic transitions, societal patterns of 
inequality, war and peace)”, having its emphasis placed “on empirically grounded, deep case-based 
research; and its attention to process and the temporal dimensions of politics” (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2015: 30-34). It has, therefore, a “macroconfigurational” focus that goes beyond the scope of this study. 
Also see: Falleti and Mahoney (2015). 
 
75 Apart from stressing this separation, Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 45-46) affirm “causes-of-effects” and 
“effects-of-causes” approaches can be combined. This happens because qualitative researchers also look 
for the effects of individual causes in specific outcomes.  
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between explanatory factors and to inform what X(s) are linked to Y. How this 
connection operates, what causal mechanisms take place, and how causal sequences 
evolve is something supplemented by process tracing. These advantages will be seen in 
the coming chapters. 
 
II.2. Analytical framework 
Gerring (2004: 342-344) defines explanatory factors as the “several relevant 
dimensions of a case” or “within unit cases” built upon one or more observations. These 
are co-variational in essence, as a treatment on a specific causal factor impacts the 
outcome. Explanatory factors precede outcomes because the very existence of outcomes 
depends on antecedent elements. Feedback effects are possible, as results can influence 
and modify initial elements, creating a dynamic process.   
As explains Lijphart (1971: 690), “scanning all variables is not the same as 
including all variables”. The temptation to consider several explanatory factors can 
make comparison unrealistic. I follow his advice, opting for a parsimonious research 
design that considers three explanatory factors, one causal mechanism and four possible 
outcomes. While I reckon the existence of other explanatory factors and mention them 
throughout the case studies, they were not included in the analytical framework. It 
provides a controlled comparison of Brazil’s foreign policy in three multilateral 
regimes. Were I to include more explanatory factors, I could lose sight of what I want to 
explain and endanger overdetermining outcomes. The more factors you take into 
consideration, the more correlations and paths – be they causal or not – exist, which 
increases the possibilities of equifinality and, at the same time, diminishes accurate 
readings of phenomena.  
Paying attention to explanatory factors and their meanings is pivotal, since 
trying to discern a causal relationship from a “snapshot – a single case without within-
unit co-variation – would be engaging in a truly random operation” (Gerring, 2004: 
344). For this reason, one should first define the explanatory factors of interest, locate 
them in time and space, and finally attest how they integrate the explanation. The more 
factors one searches for, the less bounded is the research and the more difficult it will be 
for the analyst to certify what elements are part of a causal pathway. Taking this into 
account, this thesis is centered on three explanatory factors: regime structure, domestic 
assets, and domestic decision-making procedures. The causal mechanism comprises 
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Brazil’s multilateral proposals. The outcomes involve how these proposals interact with 
existing multilateral normative and operational elements.  
 
II.2.1. Explanatory factors 
 Regime structure (X1) involves two dimensions: (i) types of membership and 
voting procedures, or what I call the degree of openness of multilateral decision-making 
instances, and (ii) the existing operational and normative elements composing the issue-
area in question. When it comes to the first dimension (i), states part of a regime can be 
formally distinguished in types of membership, which affects how decision-making 
processes take place. The UNSC is the best example, as it has 5 veto-wielding 
permanent members and 10 non-permanent members elected by the UNGA for a term 
of two years. Heupel (2008) argues that the legally binding nature of UN Chapter VII 
resolutions suggests the existence of a hierarchical distribution of power in the 
organization. In practice, the P5 are entitled to control, in a top-down manner, the 
application of these resolutions.   
 Unlike the UNGA, which reunites all 193 members once a year, the UNSC 
gathers frequently and conveys extraordinary meetings when threats to international 
peace and security arise. This institutional format provides a clear advantage for the P5. 
On the one hand, they can maintain permanent missions and diplomatic personnel 
constantly dealing with matters of peace and security. On the other hand, their 
negotiators have access to undisclosed information about unfolding events that non-
UNSC members cannot access. The dialogue on peace and security can also spillover to 
other issue-areas, producing unintended effects. Furthermore, permanent members 
receive relatively more attention. Media, public opinion, and other states follow what is 
being discussed at the UNSC.  
In some other regimes, voting power is also uneven. Quota shares determine 
how much power countries have in forums such as the IMF and the World Bank. They 
are good examples of bodies without formal separation of membership also having 
undemocratic decision-making instances, which impairs the ability of most states to 
promote interests and forward proposals. As for the WTO, it does not discriminate 
between parties and members can individually obstruct a negotiation, but decisions are 
in fact made by a handful of countries (Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006).  
Other multilateral forums are relatively more representative, as is the case with 
FAO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in which each member state 
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has one vote. Climate summits under the UNFCCC also work with a one state, one vote 
policy. One could argue that institutions dealing with issues of “low politics” such as 
food security or climate change are more open than bodies discussing “high politics” 
subjects like peace and security. Nevertheless, the idea does not hold true, as the many 
arenas of global governance are interrelated, which makes the setting of thematic 
hierarchies a faulty endeavor.  
Concerning the second dimension composing the explanatory factor (ii), states 
make decisions and forward proposals taking into consideration the existing operational 
and normative elements part of an issue-area. When presenting a new reading on a 
principle or norm or trying to control how it is operationalized, countries review 
jurisdictional documents and customary law around the topic being discussed. Novel 
ideas are not produced all of a sudden, so negotiators carefully study how to 
successfully influence multilateral talks and defeat contending propositions.  
As next chapters indicate, states dispute the meaning of paradigmatic normative 
and operational foundations. Depending on the context, some of these elements may be 
so ingrained in multilateral routines that countries have a hard time to promote shifts. In 
other contexts, these elements may be more malleable, enhancing the plausibility of 
change and allowing more diversity. That might happen when a group of states decides 
to renegotiate existing principles and norms or, more frequently, multilateral rules and 
decision-making procedures. In some cases, the opportunity to bring about 
transformation appears during specific moments, when a new accord like the Paris 
Agreement is being negotiated or when a norm such as the responsibility to protect 
(R2P) is reclaimed to justify the use of force.   
The preliminary hypothesis associated with this explanatory factor is that the 
opener and more democratic are the decision-making instances of a multilateral forum, 
the lesser limitations a country faces to engage with regimes’ ongoing normative and 
operational foundations. States sitting at the “high table” or wielding voting power face 
fewer constraints to propose new approaches, concepts, and ideas. A favorable context 
also contributes to make proposals more likely to achieve the expected results. The 
counterfactual reasoning related to that hypothesis is that countries operating in 
multilateral forums with exclusivist decision-making instances and deep-rooted 
normative and operational frameworks have a harder time to promote their interests.  
Domestic assets (X2) refer to whether a state has an advantage on which it can 
rely to underpin multilateral initiatives. Generally speaking, an asset can be a material 
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element like GDP growth, Gini Index, size of military, number of nuclear warheads, 
control of natural resources, etc. Examples abound. In the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, nuclear weapon states are expected to have more bargaining power for they 
possess these artifacts. At the same time, countries that control nuclear-related 
technology, materials and equipment, as it occurs with the members of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, should also be able to influence multilateral decision-making. The 
biggest trading nations – or at least the more representative economies – shape the rules 
governing multilateral trade within and outside the WTO. Most forested countries can 
more easily put their weight behind climate negotiations on greenhouse gas emissions 
from land use, land-use change, and forestry. Although these material assets can be 
measured in quantitative terms, that is not the intention of this research. 
Domestic assets can also include public policies and plans. When bringing 
successful national policies to the multilateral level, for instance, countries expect to be 
considered legitimate and respectful actors. For reuniting expertise, they put themselves 
in the position of being able to craft multilateral standards of conduct and frame broader 
talks. The roles of Brazil and India in the discussions of intellectual property rights and 
public health at the WTO are illustrative. China’s behavior in the food security regime 
also exemplifies the argument. As it lifted millions out of the poverty line, Chinese 
diplomats attempt to exhibit the Chinese model as the one to be followed in debates at 
FAO, the WFP, and related institutions.  
Domestic assets may also be non-quantifiable. Negotiators can resort to, for 
example, the peaceful history of their states when dealing with matters of peace and 
security at the UNSC. They can recall the tradition of support for international law 
when debating at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and mention how their nations 
help bring together developed and developing countries when engaging in debates at the 
UNGA. These symbolic resources complement the more tangible assets, as they can 
also be used to shape the preferences of others and create attraction (Nye, 2014).  
These assets, be they material or immaterial, are not automatically translated 
into more bargaining power. They need to be developed by negotiators to become 
strategic tools of foreign policy. When properly enabled, domestic assets can eventually 
create multilateral leverage. On the contrary, inadequate use of these assets can 
undermine and tarnish multilateral reputation. A state that does not preserve its natural 
resources, for example, can suffer intense criticism in climate negotiations. Diplomatic 
discourses that rely too much on self-made traditions and domestically generated 
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notions of positive behavior can also oppose multilateral conducts. A state that 
historically defends the principle of non-intervention may appear contradictory if it 
supports humanitarian interventions. Misuse of or over-reliance on these possible 
sources of multilateral power can backlash, harming the ability of a country to promote 
its interests.76 
The preliminary hypothesis associated with this explanatory factor is that the 
existence of domestic assets related to a specific issue-area can contribute to the 
multilateral position of a country. When holding material and/or immaterial assets, a 
state can better substantiate its foreign policy actions, being able to strengthen its 
position in relation to its peers. Alternatively, if not properly managed, these assets can 
also disrupt multilateral efforts.  
 Domestic decision-making procedures (X3) refer to what domestic actors matter 
in the definition of a foreign policy initiative and how they interact to define a strategy. 
I center my attention on the role of bureaucracies – mainly federal ministries - and the 
leader. The importance of bureaucratic actors depends on the area under study and the 
proposal being put forward. Their relationship can greatly vary. In some cases, they 
cooperate. In others, they compete for resources, access to the leader, and public 
attention. Not only their expertise matters, but also how they surpass domestic 
competition to define foreign policy.77  
Two domestic players receive special attention in this thesis: the president and 
the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE). These two actors, for legal and 
functional reasons, are historically the most relevant for the formulation and guidance of 
Brazil’s foreign policy.78 They are part of what Hermann (2001) names “decision 
units”. Malamud (2001) uses the term hyperpresidentialism to refer to Brazil’s – and 
Latin American - presidential concentration of power.79 As for the MRE, the creation of 
																																																								
76 Goertz (2017: 25) calls these constraint causal mechanisms. “They are not about how X produces Y, 
but rather how X prevents Y from occurring or constrains Y”.  
 
77 In his classic work on the Cuban missile crisis, Allison (1971) develops three models of foreign policy 
decision-making. For a discussion on his models, see Bendor and Hammond (1992). Putnam’s (1988) 
logic of two-level games is also illustrative.  
 
78 That prerogative is present in Brazil’s federal constitution, namely arts. 62 and 84 (VII and VIII). For a 
comparative work investigating whether domestic politics or the international system influences foreign 
policy, see: Amorim Neto and Malamud (2015). 
 
79 “The constitutional reform of 1988 granted Brazilian presidents the strongest institutional autonomy in 
Latin America” (Malamud, 2001: 22).  
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the country’s diplomatic academy in 1946, the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr), set the basis 
for Itamaraty to formally control foreign policy formulation (Amorim Neto and 
Malamud, 2019).80 Since then, a bureaucratic culture has been stimulated, which helps 
Itamaraty adapt to changing political environments and insulate itself from societal 
pressures (Albuquerque, 2013). More recently, other bureaucratic actors, civil society 
organizations, and subnational governments are being able to contest this isolation and 
influence foreign policy (Faria, 2008). 
With regard to other federal ministries, they do not formulate foreign policy, but 
can exert agency (Pinheiro, 2009). In the climate change regime, for instance, the 
ministries of the Environment (MMA) and of Science, Technology, Innovation and 
Communication (MCTIC) sit together with the MRE to define Brazilian positions. In 
the food security regime, the agendas of the ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, and 
Supply (MAPA) and of Agrarian Development (MDA) were often contradictory.81 In 
these situations, the MRE was crucial to prevent bureaucratic tensions from 
undermining Brazil’s multilateral credentials. The ability of bureaucratic actors other 
than Itamaraty to influence foreign policy depends on the themes being discussed, 
which makes decision-making procedures to vary in accordance with each regime. 
In other words, states are not black boxes, but entities in which domestic actors 
defend preferences and dispute the decision-making process (Risse-Kappen, 1995). 
Wight (2006: 2010) argues that the ability to exert agency is layered and inextricably 
linked to social contexts. In his view, social agents are “necessarily situated and 
constrained, although the determinants of activity are multiple and contradictory and 
cannot be subsumed under the logic of a single monolithic system”.82   
Domestic decision-making procedures can display distinct levels of cohesion: 
cohesive (a), partially cohesive (b), and non-cohesive (c). Cohesive decision-making (a) 
applies to situations in which bureaucracies and president have converging views. It 
happens when no significant clashes are identified and when these players cooperate 
domestically to underpin Brazil’s external positions. For example, when leader and 
ministries sum up forces to promote a novel idea in a multilateral forum. In some cases, 
cohesion occurs because the decision-making power is centered on a few actors. In 
																																																								
80 According to Amorim Neto and Malamud (2019), professionalization of diplomatic corps is a 
necessary condition for a foreign ministry to display high policymaking capacity. 
 
81 The MDA was dissolved in 2016. 
 
82 Milner (1997) and Moravcsik (1997) also have seminal works on decision-making.  
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other cases, it happens because bureaucratic players refrain from assuming positions. A 
single actor may hence compose Brazil’s views on a specific issue-area.  
In reality, however, perfect convergence is almost impossible, as bureaucratic 
actors do not fully agree on many issues and bargaining frequently occurs. It is part of 
politics in democracies and non-democracies. For this reason, I assume that decision-
making procedures are cohesive when negotiators bring a consistent position to the 
multilateral level. In this case, the country’s position will be easily identifiable by its 
peers, independent of possible domestic dissonance. When surveying the position of 
state A in negotiation N, one will be able to clearly recognize a particular proposal, 
idea, or initiative. Irrespective of possible domestic contrasting views, the “official” 
position is coherently presented as one. Conflict may exist in the domestic level, but it 
is not apparent in the multilateral arena.  
Partially cohesive decision-making (b) takes place when conflicting dynamics 
between domestic actors are visible not only in the domestic sphere, but also in the 
multilateral arena. Difference is brought to the systemic level of analysis. In partially 
cohesive decision-making circumstances, domestic bureaucracies forward divergent 
proposals, which can complicate the leverage of a country in a negotiation. 
Nevertheless, the view of a domestic actor or group of domestic actors prevails. 
External observers and multilateral peers will be able to identify the inexistence of 
perfect coherence, but clashing perspectives will be controlled by the leader and/or a 
ministry with relatively more power. As an example, country B brings members of the 
ministries of Defense and External Relations to nuclear non-proliferation talks at the 
IAEA to debate if the nuclear program of another state matches international 
safeguards. In this case, negotiators of B uphold diverging views on the issue and others 
can perceive so, but diplomats of B successfully forward a single although partially 
cohesive position.  
Lastly, non-cohesive decision-making (c) happens when divergence in both 
domestic and multilateral levels of analysis is the norm. In non-cohesive decision-
making, no group or actor is able to triumph over others and foreign policy behavior 
seems schizophrenic and highly erratic. In this instance, a country has one or more 
multilateral positions and it is difficult to identify which one is the “official”. The 
decision-making process is plagued by contradictions and domestic bureaucratic 
conflicts are repeated outside the country. In fact, bureaucratic actors know that using 
the multilateral sphere is strategic to voice dissent and surpass domestic competition. A 
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good example is the role of the United States in climate negotiations under the 
presidency of Donald Trump. While he announced that the country would withdraw 
from the 2015 Paris Agreement, its negotiators continued to participate in annual 
climate conferences and in technical mid-term review meetings.83 In this context, 
different groups are defending inconsistent views, sometimes directly confronting the 
presidency through the media and statements, and other times acquiescing.84  
The preliminary hypothesis regarding this explanatory factor is that the more 
cohesive is the domestic decision-making process, the more consistent a country will be 
in the multilateral arena, presenting itself as a reliable actor able to forward proposals 
and ideas. When appearing more coherent and speaking with one voice, a state has more 
chances to convince others and defeat rival propositions.  
Table 01 shows the three explanatory factors (X1, X2 and X3), the levels of 
analysis and how they are measured. Ideally, the three explanatory factors converge 
towards the formulation of foreign policy.  
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83 In 2017, the United States had “two rival delegations” at the Bonn Climate Summit. See: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2017/11/06/there-are-two-rival-u-s-delegations-at-the-bonn-
climate-summit-which-one-speaks-for-america/#3eaaf1791e96, accessed on 10 November 2019. 
 
84 Investigating the role of civil society actors is not the main goal of this thesis. Nevertheless, their 
positions will be considered, whenever pertinent, in respect to how they relate and possibly influence 
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Table 01. Explanatory factors 
 
In some circumstances, all explanatory factors matter for the outcome to occur. 
The analyst will then need to explore how and why they come together. Otherwise, a 
multilateral proposal may be the result of an individual explanatory factor, which, in 
this case, will be sufficient for the outcome to take place. The weight of each 
explanatory factor vary with the case study and that may happen for many reasons: the 
existence of recurrent bureaucratic clashes and inability of negotiators to translate and 
communicate ideas, which impairs the production of coherent proposals; opposition of 
states having veto power, creating a difficult structural environment for developing 
states to act; misuse of domestic assets; and/or contradictions among the explanatory 
factors that may arise when the interests of a state are manifested. Within-case analysis 
can demonstrate what explanatory factors play a role, which can further lead to new 
theoretical contributions.  
I will look into dynamics that occur in the systemic level and the domestic level, 
the latter involving the state as a whole and the bureaucratic dimension. In this respect, 
Carlsnaes (1992: 267) affirms “both domestic and international institutions are, if 
anything, structures constraining and enabling foreign policy actions”. In a classic 
study, Rosenau (1967) reinforces that domestic explanatory factors may be as relevant 
as the systemic ones. The role of bureaucracies is well explained by Allison (1971), 
mainly with the bureaucratic politics model and the organizational process model, and 
by Tan’s (1993) inter-branch politics model. Garrison et al. (2003) reflect on the 
diversity of perspectives in the field of foreign policy analysis that forged new paths of 
inquiry to understand actor’s choices in global politics.  
These elements provide the starting point upon which foreign policy is set and 
further operationalized. In between them and the outcomes, rest the causal mechanisms, 
which will be the subject of the next section.  
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II.2.2. Causal mechanisms 
In respect to causal mechanisms, I investigate Brazilian-led proposals in 
multilateral regimes. These proposals correspond to the causal mechanisms of interest 
in the three case studies: climate change, peace and security, and food security. For 
resting between the mentioned explanatory factors and outcomes, these elements 
connect both poles of the analytical framework. They carry causal meanings and are the 
byproducts of one or more explanatory factors, being ontologically connected to and 
part of the logic linking them and the outcomes.  
As for the term “proposals”, I refer to ideas and/or concepts. Proposals are 
observed, for instance, when a concept aiming to address a negotiation deadlock 
appears. A country can promote ideas to guarantee a better placement for its interests or 
to be considered a responsible mediator. This reasoning dialogues with the notion of 
“entrepreneurial behavior”, which, according to Ravenhill (2018: 517), alludes to 
purposive actions by states that may support key elements of the existing system, or 
display the intention of changing them. Guimarães and Almeida (2018: 532) use the 
same concept to contend that an entrepreneurial power “seizes opportunities created by 
disruptive crises to successfully accomplish its goals through the mobilization of 
performative tools”. Gardini (2016: 12) relies on the term “international manager”, 
stressing the importance of economic issues and emphasizing the preference for “order, 
coordination and predictability over change, inspiration or dominance”.  
Acknowledging the relevance of such contributions, this thesis has a more 
specific focus. It argues that developing powers might prefer to engage with regimes’ 
operational elements – rules and decision-making procedures – instead of their 
normative foundations, or the standing principles and norms. Proposing new norms is 
costly and demanding, as a state needs to substantiate its contribution and make it 
palatable to peers. Furthermore, countries may opt to advance new rules or innovative 
interpretations of specific parts of existing norms. Beyond arguing that state behavior 
depends on the issue-area being discussed, I further show that the regional dimension, 
key for Guimarães and Almeida (2018), is not as important for the study of Brazil’s 
multilateral endeavors.  
In particular, causal mechanisms convey concrete initiatives intentionally 
produced by government negotiators. They are the means through which a country 
manifests its interests and attempts to shape the evolution of multilateral institutions. 
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Causal mechanisms are methodological categories that, when translated into reality, 
correspond to tangible expressions of foreign policy. They are the results of foreign 
policy, or, saying differently, foreign policy outputs. These outputs are visible, 
identifiable approaches that interact with the main contents of multilateral regimes. In 
chronological terms, foreign policy outputs result from the convergence or divergence 
amongst explanatory factors. Causally speaking, they carry the meanings originated 
with foreign policy formulation.  
Furthermore, causal mechanisms are the living manifestations of foreign policy 
strategies. Once the decision-makers define through which means the country should 
pursue its interests, they strategically determine a type of behavior. This strategic 
thinking is only perceivable when translated into observable outputs such as when a 
country blocks a negotiation, attempts to mediate contrasting views, or presents a 
proposal.85 
Brazilian-led proposals can be promoted individually or with the collaboration 
of regional and/or extra-regional peers. Looking for intervening steps in the sequential 
chain between the formulation of foreign policy and its interaction with standing 
components of regimes is important because the exercise can reveal patterns of 
behavior, the role of other actors, and path dependence. Hypothetically, before engaging 
multilaterally Brazil may first opt to test the waters, discussing a proposal regionally 
with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC). Otherwise, it may seek the support of extra-regional partners like the BRICS 
and the G-20.  
When first presented regionally, the proposal in question may, in place of being 
a Brazilian proposal, turn into a “regional” proposal. Opting for a collective approach 
lowers the costs of transaction and diminishes the risks of negative responses. The 
possible advantages generated by the proposal would ideally be shared. In other 
respects, when the original proposal is first discussed with extra-regional states, it may 
become an “extra-regional” proposal. A Brazilian-led proposition may therefore be 
modified or adapted in situations in which the country chooses a shared stance instead 
of going alone. Brazil may also opt to directly partake in a multilateral negotiation, 
																																																								
85 As regards the term “strategy”, countries’ general behavior can best be seen in ad hoc engagements, as 
argues Etzioni (2012). In place of a grand strategy – which states also sustain in official rhetoric –, 
looking for their conduct in specific negotiations is much more useful, as it can disclose possible 
inconsistent behaviors.  
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skipping prior consideration with others and individually assuming possible burdens 
and benefits.  
Finally, in all the three case studies part of this thesis Brazil presents a specific 
proposal that interacts with existing multilateral components. In the climate change 
regime, the country advanced the notion of “concentric circles”, which dialogues with 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; 
in the peace and security regime, the proposal of “responsibility while protecting”, 
which deals with the norm of R2P and the principle of non-intervention; and in the food 
security regime, the idea of “right to food”, which engages with the principle of food 
security. Their differences are visible in how they were conceived, what explanatory 
factors mattered for their inception, their causal pathways from the domestic to the 
multilateral level, and how they interact with regimes’ foundations.  
 
II.2.3. Outcomes  
With regard to outcomes, they are intrinsically connected with this thesis’ 
research question. As I study how Brazilian-led proposals interact with the main 
normative and operational components of multilateral regimes, the outcomes naturally 
refer to these elements. On the one hand, I look for the interaction of Brazil’s initiatives 
with existing norms and principles. On the other hand, I explore regimes’ rules and 
decision-making procedures. I study to what extent Brazil’s propositions are convergent 
with the existing parameters of the ongoing order.  
Convergence refers back to the notion of degree of change. In this respect, if a 
country is fully satisfied with both the normative and operational elements of the 
existing order and its interests match the current state of things, one should not expect it 
to defend transformative change. Reasonably, that state would endorse existing 
parameters, as it profits from them. Contrarily, if a country is not benefiting from 
current frameworks, there exists a greater possibility that it will expect to change 
normative and/or operational components.86  
Figure 06 illustrates the argument delineated in the previous chapter that 
changes of norms and principles are more drastic than changes in rules and decision-
making procedures. This occurs because transforming principles and norms means 
																																																								




shifting the basis upon which the existing order is kept. Substituting normative elements 
of a specific issue-area of global governance means altering its prominent features, 
which leads to a change of regimes. If this happens with several regimes, we would be 
witnessing a comprehensive reconfiguration of the international order. Alternatively, 
shifts in just the rules and decision-making procedures do not fundamentally threaten 
the continuation of the global order.  
 
 
Figure 06. Outcomes 
 
In general, it is by examining how states deal with regimes’ components that one 
can ascertain their multilateral behavior. In each of the case studies, I analyze the 
meaning of Brazil’s proposals with respect to standing treaties, conventions, and other 
jurisdictional documents. I compare how the country’s initiatives interrelate with 
established frameworks in order to attest if Brazil can be considered a promoter of 
change. 
It is important to mention that I will not analyze the “successes” or “failures” of 
Brazilian-led proposals, as that would require an “effects-of-causes” logic, which is 
commonly associated with quantitative methodology. My research design focuses on 
“causes-of-effects”, following a distinct way of thinking. Additionally, studying 
successes or failures needs a different research design, literature review, and data 
collection, since one could not properly demonstrate if a proposal is “successful” 
without exploring the perceptions of other state and non-state actors.  
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II.2.4. Analytical framework  
The combination of explanatory factors, causal mechanism, and outcomes lead 




Figure 07. Analytical framework 
 
Figure 07 shows that one or more explanatory factors can engender a proposal, 
which is the causal mechanism of interest. Whereas the explanatory factors substantiate 
foreign policy formulation, the causal mechanism represents one step further, as it is the 
expression of a strategic course of action. As mentioned, the proposal can be directly 
presented during a multilateral negotiation or discussed with regional and/or extra-
regional peers. In these cases, its original content can be altered and it can turn into a 
regional proposal or an extra-regional proposal. The last step of the analytical 
framework represents the moment when the proposition is forwarded in the multilateral 
domain. It is only at this time that it interacts with regimes’ normative and operational 
components.  
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The analytical framework displays a time progression that is connected to a 
causal sequence. Proposals evolve throughout time and with each step from their 
formulation to their final presentation at the multilateral realm. This analytical 
framework will be applied to the three case studies part of this research, which will be 
subsequently compared. By doing so, I will be able to test mainstream theories of 
international relations and their views on the rise of developing powers. More than that, 
I will be capable of confronting their contributions with my argument that these 
countries aspire to produce adaptive changes in multilateral regimes. 
 
II.3. Selection of cases  
Generally speaking, a case study is defined as an in-depth analysis of a single 
unit, a “relatively bounded phenomenon” that relates to a larger class of similar 
phenomena (Gerring, 2004: 341).87 In this thesis, Brazil is the unit to be studied and the 
case studies are instances of its behavior in specific multilateral forums. Brazil is part of 
the broader population of “developing powers” or, even wider, “nation-states” or 
“countries”. When discussing the case studies, other states like China and India will be 
brought into the equation only if they prove suitable for my investigation on Brazil. In 
that case, I will be able to demonstrate if developing powers act accordingly. The 
pertinence of these other countries, however, is marginal for the analysis. 
As Flyvbjerg (2006) sustains, case studies are crucial for unveiling and 
clarifying the causes behind a problem and their consequences for the problem itself and 
for some subsets of the broader population of cases. Gerring (2004: 348) argues it 
allows “one to test the causal implications of a theory, thus providing corroborating 
evidence for a causal argument”. When working with case studies, the analyst can 
describe the inner fundamentals of an issue and assert how and why it operates in a 
certain way. Relying on case studies is a strategic means to connect more abstract 
meanings with empirical knowledge, which ensures that the object under study is 
comparable. Furthermore, cases are bounded by time and space constraints, which 
makes the case and its analysis context-dependent. Explanatory factors operate in a 
certain way and generate specific causal sequences because they are immersed in a pool 
																																																								
87 Likewise, Levy (2008: 2) defines a case study as “an attempt to understand and interpret a spatially and 
temporally bounded set of events”. 
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of relations that is hardly replicable. Changes in an explanatory factor, the time frame of 
analysis or the causal mechanism alter the configuration of the case under scrutiny.  
This reliance on context does not mean that one cannot generalize from case 
studies. The degree of generalization depends on how the case in question is chosen; 
how it relates to the overall population; if it is a deviant case, and how much deviant it 
is; what causal claims can be made; and whether its components can be applied to 
distinct cases (Goertz, 2017). A case can be suitable not only for theory testing, but also 
for theory building, illuminating points that mainstream approaches cannot elucidate. 
Having said that, instead of looking for case representativeness, the main focus of this 
thesis is to find case comparability or internal comparability.88 
Ragin (1997) assumes “casing” to be meaningful and complex configurations of 
events and structures, a systematic dialogue of ideas and evidence that is not totally 
predetermined at the onset of the analysis, being subject to constant revisiting. This 
“circular way” of doing research, as defined by Gerring (2004: 350), may be the 
“primary and most important finding of the investigation”.  
Brazil was not chosen by accident. First of all, the country has, throughout its 
history, exerted important roles at the multilateral domain (i.e. Daudelin and Burges, 
2011; Fonseca Jr., 2008; 2014). From the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
to the League of Nations and its successor, the UN, Brazil has participated in several 
multilateral experiences. In most of them, it has recurrently attempted to influence the 
shaping of multilateralism and to intertwine the content of multilateral regimes with its 
foreign policy goals. Besides, Brazilian policymakers have nurtured the hope to partake 
in decision-making instances like the Council of the League of Nations and the UNSC. 
During the military dictatorship (1964-1985), Brazilian views on multilateralism 
combined active criticism of what it saw as an unjust order in the making, in which 
power was restricted to a condominium of states, with the defense of national 
sovereignty. Brazil’s attitudes towards the NPT, considered a means of freezing world 
power amongst the nuclear weapon states, illustrate the idea of an unequal order. When 
it comes to sovereignty, the military withdrew Brazil’s candidacies for non-permanent 
membership of the UNSC in the period 1968-1988 for fears of having its repressive 
practices and human rights violations publicly exposed.  
The return to democracy came together with a renewed interest in 
																																																								
88 On representativeness, also see: Seawright and Gerring (2008). 
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multilateralism. Brazil needed to overcome its international isolation and be seen as a 
modern democratic country willing to contribute to the post-Cold War context. Keeping 
the continuing quest for autonomy, Brazilian decision-makers understood the need to 
participate in multilateral arenas being renegotiated under an American-led unipolar 
moment, which left little room to maneuver.89 Being left aside of evolving regulatory 
frameworks such as the WTO, the UNFCCC, and the NPT would be harmful to Brazil’s 
endeavors to renew its diplomatic credentials (Lampreia, 1998). During the presidency 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Brazil could not, for systemic and 
domestic reasons, nourish illusions of grandeur, therefore acting in accordance with 
ongoing normative and operational frameworks (Saraiva, 2011). The idea was to 
transform Brazil into a responsible stakeholder, available to contribute to humanitarian 
intervention efforts and to the promotion of regional stability.  
During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s years (2003-2010), multilateralism continued 
to occupy a special locus in Brazil’s foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). 
Domestic economy was stabilized and the international system more permissive, which 
opened spaces for Brazil and other developing countries to behave more assertively. 
Also, the relative ascension of China provided new possibilities of cooperation. In this 
context, Brazil saw multilateralism as a means to express its ideas. Presenting itself as 
one of the leaders of the so-called Global South, Brazil promoted individual initiatives 
and organized coalitions. From crafting the G-20 in the WTO and the BASIC at the 
climate realm to lining up with the G-4, Brazil demanded more inclusive multilateral 
decision-making instances. Its policymakers understood that engaging multilaterally 
was strategic in an increasingly multipolar world (Amorim, 2010).   
More recently, domestic turmoil, spiraling corruption scandals, and striking 
political and economic instability affected Brazil’s activism. Nevertheless, some 
previous initiatives continued being pushed forward in multilateral forums under the 
presidency of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Either for reasons of foreign policy inertia 
or Itamaraty’s relative autonomy, Brazil presented ideas and concepts in several 
regimes. It was able to come with new proposals – some of them hoping to surpass 
negotiation deadlocks - even in a moment when domestic factors were unfavorable. I 
will further explore this puzzle in the next chapters.  
All in all, Brazil has strategically dealt with multilateralism, making use of 
																																																								
89 On Brazil’s quest for autonomy, see: Saraiva (2010). 
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multilateral institutions to forward its foreign policy interests.90 It has a recognizable 
role in several issue-areas, sometimes linking its actions in one regime with its behavior 
in others. Furthermore, for being a developing country, Brazil can play with this in-
between condition, a feature that is illuminated in the case studies.91 The selection of the 
regimes of climate change, peace and security, and food security respected specific 
criteria: the same types of explanatory factors, time frame, causal mechanism, and 
possible outcomes.   
While the three case studies have the same types of explanatory factors, next 
chapters demonstrate that their configuration and temporal sequences are not equal. As 
a consequence, the cases have distinct causal narratives producing outcomes that are 
comparable but not identical (Bennett and Elman, 2007).  
As for the time frame, it refers to the period between 2011 and 2014, when the 
three Brazilian proposals that are central for this thesis were pushed forward. Whereas 
the concept of responsibility while protecting emerged in 2011 in the regime of peace 
and security and the idea of concentric circles appeared in 2014 in climate change talks, 
the proposal of right to food gained more importance after the election of José Graziano 
da Silva for FAO’s director-general in 2011. Although this time span is congruent with 
the first mandate of Rousseff (2011-2014), I opted to not define the research in terms of 
specific presidential terms or in relation to the political party in power at the moment. 
Choosing such a strategy would be misleading, as I do not want to specifically study a 
style of leadership or how a political party influences foreign policy. The cases clearly 
demonstrate that the mentioned proposals are not necessarily a direct consequence of 
Rousseff’s presidency. Besides, foreign policy was not a beloved issue of her 
government, therefore operating more in an inertial mode than guided by an explicit 
goal.  
In order to avoid selection bias, the cases were not randomly selected. I first 
scanned various occasions in which Brazil’s foreign policy interacted with established 
multilateral normative and operational elements. Afterwards, I looked for situations in 
which Brazilian-led proposals were identifiable. By doing so, I could narrow down the 
																																																								
90 A senior diplomat (MRE#14) described Brazil’s approach to multilateralism until recently: “we 
emphasized the multilateral system. It was something we considered strategic because it was through 
multilateralism that we could obtain what we judged necessary and important”. 
 
91 The same interviewee (MRE#14) reflected on Brazil’s in-between condition: “Brazil upheld the 
demands of the South. For its geography and history, it stays in a very unique position. It is a country that 
understands the path to development but still shares problems that are common to the developing world”. 
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number of possible cases, choosing fewer issue-areas. This left me with seven possible 
cases, the three chosen ones – the regimes of climate change, peace and security, and 
food security – and four others that were excluded: human rights, internet governance, 
trade, and nuclear non-proliferation.  
Some considerations should be made on why these cases were not included. 
Internet governance is a regime still in the making and no multilateral convention 
specifically deals with the issue, so I could not investigate how Brazil interacts with 
operational and normative frameworks directly associated with the matter. As a legal 
basis is missing, when discussing topics related to Internet governance, privacy, and 
online rights, countries rely on human rights treaties. Furthermore, for being such an 
early regime, a historical background would be lacking, which is essential for studies 
using process tracing. With that said, it is important to mention that Brazil together with 
Germany contributed to prepare the ground for this originating regime.92 
As for the human rights regime, it is based on regional treaties and conventions 
with near universal membership. Brazil is a key player both at the world stage and in the 
Americas. The regime was excluded, however, because no Brazilian proposal could be 
singled out from the country’s recent multilateral activism. Throughout the years, Brazil 
has influenced several human rights-related issues ranging from gender to economic and 
political rights. That broad spectrum of initiatives impairs the achievement of 
comparative accuracy. 
 Similar problem happens with the trade regime. When negotiating trade, 
Brazil’s engagement is focused on topics such as the elimination of European and 
American agricultural subsidies, agricultural market access, trade facilitation, non-
agricultural market access, and preferential treatment for least developed countries and 
developing countries. Furthermore, the paralysis of the Doha Round made states favor 
inter-regional and bilateral trade agreements, weakening the centrality of the WTO.  
Lastly, in the nuclear non-proliferation regime Brazil has defended the equal 
weight of the principles – also known as pillars - of non-proliferation, nuclear 
disarmament, and access to peaceful nuclear technology. This perspective has been 
quite stable throughout the evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy, leaving aside more 
recent ideas operating with the same set of explanatory factors and under a matching 
time frame.  
																																																								
92 On that matter, see Mares and Trinkunas (2016) and Santoro and Borges (2017). 
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Table 02 shows that the established regimes of human rights, nuclear non-
proliferation, and trade fall short in meeting the overall criteria. In these regimes, the 
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Table 02. Selection of cases 
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The three chosen case studies appropriately satisfy the analytical framework and 
the research question of this research. The explanatory factors generate causal 
mechanisms (i.e. proposals) that interact with regimes’ existing normative and 
operational foundations. I follow Goertz and Mahoney’s (2012: 183) advice, who say 
that cases should be selected in accordance with the manifestation of the outcome 
(Y=1). That is a valuable strategy for investigating necessary conditions, as they 
“provide leeway for seeing how causal mechanisms operate in practice". In a more 
recent work, Goertz (2017) defends that cases having explanatory factors leading to 
outcomes (1, 1) can be good examples of how causal mechanisms connect the two poles 
of the analytical framework.  
Moreover, climate change, peace and security, and food security are instances of 
developing powers’ interest to shape established multilateral foundations. They are 
closer to what Eckstein (1975: 115) calls critical cases: “one about which the analyst 
has particularly strong expectations that it will fit the hypothesized causal pattern”. 
Finally, I chose these cases because they remain understudied. With the 
exception of the peace and security regime, in which authors have been writing on the 
proposal of RwP, the regimes of climate change and food security received less 
attention. This is striking given their overall importance to international relations and to 
Brazil’s external insertion.  
 
II.4. Final remarks 
 This chapter assessed the methodological underpinnings of the thesis. It started 
with an overarching discussion about the two qualitative methods upon which the 
research is based: the comparative method and process tracing. More than showing their 
pertinence, I argued that their combination composes a more detailed way to study 
foreign policy. Together, the comparative method and process tracing combine within-
case and cross case research strategies, making way for works that privilege the role of 
causal mechanisms linking explanatory factors and outcomes. 
Further, I composed an analytical framework with one systemic and two 
domestic explanatory factors, a causal mechanism, and outcomes. As for the 
explanatory factors, they involve regime structure, domestic assets, and domestic 
decision-making procedures. The causal mechanism refers to Brazilian-led proposals, 
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whereas the outcomes concern how these initiatives interact with regimes’ operational 
and normative components.  
I concluded the chapter explaining why I opted for the three cases and why they 
matter. In the next chapters, the regimes of climate change, peace and security, and food 
security are evaluated and compared. Applying the discussed methodology to empirics 
can reveal patterns of foreign policy formulation and implementation. The analysis may 
also demonstrate how Brazil regards the role of regional and extra-regional actors when 






BRAZIL AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME93 
 
This chapter focuses on the first case study of the thesis, the climate change 
regime. More specifically, I analyze Brazil’s proposition of concentric circles, which 
can also be found in official documents as concentric differentiation, and investigate 
how it interrelates with the regime’s normative and operational foundations. The 
proposal of concentric circles was enacted by Brazilian negotiators in talks leading to 
the 2014 climate conference in Lima and in the context of the 2015 Paris Agreement. 94 
On the one hand, it is a clear example of how a developing state endeavors to shape 
existing multilateral frameworks. On the other hand, it illustrates how novel ideas can 
originate outside the global centers of knowledge production. 
I argue that the proposal is a legalistic interpretation of how the regime should 
evolve, which goes along with the hypothesis that Brazil does not expect to drastically 
alter the ongoing order. Recovering the initial provisions of the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), the idea 
preserves the distinction between developed and developing countries, but highlights 
that all parties should contribute in the global effort to curb climate change. Moreover, I 
contend that the proposal has a direct relationship with the three explanatory factors part 
of the analytical framework. It appears during a transitional moment of a non-
hierarchical regime; it is promoted when Brazil could still rely on its domestic assets; 
and it is consistent with the country’s diplomatic activism in climate talks. 
The chapter is divided in seven sections. The first (i) depicts the structure of the 
regime, underscoring the evolution of its normative and operational components. I 
portray Brazil’s behavior amidst these changes. The second (ii) presents Brazil’s 
domestic assets and group of climate-related public policies, which are associated with 
its energy matrix and efforts to control deforestation. The third (iii) looks for the 
country’s decision-making process related to climate matters. Sections four to six are 
the core of the chapter. They discuss what conveys the concentric circles and how it 
																																																								
93 This chapter partially draws from Albuquerque (2018a). 
 
94 For Brazil’s history in the regime, see: Vieira (2012b) and Viola and Franchini (2018).  
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came about (iv); its relationship with the explanatory factors (v); and with the regimes’ 
normative and operational foundations (vi). The last section (vii) concludes. 
 
III.1. The structure of the climate change regime  
The institutionalization of the climate change regime began in 1992, with the 
signing of the UNFCCC at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development. The convention entered into force in 1994, currently enjoying nearly 
universal membership with 197 parties. From 1995 on, states gather at annual 
conferences of the parties (COP) to revise legal gaps and advance the mandate of the 
convention.95 In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol complemented the early document and 
determined legally binding targets for emission reductions for developed country parties 
(formally known as the Annex I parties) in the period 2008-2012 (Rajamani, 2006). As 
a means to prevent a legal void, Kyoto’s implementation period was further extended in 
2012 by the Doha Amendment, which defined 2013-2020 as a second commitment 
period for Annex I parties.96 The Paris Agreement came into the equation at the 2015 
COP-21, establishing a post-Kyoto architecture. It has legal force and operates under 
the convention, which continues to be the bedrock of the regime.  
Briefly speaking, the convention divided countries in annexes defining their 
respective obligations. Annex I parties include industrialized states members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and “economies in 
transition” part of the Soviet bloc (EIT). Annex II solely involves the OECD countries, 
which are expected to financially assist developing states in mitigating carbon emissions 
and adapting to climate change. They should also take “all practicable steps” to ensure 
technical support for developing countries and to EIT (United Nations, 1992: 8). From 
its origin, the regime divided countries in accordance with their respective obligations 
and capabilities towards climate change, leaving developing powers aside from any 
binding commitments and grouping them as the non-Annex I parties.  
																																																								
95 The main goal of the UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (United 
Nations, 1992). For a list of all COPs and their final documents, see: 
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop, accessed on 12 
November 2019. 
 
96 Parties adopted a roadmap to a post-Kyoto agreement at the 2011 COP-17 in Durban and decided that 
the protocol should be amended at the 2012 COP-18 in Doha. As of 10 December 2019, 135 parties have 
accepted the Doha Amendment, while 144 instruments of acceptance are required for its entry into force. 
See: https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/the-doha-amendment, accessed on 10 December 2019. 
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The normative centerpiece of the regime is the principle of CBDR-RC. It places 
the heavier burden on the developed countries, as they are historically responsible for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and hold financial and technical capabilities (Roberts 
and Parks, 2007).97 At the same time, the word “common” remarks the need for joint 
efforts from both developed and developing countries. As far as some states are 
expected to be doing more, all parties should contribute. The regime was created with a 
“North-South” separation, with the “North” being associated with the Annex I parties 
and the “South” with all other countries that did not have binding obligations. To some 
extent, that division echoes previous disputes related to environmental issues dating 
back to the 1970s and 1980s.98 
The idea of differentiation refers back to notions of equity and climate justice. It 
reckons countries’ different levels of economic development, historical responsibilities 
for carbon emissions, and unequal technological and financial capacities. That was the 
state of things in 1992, when the convention was established, and in 1997, when the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed. Structuring a climate regime was part of a greater effort to 
promote shared governance in topics that could not receive enough attention during the 
Cold War.  
When the regime was established, countries like China, India, and Brazil could 
maintain traditional positions and avoid assuming binding responsibilities. They could 
blame the Annex I states for climate change, request funds and technologies, and 
eschew deeper engagements with multilateral norms and rules. In their view, that 
outcome was fair, given the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries for 
GHG emissions.  
Apart from the overall cooperative rhetoric, the absence of the United States 
from Kyoto impaired the establishment of broader cooperative sense. Russia ratified the 
protocol in 2005, delaying its entering into force for almost a decade. Australia only 
proceeded with its ratification in 2007. Furthermore, Kyoto itself lacked ambition, as its 
baseline for emissions levels was too conservative. Amid this lack of mutual confidence 
and leadership, developing powers blamed their developed peers for inaction. The 
regime evolved in a fragile manner, with parties constantly avoiding the implementation 
of provisions present in the convention, such as the need to develop, update, publish, 
																																																								
97 Regarding the principle of CBDR-RC, the whole philosophy behind the negotiation process is that 
developing countries should have the right to develop. 
 
98 For instance, debates at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.  
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and make available national inventories of anthropogenic emissions; the communication 
to the COPs of information related to implementation; and the adoption of national and 
regional programs to mitigate climate change.99 
Throughout time, the regime has experienced redistributions of power and 
responsibilities. In the mid-2000s, the principle of CBDR-RC started being severely 
questioned given the rise in emissions by developing nations, namely China, India, 
Brazil, Indonesia, and others. These countries suffered increasing pressures to assume 
greater responsibilities from both the Annex I parties and the least developed states.100 
For not being constrained by binding commitments, the developing powers faced 
accusations of keeping defensive positions and free riding. The main source of criticism 
was that the legal status of these players was detached from their emissions levels and 
the responsibilities they were expected to handle.101 Referring to the non-binding nature 
of the Kyoto Protocol, an interviewed Brazilian negotiator mentioned that already in 
1997 officials involved in climate talks used to say: “this is going to be a future 
problem”.102 
Under pressure, Brazil, South Africa, India, and China reunited at the 2009 
COP-15 in Copenhagen and formed the BASIC.103 The group entered a multilateral 
landscape traditionally controlled by the EU, being composed by actors with differing 
interests, energy matrices, and emission patterns (Hallding et al., 2011). As a 
heterogeneous group, the BASIC appeared with a minimal agenda encompassing the 
exercise of leadership of the G-77+China and the maintenance of CBDR-RC as the 
guiding principle (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2015). For the BASIC countries, the 
assumption of responsibilities should be voluntary, and financial and technological 
																																																								
99 These and other rules are visible throughout the text of the convention, for instance, articles 4, 7, and 
12 (United Nations, 1992). 
 
100 For a historical series of GHG emissions, see: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT/countries, accessed on 14 November 2019. Also 
see: http://cait.wri.org, accessed on 14 November 2019. 
 
101 As Voigt and Ferreira (2016: 287) argue, “’positive discrimination’ in favor of developing countries 
has led to asymmetric environmental obligations”. 
 
102 Interview with MRE#3. 
 
103 This process initiates more clearly at the 2007 COP-13 in Bali, when developing countries started to 
undertake nationally appropriate mitigation actions and decided, together with their developed peers, to 
set a long-term cooperative action, aiming at a post-2012 period of compromises. Moreover, parties 
agreed to apply measurement, reporting, and verification provisions for developing countries. See: 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/non-annex_i_mrv_handbook.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2019. 
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support should continue to come from the developed powers. The BASIC altered the 
way negotiations are conducted, since the four states could combine positions, publish 
joint communiqués, and threaten to leave negotiations (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). 
With the BASIC, the regime started to resemble other multilateral arenas such as the 
WTO, in which decision-making involves the participation of developing powers.  
Differences between the BASIC states are recognizable, for example, their 
strategies of measuring carbon emissions, the emphasis they place on determined topics, 
and their contributions to the regime. At first, forming the coalition responded to a 
reactive and protective move. In the view of the BASIC, the developed powers were the 
ones trying to revise and disrespect the regime’s jurisdictional foundations. As both the 
convention and the Kyoto Protocol created specific categories of countries and degrees 
of responsibility, any attempts to shift the status quo should be met with suspicion. As 
some decisions of subsequent COPs were not being entirely respected, the BASIC 
considered its claims to be legitimate. Developed countries’ pledge to provide annual 
US$ 30 billion for the period 2010-2012 and yearly US$ 100 billion until 2020, for 
instance, lacked implementation (Albuquerque, 2016a; Hochstetler, 2012a; Hochstetler 
and Milkoreit, 2015). 
Amid these changing dynamics, COPs continued taking place and Kyoto’s 
amendment maintained the original distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Doha Amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol renewed multilateral efforts, setting the path towards Paris, when a new 
agreement, convention, or legal treaty was expected. This process was nevertheless 
plagued by uncertainty. During Kyoto’s second implementation period (2013-2020), 
Canada, Japan, Turkey, and Russia opted out of the treaty, weakening negotiations and 
showing that dissonance and lack of commitment might also involve the Annex I 
parties.104 At this phase, the blame-and-shame game focused not only on the BASIC 
states, but also on the developed powers.  
Parties debated the division of responsibilities embodied in CBDR-RC. Kyoto 
reinforced the principle, but increasing emissions from the BASIC countries 
exacerbated a binary view of the regime, thwarting negotiations (Voigt and Ferreira, 
2016). In the opinion of the Annex I parties, they were alone in tackling climate change 
																																																								
104 See: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
c&chapter=27&clang=_en, accessed on 16 November 2019. 
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in a world that did not resemble 1992. Their obligations were too strict while others 
could free ride. For the BASIC members, they were doing what they could and in 
accordance with their levels of development. For them, the Annex I parties were trying 
to revoke CBDR-RC, circumventing obligations and harming the regime.  
Together with the criticism, the BASIC states suggested that they could be doing 
more, which demonstrates the intention to shift their initial defensive positions. On the 
one hand, climate change was increasingly perceived as a strategic issue that involves 
structural socioeconomic transformations. Taking part in this process and being able to 
influence its progression captured the attention of policymakers in the developing 
world.105 On the other hand, the mounting relevance of the regime leading to the 2015 
COP-21 in Paris provided developing powers new opportunities to act, make proposals, 
and be considered responsible actors.  
In like manner, changes in the content of talks were visible. The original themes 
of the convention had their provisions and technicality enlarged and new topics, for 
instance loss and damage, were introduced, making negotiations slower and greatly 
complicating consensus making. 106 To some extent, that increase can harm the proper 
functioning of the regime because individual states and coalitions can bargain with 
several topics and explore spaces of maneuver. As more issues are incorporated, parties 
have more conditions to rely on their domestic climate-related assets to influence talks. 
Still centered on mitigation of carbon emissions, discussions today revolve around 
topics like adaptation,107 loss and damage, reduction of emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD+), finance, and means of implementation, not to mention 
others. 
Succinctly, from the 2013 COP-19 in Warsaw onwards the regime started 
moving into the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), through which 
all parties should voluntarily assume carbon emission targets (United Nations, 2014). In 
a sense, the regime evolved from Kyoto’s top-down approach to a bottom-up 
																																																								
105 In the Chinese case, efforts to develop greener technologies are directly related to high levels of urban 
pollution. For the Chinese Communist Party, curbing the adverse effects of climate change is strategic to 
avoid domestic turmoil. See: Falkner (2016).  
 
106 Loss and damage refers to effects of climate change that people have not been able to cope with or 
adapt to. It involves extreme climate-related events like hurricanes.  
 
107 Adaptation is adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to climatic impacts. 
See: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/, accessed on 16 November 2019.  
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framework, as each party should say how much it could deliver. With the Paris 
Agreement, INDCs became Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), or what each 
party should prepare, communicate, and enhance with the progression of time. These 
pledges would be embedded in domestic law, assuring predictability (Bodansky, 2016).  
The road to Paris was taken when renewed interest to promote bilateral 
cooperation on climate change became clear. Talks involving the United States, the EU, 
China, India, and Brazil prior to COP-21 brought together the principal emitters and 
their points of view towards a common denominator. That diplomatic activism was 
crucial for the new agreement to come about. 
Two points should be made about the regime’s decision-making procedures. The 
first concerns what is written in law and the second how things operate in practice. First, 
the regime continues to be marked by a one-country one-vote policy, as defined by the 
convention (United Nations, 1992). Since decisions should be consensual, all parties 
equally vote in the annual COPs, formally having the same capacity to allow or block 
agreements.108 All parties, from Tuvalu to the EU, could then act as veto players. That 
factor singles out the climate arena in comparison to, for example, the IMF, the World 
Bank, or the UNSC. Although the division of responsibilities persists with the Paris 
Agreement, it does not give special prerogatives - such as veto power - to any member. 
Furthermore, the foundational documents that established the regime specified open and 
non-hierarchical formal decision-making instances.  
Second, and apart from that, most decisions are made in meetings involving few 
states during or prior to COPs. They are then presented to the “others” as a means to 
garner legitimacy and “multilateralize” the process. These arrangements may also take 
place in groupings like the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), the 
G-7, and the financial G-20. Patrick (2015: 115) uses the term “minilateralism” to refer 
to “informal, non-binding, purpose-built partnerships and coalitions of the interested”, 
which can be understood as instrumental arenas subject to states’ forum shopping and, 
ultimately, alternatives to formal institutions of global governance. 
During the 2010 COP-16 in Cancun, for example, Bolivia stood alone in 
opposing the final agreement on the grounds that it saw the document, among other 
things, “to be insufficient and full of loopholes for polluters”. If the formal criteria of 
																																																								
108 Any party may propose amendments to the UNFCCC as long as they are consensual. Nevertheless, an 
amendment being adopted by a three-fourths majority vote can only occur “as a last resort” (United 
Nations, 1992: 18). 
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one-country, one-vote prevailed, that would be sufficient for the Cancun accord to sink. 
Isolated, negotiators were accused of being obstructionist and unrealistic. In the end, La 
Paz acquiesced after “intense pressure from the chair of talks and other countries”, 
demonstrating that power indeed plays a role in the climate realm.109  
As discussed, while the regime was initially controlled by the EU and the United 
States, other stakeholders now have more conditions to shape the agenda. These days, 
Brussels and Washington need to find common ground not solely with Russia and 
Japan, but also with the BASIC states. The transition towards a bottom-up legal 
architecture and the enlargement of the pool of topics discussed represent new avenues 
for action. Currently, China, India, and Brazil are key to dialogues involving issues like 
means of implementation, division of responsibilities, and measurement of emissions. 
Brazil’s concentric circles proposal appears in this context. 
 
III.2. Brazil’s domestic climate-related assets  
This section discusses the second explanatory factor, which refers to Brazil’s 
domestic climate-related assets. Similarly to what happens with the structural 
dimension, domestic features can add up to explain multilateral behavior. When 
promoting initiatives, negotiators tend to consider domestic public policies, not to 
mention material and immaterial assets.  
While there is no such thing as “climate material capabilities”, it is fair to say 
that some states might hold distinctive features. Large GHG emitters, for example, have 
a natural standing in climate talks, as they are the ones mostly contributing for the 
problem and needing to engage for it to be controlled. Leaving the United States, China, 
or India aside would harm the chances of real advancements. Other actors such as the 
EU are major financial providers, being able to influence negotiations.  
In contrast, smaller developing states can also translate domestic disadvantages 
and power asymmetries into multilateral influence. Countries facing existential threats 
due to the consequences of climate change like the small island states in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific, can express their views prominently in the climate domain. The same 
happens with some African states when discussing issues such as adaptation. In these 
cases, negotiators make reference to national vulnerabilities in their communications 
																																																								
109 See: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-green/2010/dec/21/bolivia-oppose-cancun-
climate-agreement, accessed on 16 November 2019. Also see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/11/cancun-climate-change-summit-deal, accessed 
on 16 November 2019. 
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with the media, networks of NGO, UN officials, and other countries. By doing so, they 
can access the decision-making process and insert specific interests into the broader 
multilateral agenda. Reinforcing a sense of urgency and bargaining for financial and 
technological support are strategies these parties commonly pursue. The importance of 
the topic of loss and damage, for instance, is a direct consequence of the activism of 
these smaller countries. 
Other domestic features can enhance the bargaining power of a state: its energy 
matrix; whether it has tangible assets on the ground, as is the case with forest coverage; 
and the existence of public policies to address climate change, which can underpin 
international pledges and provide legitimation. Moreover, these factors can, individually 
or jointly, be part of a country’s foreign policy. In principle, a state holding domestic 
advantages will be capable of influencing a wider range of topics.  
Of course, these domestic assets should be considered in relative terms. It is 
only by means of comparison that one can grasp the relevance of a country’s emissions 
levels, energy matrix, or forest coverage. Take the examples of Pakistan and Colombia. 
Pakistan ranks 20th in world’s GHG emissions and Colombia occupies the 34th position. 
In global terms, however, their share of the problem is not that significant: Pakistani 
emissions represent 0,75% of the total, whilst Colombian stand for 0,36%.110 In regional 
terms, Pakistan lags behind China, India, Japan, and Indonesia, while Colombia is only 
the 5th largest emitter in Latin America. As I further show, the Brazilian case is less 
incongruent, as it ranks high in almost all the domestic features here described.  
I understand that these assets can be self-identified, externally identified, or 
both. Commonly, decision-makers overestimate national features, overvaluing assets as 
unique in attempts to portray benign images. Alternatively, international organizations 
such as the UNFCCC and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) can 
commend a state’s public policies or its contributions to climate finance. In the best 
scenario, domestic assets would receive international and national backing, reinforcing 
the chances of a state to influence negotiations.  
When it comes to Brazil, it ranked 7th in world’s GHG emissions in 2014.111 In 
comparison to the other BRICS countries, Brazil ranked 4th. Considering the G-
																																																								
110 See: http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-top-10-emitters-and-how-
theyve-changed, accessed on 18 November 2019.  
 
111 See: http://cait.wri.org, accessed on 19 November 2019.  
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77+China, Brazil also ranked 4th and, in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean, its 
emissions (1.4 Gt) equated a combination of Mexico’s (730Mt), Argentina’s (440Mt), 
and Venezuela’s (340Mt). Brazil was the 5th largest carbon emitter in the periods 1990-
1996, 1998-1999, 2001, and 2003-2005.112 In terms of per capita emissions, Brazil had 
2.6 metric tons per capita in 2014. World levels stay in 5 metric tons per capita, whereas 
per capita emissions from Latin America and the Caribbean are 3.1, with the OECD 
members having 9.5.113 Brazil’s per capita profile also reflects the country’s widespread 
inequality.  
As it holds the major part of the Amazon rainforest,114 Brazil is the 2nd state in 
forest area (4.935.380 km2 in 2015), standing only behind Russia and followed by 
Canada, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Congo, China, Australia, and 
Indonesia.115 While in 1990 the country had 65,4% of its land area composed of forests, 
the number shrunk to 58,9% in 2016. Notwithstanding, it is still considerably larger 
than global (30,7%); European (38,1%); and Latin American (46,2%) levels.116 
Deforestation in Brazil has never ceased, although its pace was moderated by 
national domestic plans such as the Plan to Prevent and Control Deforestation in the 
Amazon (PPCDAm), specifically its command and control axis. From 2004 to 2012, 
forest clearing dramatically decreased from 27.000 km2 to 4.571 km2.117 Even though 




CBRA%2CIDN%2CCAN%2CMEX%2CTOP, accessed on 19 November 2019. Depending on the 
source, data can vary. The World Resources Institute’s (WRI) CAIT Climate Data Explorer also places 
Brazil in the 7th position, but considers a different metric that excludes emissions from land-use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF). See: http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-
top-10-emitters-and-how-theyve-changed, accessed on 19 November 2019. 
 
113 See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?view=chart, accessed on 19 November 
2019. 
 
114 Not to mention other biomes such as the Cerrado savanna, the Atlantic rainforest, Pantanal, Caatinga, 
and Pampas.  
 
115 See: https://data.worldbank.org/, accessed on 20 November 2019. 
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as shows figure 08.118  In 2016, however, Brazil’s Amazonian deforestation rates 
reached 7.893 km2, exceeding 2009 levels. 
 
 
   
Figure 08. Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (sq. km)119 
 
Deforestation in the Cerrado savanna, which comprises most of Brazil’s Center-
Western region, attained worse rates, with 11.881 km2 cleared in 2015. Although forest 
clearing fell from 2004 to 2009 due to satellite monitoring activities and the 
advancement of tailored public policies, it stagnated until 2012 to rise again in the next 
year, displaying a deforestation rate more than twice the one of the Amazon.120 Growing 
influence of the agribusiness sector, which is responsible for a substantial share of 
Brazilian exports, bureaucratic constraints, and lack of funds explain the situation. 
Deforestation in the Amazon and the Cerrado made Brazil’s GHG emissions to surge 
																																																								
118 For Brazil’s annual deforestation rates, see: 
http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes, accessed on 20 November 2019. For 
an alternative view, the Greenhouse Gas Emission and Removal Estimating System (SEEG) is compiled 
by a group of NGO. See: http://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#, accessed on 21 November 2019. 
 
119 Figure 08 refers to the “Legal Amazon”, a region defined for regional planning purposes, involving the 
Northern region and parts of the Center-Western and Northeastern regions of Brazil. See: 
http://combateaodesmatamento.mma.gov.br/, accessed on 20 November 2019. Also see: 
http://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates, accessed on 21 
November 2019. 
 
120 See: http://combateaodesmatamento.mma.gov.br/, accessed on 21 November 2019.  
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even amidst its worst economic recession, creating fears that recent progresses could be 
reversed (Viola and Franchini, 2018).121 
As for its emission profile, Brazil stands in a reasonably comfortable position in 
comparison to the BASIC states and the Annex I parties  (Hallding et al., 2011). Until 
recently, the country’s emissions were primarily driven by land use, land use change, 
and forestry (LULUCF). In 2010, emissions from LULUCF did not rank first for the 
first time in the country’s historical series, in reason of the successes in curbing 
deforestation. In that year, emissions originated from agriculture and livestock (32%); 
energy (29,4%); LULUCF (27,4%); industrial processes (7,1%); and waste management 
(4,2%). As show figures 09 and 10, an ongoing shift towards the sectors of agriculture 
and livestock and energy is visible, demanding more accurate actions in these areas.122  
 
 
Figure 09. Brazilian GHG emissions per sector123 
 
																																																								
121 Brazilian GDP submerged 3,8% in 2015 and 3,6% in 2016. The bitter economic crisis came together 
with political turmoil, a burgeoning corruption scandal, massive street protests, decrease in social 
expenditure, and eventually impeachment. Recent analyzes point out that Brazil’s GHG emissions 
stagnated, but not reduced, from 2009 to 2012, to rise again in 2015 and 2016. See, for instance: 
http://seeg.eco.br/, accessed on 21 November 2019. 
 
122 See: http://sirene.mcti.gov.br/web/guest/emissoes-em-co2-e-por-setor, accessed on 22 May 2018. Data 
for the period 2010-2015 recently disappeared from this government website, but can be found here: 
http://educaclima.mma.gov.br/panorama-das-emissoes-de-gases-de-efeito-estufa-e-acoes-de-mitigacao-
no-brasil/, accessed on 21 November 2019.  
 
123 The green bar depicts emissions from LULUCF; orange, waste management; red, industrial processes; 




 Figure 10. Emissions per sector: temporal evolution (Brasil, 2016) 
 
To Brazil’s advantage, the major part of its emissions (around 90%) is divided in 
three sectors (energy, agriculture and livestock, and LULUCF), composing an emission 
profile not dependent on a specific sector. For that reason, policymakers can devise 
custom-built programs, not having to face the political costs of tackling a single sector 
responsible for the major part of emissions. Less than a third of its emissions come from 
LULUCF, which can be controlled by effective public policies, as the ones 
inconsistently implemented in the Amazon and the Cerrado. Moreover, emissions from 
the energy sector illustrate a greener energy matrix in relation to other major emitters.  
For matters of comparison, more than 75% of South Africa’s emissions come 
from the energy sector.124 India has a parallel profile, with around 70% of its emissions 
originated in the energy sector, while the United States have almost 88%, a similar 
amount as the EU (90%) and China (80%). Brazil’s profile is closer to countries such as 
Argentina (47% energy; 25% agriculture and livestock) and Colombia (49% and 30%), 
but even in relation to these cases Brazil’s emissions are more balanced. 125   
The composition of Brazil’s energy matrix is key to understanding its 
advantages vis-à-vis other countries, as depicted in figure 11. World’s energy matrix is 
mainly composed of non-renewables such as oil, coal, nuclear, and natural gas, which 
account for 86,3% of global and 89% of OECD’s total energy production (International 
Energy Agency, 2019a). Brazil’s energy matrix, for its turn, is composed by 43,2% of 
																																																								
124 Approximate numbers. See: https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/non-
annex_i_parties/biennial_update_reports/application/pdf/rsaghg_bur1.pdf, accessed on 23 November 
2019. 
 
125 Data from the Climate Watch Data Project. See: https://www.climatewatchdata.org/countries, accessed 
on 23 November 2019. 
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renewables, which creates a distinguished position for the country when compared to 
global standards (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 11. Brazilian and global energy matrix 
 
Brazil’s energy matrix is divided in oil (36,2%); biofuels (17,4%); natural gas 
(12,9%); hydropower (11,9%); wood fuel and charcoal (8%); coal (5,6%); other 
renewables (5,8%)126; nuclear (1,4%); and other non-renewables (0,6%) (Empresa de 
Pesquisa Energética, 2018). Furthermore, Brazil’s electricity grid is even “cleaner” than 
global standards, comprising 80,3% of renewables compared with world’s 25,3% 
(Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2018; International Energy Agency, 
2019b).127Adding to that, Brazil is the second largest global producer of biofuels after 
the United States. It is worth mentioning, however, that 65,2% of the country’s electric 
matrix is reliant on hydropower, which is vulnerable to droughts and subject to 
socioeconomic and environmental impacts due to, among other things, the construction 
of reservoirs. The building of the Belo Monte Dam, for instance, displaced more than 
30,000 people, affected water supplies and fishing stocks of coastal communities, and 
motivated the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to request the suspension 
																																																								
126 Such as wind and solar power.  
 
127 As regards annual investment, net capacity additions, and production in 2016, Brazil ranks 2nd in 
hydropower capacity; 5th in wind power capacity; 3rd in solar water heating capacity; and 2nd in biodiesel 
and ethanol production (REN21, 2017).  
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of the project.128 Brazil not only rejected the request, but also recalled its ambassador to 
the OAS and refused to disburse its annual contribution.129  
The stated climate-related assets were matched by public policies and plans, for 
example the 2008 National Climate Change Plan, which brought an array of measures 
and associated targets to curb GHG emissions. In the following year, Brazil became the 
first non-OECD state to draft a National Climate Change Law (Law n. 12.187), which 
incorporated the National Plan and established a National Policy on Climate Change 
(PNMC). The PNMC made official Brazil’s pledge to an expected reduction of 36,1% 
to 38,9% regarding the projected emissions by 2020, which was part of the country’s 
commitment at COP-15. In 2010, the country developed a low-carbon agriculture plan, 
which granted low-interest loans to farmers who adopted sustainable agricultural 
practices.130 Apart from that, a National Commission and a National Strategy on 
REDD+ were created in 2015, and the National Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change 
was launched in 2016. In 2017, Brazil established a National Biofuels Policy 
(RenovaBio), with a focus on lowering emissions through the promotion of sustainable 
production of ethanol, biodiesel, and biogas. 
For COP-21, Brazil was the only large developing state to present in its Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) economy-wide absolute targets for 
emissions reduction ranging from 37% in 2025 to 43% in 2030 below 2005 levels 
(Hochstetler, 2012b). Rousseff’s administration advanced that the country’s INDC was 
not contingent upon international support and would eliminate illegal suppression of 
vegetation by 2030; restore and reforest 12 million hectares by 2030; increase the share 
of sustainable biofuels to 18% in the energy matrix by 2030; boost the share of 
renewables to 45% by 2030; and expand the use of renewables other than hydropower 
in the power supply to at least 23% by 2030. Furthermore, the INDC opened space for 
																																																								




imp-,787892, accessed on 23 November 2019. 
 
130 Additionally, it is worth noting Brazil’s Bolsa Verde program, which was created in 2011 expecting to 
promote environmental conservation through productive inclusion of impoverished families. In 2018, 
Temer’s administration discontinued the program. Amongst other national programs and laws, I highlight 
the 2000 National System of Conservation Units, the 2008 Sustainable Amazon Plan, and the 2012 Forest 
Code. For a compilation of domestic policies, see: Gamba (2015). 
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South-South cooperation projects, especially with Portuguese speaking countries 
(Brazil, 2015).  
At the same time, domestic assets can restrain multilateral behavior. If not 
properly managed, they can delegitimize and go against the interests of a state. The 
Brazilian case appears generally positive, but some factors raised doubts on whether the 
country can fulfill its pledges: the 2014-2016 economic crisis, which made 
environmental policies lose pace; bureaucratic mismanagement; budget cuts affecting 
the Ministry of the Environment and deforestation monitoring authorities; and the lack 
of proper implementation of the 2012 Forest Code, which averted recent efforts to curb 
deforestation (Viola and Franchini, 2018).131 These factors affected Brazil’s image as a 
reliable player in the climate arena. Such setbacks could also be perceived during 
Temer’s presidency, when Norway announced it would cut forest protection payments 
to Brazil through the Amazon Fund.132 Other hurdles are more perennial, posing not 
negligible challenges to Brazil’s credentials, as is the case with the expansion of oil 
production, the risks of relying too heavily on hydroelectric power, the dependence on 
natural gas as an alternative, and a bioenergy sector experiencing discontinuities and 
growing pains (Luomi, 2014).133  
Apart from existing difficulties, Brazil’s domestic assets were taken into account 
in the setting of its multilateral proposals. Throughout time, from being considered a 
country that acts in a defensive manner, mostly because of its protective stance over the 
Amazon, Brazil has become a participative actor who manifests interest in influencing 
the advancement of the regime. The importance of the group of domestic policies and 




131 On the relationship between the Forest Code and deforestation, see, for instance: 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2016/12/1840178-novo-codigo-florestal-contribuiu-para-
aumento-no-desmatamento.shtml, accessed on 24 November 2019.  
 
132 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-brazil-amazon/norway-cuts-forest-protection-payments-to-
brazil-to-35-million-idUSKBN19E1R2, accessed on 24 November 2019. 
 
133 Climate Action Tracker, a consortium of research organizations, rates Brazil’s INDC as “insufficient”, 
the same classification it confers to the EU, Australia, and Mexico. Regarding Brazil, it says: “Brazil will 
need to reverse the current trend of weakening climate policy, by sustaining and strengthening policy 
implementation in the forestry sector and accelerating mitigation action in other sectors - including a 
reversal of present plans to expand fossil fuel energy sources.” See: 
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/, accessed on 24 November 2019.  
 
	 90	
III.3. Domestic decision-making processes related to climate change  
Brazil’s multilateral endeavors are the result of discussions involving a series of 
domestic actors. Far from consensual, these debates reverberate distinct and sometimes 
clashing standpoints, which reflects the existence of varied interest groups, lobbies, and 
civil society organizations disputing Brazil’s climate agenda. For matters of consistency 
with the analytical framework, I here show which bureaucratic actors influence the 
definition of Brazil’s positions and investigate whether domestic disputes are reflected 
in the country’s multilateral behavior.  
In general, Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations (MRE or Itamaraty) is the 
bureaucratic institution that, alongside the presidency, carries the country’s positions. In 
the specific case of climate change, other ministries are also involved in the domestic 
decision-making process. The list is extensive. The ministries of the Environment 
(MMA); Science, Technology, Innovation, and Communication (MCTIC); Mines and 
Energy (MME); Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply (MAPA); Finance (MF); Transport, 
Ports, and Civil Aviation (MTPAC); Planning, Development, and Management (MP); 
Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services (MDIC); Cities (MC); not to mention the Civil 
House of the Presidency are associated with national climate policies. Their 
participation, technical expertise, and influence are quite distinct.134  
The MME, which guides the implementation of policies on renewable and non-
renewable energy, is more active in the domestic realm. Its weight is better perceived 
externally when parties are debating topics related to bioenergy. MAPA’s role is also 
mostly sensed domestically, especially in respect to policies like the mentioned low-
carbon agriculture plan and the tensions between agribusiness and deforestation. 
MAPA’s participation is more easily seen through its Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (EMBRAPA), which partakes in discussions on REDD+ and sustainable 
rural practices.  
As for the MF, its Secretariat of International Affairs is the national designated 
authority to the Green Climate Fund and represents Brazil in other financial boards like 
the Climate Investment Funds.135 The MTPAC deals with transportation and urban 
																																																								
134 Brazilian ministries have a routine of shifting names, being also agglutinated or extinct, as 
governments promote ministerial reforms. I here use their official names as of 01 June 2018. This list is 
not exhaustive. The ministries of Defense, Health, and Education, for instance, participated in the 
discussions that led to the 2008 National Climate Change Plan. 
 
135 The MF also discusses topics such as carbon pricing.  
	 91	
mobility,136 but its multilateral involvement is minor. In the main, MP oversees and 
evaluates public policies that might be tangential to climate change. The MDIC operates 
through its General Coordination of Energy and Sustainability, which aims to 
disseminate climate-related topics in Brazil’s industrial and agribusiness sectors. Lastly, 
the MC develops initiatives with multilateral development banks such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and other external partners on urban mobility, 
sustainable practices in urban contexts, and disaster management and reduction.  
As far as all these bureaucratic actors develop activities that touch upon climate 
change, three ministries chiefly define Brazil’s positions: the MCTIC, the MMA, and 
Itamaraty. The MCTIC is responsible to coordinate Brazil’s national communications to 
the climate convention and its biennial update reports (BUR).137 The MCTIC is also the 
responsible authority for technology transfer and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), an instrument of the Kyoto Protocol devised to aid developing countries in 
achieving sustainable development. Brazil is one of the champions of the CDM and, 
after China and India, one of the biggest beneficiaries of it. Moreover, the MCTIC 
organizes, in partnership with other entities, Brazil’s emissions estimates and the 
inventory of anthropogenic emissions and removals.138 
The MMA is the governmental body that deals with climate change, namely 
through its Climate Change and Forests Secretariat. The MMA defines strategies and 
public policies related to Brazil’s plans on mitigation and adaptation; articulates a 
national strategy to implement and finance Brazil’s INDC; develops technical and 
scientific cooperation projects; promotes initiatives on REDD+, sustainable forest 
management, and preservation of Brazilian biomes; develops studies using geospatial 
data; and is part of the country’s delegations, actively participating at the subsequent 
COPs. Its activities are also intermeshed with topics like biodiversity, disaster risk 
reduction, rural development, territorial management, and genetic heritage.  
																																																								
 
136 I mention its 2013 Sectoral Transport and Urban Mobility Plan for the Mitigation and Adaptation to 
Climate Change.  
 
137 Every party to the UNFCCC is required to make periodic national communications concerning its 
domestic policies on climate change. BUR contain updates of national GHG inventories. See: 
https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-
convention/biennial-update-reports-and-international-consultation-and-analysis-non-annex-i-
parties/biennial-update-reports, accessed on 26 November 2019. 
 
138 The MCTIC dialogues with scientific institutes in Brazil and outside the country as well as 
systematize, together with the MMA, studies on impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation. 
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Itamaraty’s role has been predominantly performed by its Division of Climate, 
Ozone, and Chemical Safety. Generally, the same diplomats deal with these topics and 
gather at successive COPs, which enhances their knowledge and ability to influence 
outcomes.139 By participating in meetings, these negotiators are socialized into the 
established language and the jurisdictional and technical wording that overwhelm 
negotiations. In doing so, they can become familiar with key themes, players, and 
interest groups. Getting to know the multilateral domain through learning processes is 
not a Brazilian prerogative, since other countries act similarly. Underdal (1998: 21) 
argues that policies – or multilateral decisions – can develop through processes of 
learning and diffusion of beliefs and ideas. Becoming incorporated into the “standard 
operating procedures” is a way to make this happen. 
 Throughout time, subnational governments, trade unions, civil society actors 
such as NGO, media outlets, and academia have gained more importance.140 They 
sometimes overtly criticize governmental positions, which can be seen in debates 
related to deforestation, but their ability to shape Brazil’s international agenda is 
reduced. Although new initiatives to promote conversation have recently been 
developed, the willingness to take their positions into account is limited.141 Up to this 
moment, the country’s multilateral positions are still defined in a top-down manner and 
spaces of exchange lack permanence.  
 So many domestic actors being able to vocalize preferences risk overpopulating 
the decision-making process. 142  They not only dispute scarce resources, but also 
																																																								
139 Some of these diplomats also worked at the MMA. 
 
140 In the specific case of subnational governments, Amazonian states have diverging stances regarding 
REDD+ and climate finance in relation to the MMA. An interviewee (MRE#2) mentioned that discussing 
such topics with them is like hosting a “mini-COP” in Brazil, for the difficulties of reaching consensuses 
and the existence of differing levels of development in the country.  
 
141 The definition of Brazil’s INDC, for example, involved several civil society organizations, which 
filled up an online questionnaire and then gathered in meetings mostly with Itamaraty and the MMA. 
Itamaraty made public a preparatory meeting organized on November 11th 2015 that substantiated the 
country’s positions for the COP-21. It was broadcasted live on its YouTube and Facebook channels. The 
Brazilian Forum on Climate Change (FBMC) also organized several meetings with civil society actors. 
For an analysis of the lack of proper dialogue with civil society organizations, see: 
https://apublica.org/2015/12/o-brasil-nao-esta-inteiro-na-cop21/, accessed on 26 November 2019. Also 
see: Rittl (2015). 
 
142 A good example of dissonance happened during the 2014 UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit, 
which established the New York Declaration on Forests. Contrary to the position of the federal 




contend over the selection of priorities. The situation originates distinct layers of 
domestic governance, which might harm the interaction between national bureaucracies 
and affect Brazil’s positions. Several government initiatives attempted to surpass such 
dissents, for instance, the 1999 Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change 
(CIMGC), led by the MCTIC;143 the 2003 Interministerial Executive Commission on 
Biodiesel; the 2007 Interministerial Committee on Climate Change (CIM) and its 
Executive Group (GEx), this last one coordinated by the MMA;144 the Brazilian Forum 
on Climate Change (FBMC); the 2013 Federal Climate Articulation Nucleus 
(NAFC);145 and the 2015 National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+) and National REDD+ 
Commission (CONAREDD+).146  
These attempts did not solve the problem, since the interministerial groups also 
competed for space and prestige, with most topics being divided between the MCTIC 
and the MMA. As the regime evolved, new layers were added to Brazil’s domestic 
climate governance, which ended up making disputes more apparent. “It is somehow 
ridiculous, because we have many groups and the same people participating in them”.147 
Regarding the role of the leader, climate change did not rank high in the 
priorities of Brazilian presidents. After the demise of the military dictatorship, 
promoting environment-related issues was seen as a means to renew the country’s 
tarnished image, which came along with the institutionalization of the regime. Brazil 
was more receptive to multilateral norms and rules during the mandates of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, but that disposition was not translated into successful policies. In 
fact, as argues Vieira (2012b: 10), during that time the government “consistently 
opposed the view that developing countries should be included in emissions reduction” 
efforts. Clashes between ministries also hampered the functioning of the CIMGC, 
which was created during Cardoso’s government. 
																																																								
143 Which deals with issues related to, among other things, the clean development mechanism. 
 
144 The CIM involves 16 ministries and the Civil House of the presidency, dealing with the National 
Climate Change Plan. The GEx reunites eight ministries and the FBMC. 
 
145 It is composed by federal and state governments and is coordinated by the MMA and the Civil House 
of the presidency. 
 
146 For a broader view on the domestic decision-making processes related to climate change, see 
Hochstetler and Viola (2012) and Viola and Franchini (2014). 
 
147 Interview with MRE#2.  
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According to Vieira (2012b), quarrels between groups holding distinctive 
positions were clearer during Lula da Silva’s administration, as these became more 
vocal and the inconsistencies of the country’s development model more evident. On the 
one hand, deep-rooted “developmentalist” ideas gained traction in several ministries, 
were reinforced by Lula da Silva’s then chief of staff and minister of Mines and Energy, 
Dilma Rousseff, and found echo in Itamaraty’s attempt to conduct an “autonomous” 
foreign policy. On the other hand, environmental issues gained importance thanks to 
MMA’s greater bureaucratic leverage and mounting pressures from civil society 
organizations. These contradictions and lack of domestic cohesion complicated 
domestic climate governance throughout Lula da Silva’s presidency. 
Apart from that, several policies to curb deforestation started during his 
government and the MMA gained ground under the supervision of senator Marina Silva 
(2003-2008), who ran for president in 2010, 2014, and 2018, and included climate 
change in the ministry’s portfolio.148 During COP-15, Lula da Silva announced Brazil’s 
emission reduction targets, saying that they “will force a developing country with many 
economic difficulties to spend US$ 166 billion until 2020 (…) to show the world that 
with just words and bargains we would not reach a solution”.149 His attempt to exert 
leadership and promise that Brazil would financially help other countries can be directly 
related to Marina’s presidential candidacy and growing political weight.  
In comparative terms, climate change received less attention during Rousseff’s 
administration. Deforestation returned to increase due to lack of leadership and a 
spiraling economic crisis. Interviewees working in Brazilian and international NGO 
were the most vocal against her.150 At the same time, new initiatives and Brazil’s INDC 
were defined under the guidance of her environment minister, Izabella Teixeira (2010-
2016), the longest-serving minister during Rousseff’s presidency. 151  A negotiator 
argued that the president was “very involved” in the definition of Brazil’s INDC and 
minimized possible negative influence of her alleged “developmentalist” views. “They 
																																																								
148 Hochstetler and Keck (2007) affirm that during Lula da Silva’s administration environmental activists 
entered the bureaucracy of the MMA, being able to shape public policies. Carlos Minc (2008-2010) was 
appointed minister after Marina’s resignation. 
 
149 Available at: https://sustentabilidade.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,leia-na-integra-o-discurso-de-lula-
na-cop-15,484275, accessed on 28 November 2019. In the end, Brazil did not fulfill its pledges. 
 
150 Interview with NGO#4, NGO#8 and NGO#9. 
 
151 A government official (MMA#1) defended that the MMA had less bureaucratic power with Marina or 
Minc under Lula’s presidency than with Izabella Teixeira under Rousseff’s government.  
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did not impact our work. If she holds these notions, why did she authorize an absolute 
reduction target [in our INDC] in Paris? These narratives do not match”.152  
In the view of another negotiator, Rousseff’s meetings prior to COP-21 
demonstrate that Brazil’s influence continued in spite of changes in government. 
“Contradictions in our policies do not invalidate – and I guess many sectors fail to 
reckon that – what was being made in terms of presidential diplomacy”.153 In May 2015 
Brasília received the visit of the Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang and the two 
countries issued a joint-declaration on climate change. In June, during Rousseff’s visit 
to Washington, Brazil and the United States reaffirmed their compromise to tackle 
climate change. In August, during Angela Merkel’s visit to Brasília, Brazil and 
Germany issued a joint-communiqué. A week before COP-21, in November, Rousseff 
met with French foreign minister and president of the conference, Laurent Fabius. 
According to the same interviewee: “it is curious that these declarations were well 
received outside Brazil and encountered unenthusiastic reactions within the country. 
(…) These declarations fomented a political momentum that led to Paris”.154  
All things considered, the domestic decision-making process was not coherent 
or peaceful.   
 
Every ministry wants to have a say, but their views are not necessarily related to the 
regime. Often, bureaucratic interests contradict what negotiators defend at the COPs 
and in multilateral discussions. This is absurd. Having a climate policy or legislation 
that is thought to be solely domestic-driven, without considering all the efforts to 
achieve collective global cooperation, is puerile.155  
 
More important than domestic disputes is to understand how disharmony is 
softened and translated into the country’s multilateral positions. Itamaraty’s role is 
																																																								
152 Interview with MRE#3. Comparing Brazil’s pledges at the COP-15, with Lula, and at the COP-21, 
with Rousseff, another negotiator (IPCC#1) said the consultation process was more inclusive with 
Rousseff than with Lula. A third interviewee (MRE#2) mentioned that Rousseff “never gave an order 
saying that ‘the president does not want this or that’. (…) It is unfair to evaluate her [like that] just 
because she is a former minister of Mines and Energy”. The same person affirmed that criticism normally 
comes from NGO related “financially and ideologically” to Marina Silva.  
 
153 Interview with MRE#1. 
 
154 Interview with MRE#1. 
 
155 Interview with MRE#2. 
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essential for this conversion to occur. Alongside the MMA, it largely controls the 
interplay between the national and the multilateral levels, acting to harmonize and 
control differing views.156 Although Itamaraty organizes interministerial meetings and 
encounters with civil society organizations to substantiate the country’s positions before 
COPs, the definition of Brazil’s behavior “is not a collegiate decision”.157   
For this reason, domestic dichotomies are normally not patent to external 
observers. According to a UNFCCC official, “when they [Brazilian negotiators] come, 
they have one voice. Whatever differences they have, they solve at home and come with 
one voice”. 158  Several interviewees – namely the ones more involved with the 
negotiations – also pointed out that the country’s diplomatic positions are marked by 
more continuities than shifts, which shields the multilateral behavior from being 
captured by specific domestic agendas and assures stability. As a negotiator points out: 
“even if the government changes, we are the ones holding the ‘memory’ of the 
negotiation, we are the ones defending the positions throughout time”.159 The quote 
demonstrates that climate negotiators are socialized into the notion that they are the 
ones defining and “safeguarding” the general guidelines of Brazil’s behavior. 
As a government official explains, “Brazil has negotiators who are able to 
develop very good technical knowledge and negotiate several topics related to very 
pulverized and hard negotiations”. 160  The combination of technical expertise and 
diplomatic ability is a prerogative of developed countries and large developing states 
like Brazil, India, and China. Smaller countries have to rely either on personnel of 
environment ministries, who do not fully grasp how the UNFCCC operates, or the 
diplomatic corps, which cannot keep pace with burdensome technical discussions. A 
former climate negotiator of a Latin American country has a similar impression:  
 
																																																								
156 The role of the MCTIC was greater in the past, namely due to the importance of the CDM. Today it 
still participates and influences the agenda, but with less relevance than the MMA and Itamaraty. 
 
157 Interview with MRE#2.  
 
158 Interview with UNFCCC#5. 
 
159 Interview with MRE#3. In the conclusion of the thesis I argue that this impression did not remain valid 
during the first year of Bolsonaro’s presidency.  
 
160 Interview with MRE#1. MMA#2 had a similar view.  
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What has always surprised me about Brazil is the ability of its negotiators and how they 
were trained. (…) They have a capacity building vision and I can say that during all my 
time - now more than ten years - in this process, I have always seen very capable 
Brazilian negotiators. (…) In the end, it is one of the developing countries with the 
greatest emissions, but also with the greatest influence. So, they always get to the 
negotiations with this attitude.161 
 
Continuity of negotiators assures predictability and stability to Brazilian 
positions, something officials at the UNFCCC pointed out as an asset. Nonetheless, it 
hinders the possibility of more encompassing changes. “Novel negotiators compose a 
‘lower clergy’ in relation to the older generation”, who, for an interviewee, still control 
the agenda and restrain more “audacious” pledges.162 The counterpoint to this argument 
is that Brazil – and other developing countries – would be willing to assume more 
responsibilities only if the developed powers also proceed with so. I further show that 
this discussion fits well the proposal of concentric circles.  
Lastly, Brazil constantly figures among the top 15 largest delegations to COPs. 
While delegation size does not automatically mean influence, bringing a big delegation 
can aid negotiators to deal with more technical topics.  
 
Designating negotiators to follow all themes in a coherent and focused manner is a 
challenge. Few countries have the means to do that. Then you designate someone from 
a developed country – especially from the EU –, who is working on a topic for ten 
years, and someone [from a developing state] who just arrived, who is junior… Who do 
you think will negotiate better?163 
 
Also, a large delegation can function as an intangible asset, for example, making 
the country be seen as more transparent and inclusive. Several NGO, some of them 
critical of the government’s positions, are part of Brazil’s delegations. For COP-21, the 
country brought 319 delegates, composing the 9th largest delegation. In the next year, 
																																																								
161 Interview with AILAC#1. 
 
162 Interview with UFRJ#1. 
 
163 Interview with MRE#2. 
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125 delegates were registered with the delegation to COP-22. During COP-23 the 
number was similar.164  
 
III.4. The concentric circles proposal   
 Brazil’s normative contributions can be traced back to the institutionalization of 
the regime. Several examples can be mentioned: the CDM, the debates on forests and 
REDD+, and what came to be known as the “Brazilian proposal”, which was advanced 
during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol and advocated the calculation of 
countries’ historical responsibility for climate change as a burden sharing standard.165 In 
addition, Brazil has historically attempted to exert a bridge-building role, mediating 
conflicts between developed and developing states and trying to preserve a good 
relationship with all parties.  
 
Itamaraty’s strategy has always been the same: [to defend] common but differentiated 
responsibilities, a principle we helped crafting; support to sustainable development; 
financial [cooperation]… If you look carefully, this is highlighted in all environmental 
regimes Brazil participates. [In the debates on] chemical security, biodiversity, Agenda 
2030, etc. The position is the same. And I think this is one of reasons why Brazil is 
respected.166 
 
The concentric circles is related to this overall attempt to influence the climate 
agenda. It appeared when parties decided that a “protocol, another legal instrument, or 
an agreed outcome with legal force under the convention applicable to all” should be 
																																																								
164 For Brazil’s delegation to the COP-21, see: http://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-
have-sent-the-most-delegates-to-cop21, accessed on 28 November 2019. To the COP-22, see: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/eng/misc02p01.pdf, accessed on 28 November 2019. To the 
COP-23, see: https://www.ecowatch.com/countries-delegates-cop23-2507136533.html, accessed on 28 
November 2019. Nevertheless, a careful study of the delegations to the COP-22 and COP-23 demonstrate 
that several African countries like Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea brought inflated delegations, 
which does not match their diplomatic ability in climate talks. Parties like the United States, the EU, and 
Brazil normally rank high in delegation sizes.  
 
165 On the “Brazilian proposal”, see: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/brazil.pdf, accessed on 28 
November 2019. Referring to Brazil’s historical participation in the regime, a UNFCCC official 
(UNFCCC#5) mentioned: “I would say that Brazil is, from the developing world, one of the main players 
and certainly one of the most vocal. Many developing countries did not treat climate change with a lot of 
seriousness”. 
 
166 Interview with MRE#3. 
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completed no later than 2015 and come into effect from 2020.167 Parties also concurred 
to move the regime into a non-binding, bottom-up setting tempered by international 
rules promoting ambition (Bodansky, 2016). In other words, the proposition emerged in 
the discussions leading to the Paris Agreement.  
The idea to develop a concentric differentiation approach was presented in 2014 
at the UNFCCC Secretariat, during preparatory meetings for COP-20 later that year in 
Lima. At that moment, discussions revolved around two main positions: (i) countries 
advocating that differentiation of responsibilities between developing and developed 
countries was not suitable, so it should be eliminated in a post-Kyoto agreement; and 
(ii) states, among them Brazil, underpinning a legalistic view and saying that the 
framework brought about by the convention in 1992 should be kept in place in the new 
accord. Maintaining the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) was central to Brazil’s idea (Albuquerque, 2018a).  
As a Brazilian negotiator describes,  
 
In the beginning it [the proposal] was simply an image, a means to illustrate CBDR-RC, 
of using Kyoto annexes to break the argument that referring to CBDR-RC or to the 
convention would necessarily imply a binary vision of the world. The great leap, the 
great innovation, was to give a visual representation to the differentiation between 
developing and developed countries.168  
 
The major goal was to update the regime’s notion of differentiation and improve 
the division of responsibilities in a context of shifting power dynamics. According to 
the proposal, CBDR-RC would be operationalized in the Paris Agreement primarily 
through differentiation in the types of NDCs and level of effort expected, with a view to 
demonstrate that developed countries are effectively taking the lead (Brazil, 2014).169 
The proposal dialogues with distinctive perspectives on how the regime should evolve, 
forwarding a way to break a binary division of parties in “complying” and “not-
complying”.  
																																																								
167 Decision 1/CP.17. See: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=2, accessed 
on 30 November 2019. 
 
168 Interview with MRE#2. 
 




As figure 12 shows, the concentric circles is a three-layer proposal, in which the 
inner circle comprises parties having quantified absolute limitation or reduction targets 
in relation to a baseline year in their NDCs. Such targets would involve their economies 
as a whole. The central circle was thought for the Annex I parties, which should 
continue to take most of the burden. The second layer contains states with emission 
limitation or reduction targets related to all sectors of their economies, but not absolute 
ones. They would be able to adopt their own criteria to define targets, for example: per 
capita; energy intensity reductions; or halting emissions in comparison to a business as 
usual (BAU) scenario.170 Developing powers such as the members of the BASIC would 
fit into this intermediate category, but they could also voluntarily adopt absolute targets. 
Parties in the last circle, referred to in the proposal as the “least developed countries”, 




Figure 12. Representation of the concentric circles (Brazil, 2014)171 
 
 The proposal affirms that all parties are required to give details on their targets 
and actions, which may include sub-targets and/or specific national policies relevant to 
																																																								
170 Energy intensity reductions are calculated as units of energy per unit of GDP. Business as usual 
(BAU) are emissions that would occur if no efforts were made to reduce them. 
 
171 Also see: Ott et al. (2014).  
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the implementation of their responsibilities. Developed countries should include in their 
NDCs quantified financial pledges and technology development and transfer to assist 
the implementation of the NDCs of developing and least developed states. Moreover, 
developing countries should insert in their NDCs South-South cooperation initiatives 
involving finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building to assist 
other developing and least developed countries (Brazil, 2014).   
The intermediate category, which does not exist in the convention or in the 
Kyoto Protocol, demonstrates that, for Brazil, large developing countries like the 
BASIC states are not on equal footing with their developed or least developed peers. At 
COP-20, Brazil’s environment minister Izabella Teixeira expressed her country’s view: 
“’Self-differentiation’ is not an option: it would neither be fair nor reasonable to expect 
developing countries to assume further obligations, while at the same time reducing the 
level of ambition expected from developed countries”. 172 By assuming an “in-between” 
condition, the BASIC members would be able to continue pushing for financial and 
technical aid. This choice keeps their developing status in place and shields them from 
criticism for possible inactions (Albuquerque, 2019a).  
Another important element is the idea of no backtracking. Countries have to 
move towards the center of the concentric circles, assuming more responsibilities with 
the progression of time and improvement of national capacities. As a country develops 
and receives more technical and financial support, it should provide additional 
commitments in their NDCs, “with a view to enhance ambition in a sustained and 
balanced manner, in all pillars of the convention” (Brazil, 2014).173 The NDCs would be 
periodically adjusted and subject to a multilateral review process. Sooner or later, all 
parties would move into economy-wide absolute targets in a rationality resembling the 
graduation process of the WTO.  
Finally, the concentric circles was not subject to previous approval of regional or 
extra-regional partners, being solely presented and sponsored by Brazil. In the case of 
the BASIC, it is not a formal negotiating group and the four countries – perhaps with 
the exception of South Africa for its allegiance to the African group – hold relatively 
autonomous behaviors in the regime. Since 2009, the BASIC members regularly reunite 
																																																								
172 See: http://simat.mma.gov.br/acomweb/Media/Documentos/042c8320-5f65-4006-a.pdf, accessed on 2 
December 2019. 
 
173 “Neither political changes nor global or systemic phenomena such as an economic crisis should justify 
an adjustment towards lower ambition” (Brazil, 2014: 3). 
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in coordination meetings to exchange visions on general issues, but do not present a 
single voice regarding several items of the multilateral agenda.174 Although some 
interviewees mentioned that the second circle of the concentric circles was thought for 
the BASIC, they affirmed that the idea was promoted without prior contacts with its 
members.175   
As for Latin American and Caribbean states, they integrate several groupings, as 
is the case with the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), 
the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), the Cartagena 
Dialogue, the Like Minded Group, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS).176 Countries could also engage through the Latin American and Caribbean 
Group (GRULAC), which is one of the five regional groups of the UN, but its role in 
climate change negotiations is almost irrelevant in comparison to its presence in other 
arrangements like the food security regime.  
Brazil is not part of any regional groups, as it commonly acts individually or 
through ad hoc partnerships. Among the many reasons for that is the fact that Brazil is 
the largest regional economy, with a distinct energy matrix and priorities. Whereas 
Caribbean and Andean countries focus on discussing loss and damage and adaptation, 
Brazil has a more prominent standing on mitigation, as illustrates the concentric circles. 
Moreover, Amazonian countries disagree with Brazil on subjects such as REDD+ and 
finance for forests. With the exception of Mexico, however, Latin American and 
Caribbean nations are members of the G-77+China and broadly agree on topics like the 
principle of CBDR-RC.  
Consensuses are hardly possible in a region having so many arrangements, 
which suggests lack of leadership and common goals. That number of coalitions reflects 
disparate levels of development and climate-related challenges. A Brazilian negotiator 
mentioned that it is difficult to advance “anything substantive” when you have ALBA 
																																																								
174 Up to December 2019, the BASIC organized 29 ministerial meetings. See: 
https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1589318, accessed on 2 December 2019. 
 
175 i.e. MRE#2. 
 
176 For a list of party-groupings, see: https://unfccc.int/party-groupings, accessed on 2 December 2019. 




and AILAC sitting at the same table.177 A Latin American negotiator pointed out that 
linguistic and cultural differences also explain the lack of regional cohesion. “I know 
that the Brazilians who go to COPs speak Spanish, but it is not the same thing. We do 
not share a similar identity”.178  
That same negotiator identified the contradictions of Brazil portraying itself as a 
regional leader and acting multilaterally without the region. “Brazilians only talk with 
whom they need. They speak with the BASIC, with the United States, with the EU, with 
the Arabs... But they do not speak with Latin American countries”.179 The quote can be 
directly related to the work of Malamud (2011), who shows how Brazil upholds a 
discourse of regional cooperation that is not substantiated by real actions and is 
detached from the country’s external endeavors.  
All things considered, some novel initiatives have attempted to bring these 
groups and countries closer, but without effective success.180 For these reasons, Brazil 
did not “test the waters” or discussed the idea of concentric circles with regional peers 
before presenting it to the UNFCCC. 
 
III.5. Concentric circles and explanatory factors 
The three explanatory factors previously discussed accurately account for the 
concentric circles. The structure of the climate change regime, Brazil’s domestic 
climate-related assets, and the decision-making process controlled by Itamaraty explain 
the proposal. These factors integrate the formulation of foreign policy, further 
producing a strategic course of action – or, if we use a “methodological” term, a 
mechanism - here embodied by the concentric circles.  
 
Regime structure 
The structure of the climate change regime played a decisive role for the 
concentric circles to come about. Five points should be made in this respect. (i) The 
																																																								
177 Interview with MRE#2. 
 
178 Interview with AILAC#1. 
 
179 An interviewee working for a development bank in Latin America (CAF#1) made a similar comment: 
“I feel that Brazil, although being part of Latin America, has the tendency to turn its back on the region.” 
 
180 For example, meetings of the CELAC. More recently, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay submitted 
common views to the UNFCCC.  
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regime is formally non-hierarchical and open, which makes room for developing 
countries like Brazil to advance initiatives. On top of that, Brazil has been able to 
influence negotiations, historically pushing forward its views on how the regime should 
evolve and how responsibilities should be shared. (ii) The concentric circles appears in 
a moment of institutional transformation, when the regime was moving towards a post-
Kyoto architecture with parties having voluntary obligations. In these circumstances, 
states have more chances to promote new contributions. In the specific case of climate 
change, the presidents of COPs and the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn are open to 
conceptual innovations aiming to overcome deadlocks. A UNFCCC official mentioned 
that the concentric circles proposal “received much attention. The submission was 
circulated and internally it had weight.”181 
(iii) Were the regime not divided in annexes, Brazil would hardly come up with 
the proposal. The separation made the regime possible, but was exacerbated with 
Kyoto’s quantified reduction commitments for just the developed powers, later turning 
into a source of dissent and inaction. The concentric circles intended to redress that. (iv) 
It was precisely because Brazil and the BASIC were under pressure that Itamaraty 
conveyed an idea to keep differentiation of responsibilities at the table. “Now [after 
Paris] you have a jurisdictional structure that allows developing countries to have 
ambitious actions, with them being reckoned for that without losing the status of 
developing powers”.182 (v) The proposal is directly related to discussions leading to the 
Paris Agreement, especially the ones held after the 2013 COP-19 in Warsaw, which 
defined that parties should assume INDCs. The concentric circles endorses this 
voluntary system, given that the multilateral arena guarantees incentives for countries to 
gradually enhance actions.  
 
Domestic assets 
 The existence of climate-related domestic assets also explains why negotiators 
formulated and proposed the concentric circles. (i) The proposal suitably came when 
Brazil was enjoying a relatively comfortable position in comparison to other parties and 
being commended by civil society organizations and foreign government officials. In 
mid-2014, deforestation levels were still under control and Brazil’s standing was much 
																																																								
181 Interview with UNFCCC#2. 
 
182 Interview with MRE#2. 
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linked to the successes of its public policies and national plans. Setbacks in domestic 
climate governance would only gain strength from late 2015 onwards, after the 
concentric circles was introduced. Critiques appeared mainly because of Brazil’s INDC 
commitment to end illegal deforestation (and not all deforestation), and in consequence 
of an upsurge in deforestation.183 
 (ii) Conveying the graphic representation was not unintentional, as it is related, 
among other things, to the country’s INDC, which demonstrates that negotiators took 
domestic assets into consideration. Even though the officials interviewed were not sure 
– or not willing - to identify in which circle of the concentric circles Brazil would be 
placed, the country can be located somewhere between the central and the second 
circles of figure 12. This incertitude is visible when comparing the country’s INDC with 
the concentric circles. The INDC projected an economy-wide absolute-target, which 
would put the country alongside the Annex I parties. At the same time, Brazil is a non-
Annex I state and its INDC welcomes support from the developed countries. The text 
says that “additional actions would demand large-scale increase of international support 
and investment flows, as well as technology development, deployment, diffusion and 
transfer” (Brazil, 2015: 4). Like the concentric circles, the INDC envisions South-South 
cooperation initiatives with other developing and least developed states and remembers 
the historical responsibilities for climate change. The notion that there should be no 
backtracking, with parties presenting successive cycles of contributions, is present in 
Brazil’s INDC and in the concentric circles.  
 The dubiety regarding Brazil’s pertinence to a specific circle can be seen as a 
strategic move because its negotiators could argue that the country is “doing more” than 
expected, as Brazil is still a developing country, but the only one among them 
presenting absolute targets. According to this view, Brazil would be inserted in the 
second circle, but willing to act according to states pertaining to the central circle. The 
domestic assets would give Brazil a “moral argument” that it is already contributing to 
the regime and, for that reason, it is the turn of the other powers – developing and 
developed – to make greater effort.184  
  
																																																								
183 For some examples of criticism, see: http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/en/brasil-registra-meta-
para-paris/, accessed on 3 December 2019. Also see Viola and Franchini (2018). 
 
184 Brazil’s INDC maintains that it is “far more ambitious than would correspond to Brazil’s marginal 
relative responsibility for the global average temperature increase” (Brazil, 2015: 6).  
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Domestic decision-making procedures 
 As for the third explanatory factor, the concentric circles is a contribution devised 
by diplomats and conceived as a timely reaction to the uncertainties about the future of 
climate politics. The proposal was circulated at the climate secretariat and discussed 
with negotiators from the MMA, not being subject to consultations with other actors in 
the domestic realm. For that reason, the many internal dissonances involving 
government bureaucracies and civil society organizations did not affect the proposal’s 
content or its existence. No other domestic actors, including president Rousseff, exerted 
a direct and relevant role in the design of the proposal. In this specific case, foreign 
policy formulation relied on a straightforward decision-making process that was 
handled by Itamaraty with the backing of the MMA.  
 To external observers, the concentric circles was presented as a cohesive 
byproduct of the country’s interpretations on how the regime should evolve and 
function. That is visible even in the name of the document introducing the proposition, 
which is entitled “views of Brazil on the elements of the new agreement under the 
convention applicable to all parties” (Brazil, 2014: 1).185 Instead of personalizing the 
idea, Itamaraty chose to collectivize the proposal, publicizing it as an outcome of an 
undivided country that expects to surpass multilateral stalemates. By doing so, 
negotiators could protect Brazil from possible domestic and multilateral criticism and 
portray it as a cooperative actor. 
 Furthermore, the concentric circles is a logical consequence of previous 
Brazilian positions. If, in discussions that led to the convention and to the Kyoto 
Protocol Brazil was one of the fierce defenders of a formal separation in annexes and 
supporter of CBDR-RC, in the 2006 COP-12 in Nairobi Brazil accepted discussing 
forest issues, but always preserving its independence on the matter (Carvalho, 2012). In 
the next COP-13, its negotiators agreed with developing powers assuming more 
responsibilities, which later was materialized in the country’s voluntary pledge at COP-
15. Besides, Brazil participated in the construction of a post-Kyoto framework. This 
progression that led to the Paris Agreement is directly related to the permanence of 
negotiators and to the continuation of underlying ideas concerning how Brazil should 
behave. The intention to build a regime based on a dynamic interpretation of CBDR-RC 
																																																								




is visible in the concentric circles, as exemplify the will to undertake more 
responsibilities and harmonize contrasting positions between developed and developing 
countries.  
Creating a novel and intermediate layer of dynamic differentiation while 
keeping the basics of the convention serves this purpose. According to Brazilian 
officials, doing so “is strategic. [...] We often develop this ‘bridge-role’ during 
negotiations exactly because we do not have anything crucial to be lost, so we can 
sometimes risk something and act audaciously in talks”.186 The excerpt “we do not have 
anything crucial to be lost” reinforces the argument that negotiators take domestic assets 
into account when engaging multilaterally.  
 It is important to mention that Brazil was not the only country to discuss 
differentiation. In several meetings before COP-21, parties engaged in heated debates 
over how to make the new agreement reflect differing interests while referring back to 
the established normative and operational elements part of the regime. Amongst the 
several initiatives aiming to address CBDR-RC, many states expressed that the principle 
should be refocused. They clashed, however, on the extent to which differentiation 
should be flexed, and whether countries should be inserted in particular categories while 
pursuing specific types of targets.  
 Many of these views appeared before COP-20. In the March 2014 Bonn Climate 
Change Conference, Turkey called for a dynamic differentiation among parties in 
accordance with CBDR-RC and in consideration of national circumstances. Norway 
defended a more flexible approach to parties’ mitigation commitments. Brazil’s 
perspective that there should be no backtracking was also raised on the occasion. 
Furthermore, its negotiators already exposed some elements of the concentric circles, 
mentioning that whereas Annex I parties should present ambitious economy-wide 
emission reduction pledges, non-Annex I parties should have more options to put 
forward their contributions.187  
 In a June meeting also in Bonn, Japan stressed that CBDR-RC should be 
operationalized in a “dynamic context” and Switzerland argued that the intensity and 
type of contributions should reflect the principle and be seen in light of today’s realities. 
China voiced against new categorizations of countries, dynamic interpretations, and 
																																																								
186 Interview with MCTI#1 and MCTI#2. 
 
187 See: http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12595e.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2019. 
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self-differentiation, expressing concern over attempts to close the responsibility gap 
between developed and developing countries in climate finance.188 Brazil’s “concentric 
approach to differentiation” was presented as a concise package in an October meeting, 
attracting “much attention”.189 Later on, in the 2015 Geneva climate change conference, 
the EU shared the need for parties to increase their commitments periodically, while 
Indonesia reinforced the notion of no backsliding.190 
 In a nutshell, many elements of Brazil’s proposal were visible in the discourses of 
other parties. The concentric circles was not entirely original in its content nor 
disconnected with the views and propositions of other states (Maljean-Dubois, 2016). 
None, however, gained momentum in comparison to the concentric circles (Voigt and 
Ferreira, 2016). The leverage of Brazil’s negotiators, consequently, was decisive. 
 
III.6. Concentric circles and the degree of change 
The concentric circles interacts with the regime’s normative and operational 
elements. Amidst the discussions leading to the Paris Agreement, Brazil devoted efforts 
to make the regime more effective while keeping in place its jurisdictional foundations. 
Bringing a more nuanced view on CBDR-RC, the concentric circles does not intend to 
harm its meaning. Above all, the proposal demonstrates that Brazil acted as a legalist 
player, attempting to make the regime more operational and in tune with current power 
distribution.  
When it comes to the regime’s major norms and principles, the concentric 
circles not only refers back to original ideational components, but it reclaims CBDR-RC 
as the point of reference. The document outlining the proposal affirms “Brazil 
underlines that the 2015 agreement must be fully consistent with the principles and 
provisions of the UNFCCC, including differentiation between developed and 
developing countries”. According to the proposition, “it is of utmost importance” that 
the agreement reflects CBDR-RC (Brazil, 2014: 1).  
The proposal also makes explicit reference to the convention, referring to the 
Kyoto Protocol only once. Although that emphasis does not suggest that negotiators 
belittle the protocol, it reaffirms the notion that Kyoto exacerbated the divisions 
																																																								
188 See: http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12598e.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2019. 
 
189 AILAC and other Latin American countries supported Brazil’s proposal. See: 
http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12605e.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2019.  
  
190 See: http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12626e.html, accessed on 6 December 2019. 
	 109	
between developed and developing powers, prompting the regime into a binary 
configuration that later obstructed talks. Since Kyoto imposed quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments only to the Annex I parties, CBDR-RC is 
interpreted more rigidly there than in the convention. Going away from a punitive 
interpretation is a core preoccupation of the concentric circles.  
Brazil’s nuanced view on CBDR-RC is revealed in how the principle should 
function. Saying in other words, in the rule-based components of the regime. The 
greatest contribution of the proposal is precisely related to how the division of 
responsibilities should be operationalized in the Paris Agreement, leading to a more 
effective and fair regime. This is reflected “through differentiation in the types of NDC 
and the level of effort expected, with a view to demonstrate that developed country 
parties are effectively taking the lead” (Brazil, 2014: 1). For that reason, the proposal 
treats the regime’s operational components – or the NDCs – as a means to assure the 
continuity of CBDR-RC. Its three layers, however, exclude the possibility of parties to 
autonomously define pledges through an approach of self-differentiation. Countries 
could define their own contributions, but not rewrite the commitments or obligations 
under the legal framework of the convention or bypass its legal character. 
The realistic view on how CBDR-RC should work is combined with the notion 
of “no backtracking”, assuring a continuous review process of each country’s 
commitments and the progression towards more ambitious contributions. Pledges 
should be nationally determined and then compared and harmonized in accordance with 
the overall efforts to tackle climate change. As a Brazilian negotiator explains, “our 
argument has always been: differentiation does not prevent action. The challenge was 
then to use differentiation in a creative way assuring that it does not mean inaction”.191 
More than changing the division of power within the regime, the concentric 
circles comes as a consequence of the clashes between developed and developing 
countries. On the one hand, it reckons the enhanced status of the BASIC states and 
encourages the large developing powers to assume more ambitious targets, which would 
create confidence and unlock cooperation. On the other hand, the proposal combines the 
call for a more proactive behavior with the defense of a “developing condition” that is 
present in the convention and the Kyoto Protocol.  
																																																								
191 Interview with MRE#1. 
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That legalistic view was part of a Brazilian statement on behalf of the BASIC 
months before COP-21:  
 
Achieving consensus requires the strengthening of the multilateral rules-based regime 
under the convention, in full accordance with its principles, and provisions. The Paris 
Agreement should enhance the full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
convention, not create a new regime or restructure, reinterpret or rewrite the 
convention.192 
 
This pro-status quo behavior can be read as a defensive or conservative way to 
address differentiation, as it serves well Brazil’s interests of not assuming top-down 
binding commitments (De Luna, 2016). According to Edwards et al. (2015: 14), 
“although the proposal has been regarded as constructive (…) it is also perceived as a 
way for Brazil to avoid taking on commitments (or at least delaying them), and insisting 
on developed countries taking responsibility”. Brazilian officials refute the criticism, 
affirming that the country’s INDC has absolute reduction targets and that the concentric 
circles contributed to unlock talks leading to the Paris Agreement.193  
The concentric circles was not explicitly present in the final declaration of COP-
20 for three main reasons. First, because of bad timing: depending on whom you speak 
with, the comment is that the proposal appeared too late or too early in negotiations. To 
a UNFCCC official, the concentric circles came “a little bit late”.194 Another UNFCCC 
official has an opposing view: 
 
It was probably too early to present it, because at the time when it was tabled the 
discussion was about everything: it was about mechanisms, it was about adaptation, it 
was about financing. So, the idea behind the concentric circles tackles a very specific 
problem, which is precisely the implementation of common but differentiated 




BASIC%20statement%20adp2.9%20final.pdf, accessed on 9 December 2019.   
 
193 Interview with MMA#3. 
 
194 Interview with UNFCCC#6.  
 
195 Interview with UNFCCC#1. 
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Second, for the fact that the proposal “was not easy for other people to 
understand. People understood it when they saw it written, but not so much when it was 
first presented”.196 And third, because Brazilian negotiators decided to re-label the idea 
after COP-20. They kept developing the concept, but not with the names “concentric 
circles” or “concentric differentiation”, which made it harder for the proposal to be 
publicized and others to reckon and follow it. After Lima, the focus was much more on 
the notion of graduation, or the belief that states should progress contributions towards a 
common effort.  
Commenting on the non-continuity of the concentric circles as such, a Brazilian 
negotiator mentioned that:  
 
Our idea was not to have a concept inserted in the new agreement or to say that it is 
now using concentric differentiation. That was in fact an interpretation of something 
that already existed and that was in the convention since the beginning. We have always 
said that we did not want to rewrite it. So, the idea was not to introduce a new concept, 
but to interpret what is present in the convention in order to make the new agreement 
[Paris] viable and ambitious.197  
 
Although the proposal was not mentioned in final document of COP-20, its 
content is present in some parts of the Paris Agreement, for instance, articles 2.2; 3; 4.3; 
4.4; 4.9; and 6.4 (Albuquerque, 2018a; De Luna, 2016; United Nations, 2015).198 In 
consonance with the concentric circles, Paris defined the “global stocktake”, a process 
through which every state should present a climate action plan in five-yearly cycles.199 
Additionally, Paris established a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of GHG 
emissions and support sustainable development, which can be related to Brazil’s 
intention to develop an Enhanced Clean Development Mechanism (CDM+).200  
																																																								
196 Interview with UNFCCC#6.  
 
197 Interview with MRE#1. 
 
198 See: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/525_318_131354420270499165-
BRAZIL%20-%20Article%206.4.%20SBSTA46%20May%202017.%20FINAL.pdf, accessed on 9 
December 2019. 
  
199 Starting in 2023, the global stocktake will function as a review mechanism guiding the behavior of 
states and providing transparency (Milkoreit and Haapala, 2017). 
 
200 The concentric circles suggested making an economic mechanism to generate incentives for further 
action in developing countries, which should be related to an enhanced clean development mechanism 
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A difference between the proposal and the Paris Agreement is that while the 
former recommends that developing powers undertake a modality of economy-wide 
limitation or reduction target, the latter does not request any precise commitments from 
these parties, only stating that they “are encouraged to move over time towards 
economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets” (United Nations, 2015: 22). 
One could say that the concentric circles is therefore less “bottom-up” than the Paris 
Agreement.  
Another distinction is that while the Brazilian proposal talks about CBDR-RC, 
both the final document of COP-20 and the Paris Agreement use the expression 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances” (Voigt and Ferreira, 2016: 294; Zhang, 2016).201 
According to Bodansky (2016), the expression opens space for self-differentiation of 
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(Brazil, 2014; Stua, 2017). This adds up to my previous point that the concentric circles was created in 
light of Brazil’s past initiatives and domestic circumstances. 
 
201 The expression “in light of” appears in the 2014 US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. 
See: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-
climate-change, accessed on 9 December 2019. 
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targets for some sectors 
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Table 03. Regime’s main treaties and concentric circles (Brazil, 2014; United 
Nations, 1992; 1998; 2015) 
 
Finally, the Brazilian environment minister Izabella Teixeira was chosen by 
COP-21 president Laurent Fabius as a co-facilitator of the working group on 
“differentiation, in particular regard to mitigation, finance, and transparency”. That 
choice can be interpreted as a consequence of the country’s pro-active role in bridging 
contrasting positions, which is reflected in the concentric circles.202 
 
III.7. Final remarks 
This chapter demonstrated that Brazilian negotiators expected, by means of 
crafting the concentric circles, to influence the climate agenda. By and large, the idea 
was to maintain the regime’s core and original principle – CBDR-RC - while adapting 
its operational provisions to current power shifts. In the view of Brazil’s decision-
makers, the proposal contributes to discussions about how to balance a rigid and 
divisive interpretation of the principle, which is mostly identified with the Kyoto 
																																																								
202 See: https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/paris-climate-change-conference-
november-2015/statements-and-resources/negotiating-updates#7, accessed on 9 December 2019. Besides 
her, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, former ambassador to the United States and chancellor during 
Rousseff’s government (2013-2015), also contributed to make consensus possible during the conference.  
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Protocol, with the continuation of the climate convention in the novel Paris Agreement. 
That approach corroborates the central claim of this thesis.  
As shown, official documents reveal that the concentric circles did not expect to 
transform the main normative elements composing the regime. That prerogative was 
confirmed in several interviews conducted with senior and junior negotiators 
representing the country in subsequent COPs, as well as in talks with UNFCCC officials 
based at the climate secretariat. Data validates the notion that Brazil did not expect to 
provoke encompassing changes that could eventually lead to shifts of the regime, 
affecting its overall content.   
What is clear is that the proposal expected to shape how CBDR-RC is put in 
motion, providing a more dynamic and flexible interpretation of the principle without 
eroding its significance or revising its meaning. In other words, the concentric circles 
focused on keeping the initial norms and principles precisely by shifting the way they 
are operationalized. Aiming at the coming Paris Agreement, the proposal had the goal to 
conduct ad hoc and specific changes. That orientation was preserved at the 2016 COP-
22 in Marrakesh. During the conference, José Antonio Marcondes, the country’s chief-
negotiator, explained Brazil’s participation: “we had a legalist position”.203 As seen, that 
behavior was not exclusive to Brazil, as other parties shared similar views.  
Another question is why the country conceived the concentric circles. Reasons 
for that involve, first, the intention to maintain a position of bridge-country or mediator, 
something that is commonly repeated in the official rhetoric and is also shared by UN 
officials and foreign delegations.204 Second, because since the inception of the climate 
convention Brazilian negotiators attempted to influence the evolution of the regime in 
respect to its normative and operational components. The concentric circles is now part 
of these initiatives put forward at the multilateral level.  
Third, because the concentric circles could function as a means to react to 
mounting pressures. Compelled to assume more ambitious commitments, Brazilian 
negotiators came up with a middle-ground position that kept differentiation between 
developed and developing countries in place while stimulating the progression of 
pledges towards absolute targets. By doing so, negotiators could ease calls for 
encompassing changes, which could end up generating binding commitments for Brazil 
																																																								
203 See: http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/reuniao-morna-termina-quente-em-marrakesh/, accessed 
on 10 December 2019. 
 
204 That impression appeared, for instance, in the interview with UN#1.  
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and other large developing countries. Fourth and related to that, because Brazil’s 
negotiators crafted a proposal that places the country in a privileged position. Of the 
three layers part of the graphic representation, Brazil would sit on the verge of the 
second and the central circles, which reinforces the idea that it can act cooperatively 
while defending a developing condition. For this reason, the proposition can be seen as 
conservative and defensive and, at the same time, as progressive and proactive.  
Figure 13 recovers the thesis’ analytical framework, bringing the three 
explanatory factors, the proposal (or causal mechanism), and its interactions with the 
main normative and operational elements (or the outcomes). As mentioned, although the 




Figure 13. Analytical framework and concentric circles  
 
The structure of the climate change regime (X1) was permissive enough for 
negotiators to advance the concentric circles. As it is a non-hierarchical setting with 
countries having equal voting weight, no restraints are imposed on developing countries 
to promote their views. Also, the regime was transitioning towards a new agreement, 
with parties debating not only the Paris Agreement, but also reevaluating the climate 
convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Besides that, negotiators took advantage of the 
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country’s domestic assets (X2) – namely Brazil’s energy matrix, level of carbon 
emissions and INDC - to promote the idea. Lastly, the domestic decision-making 
procedures (X3) are conflictive, reflecting the diverse layers of climate governance and 
bureaucracies defending different agendas. Nevertheless, the lack of cohesion at the 
national level did not refrain Itamaraty from controlling the decision-making process 
and, with the backing of the MMA, advancing the proposal as a coherent contribution. 
The role of president Rousseff was not relevant.  
With that said, the explanatory factors were individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for the concentric circles to exist. Separately, these factors only provide 
partial explanations, not accounting for the proposal. Together and operating in a 
specific context, however, they could be maneuvered by negotiators – mainly Itamaraty 
–, composing the concentric circles. Without a permissive multilateral environment, 
(self-) identified domestic comparative advantages, and diplomatic expertise, the 
proposal would not come about. It was advanced at a time when talks were leading to 
the Paris Agreement and Brazil saw a drop in its GHG emissions.  
Moreover, figure 13 shows that the concentric circles was not previously 
discussed with regional (i.e. Latin American) or extra-regional (for instance, the 
BASIC) peers, but put forward individually. The content of the proposal was therefore 
not changed in reason of possible exchanges with other countries.  
Next chapter focuses on the proposal of responsibility while protecting (RwP) 
and shows that many of the discussions pertaining to Brazil’s behavior in the climate 






BRAZIL AND THE PEACE AND SECURITY REGIME 
 
 This chapter addresses the Brazilian-led proposal of responsibility while 
protecting (RwP), analyzing how it interacts with the normative and operational 
components of the peace and security regime. Brazilian diplomats first pushed forward 
the idea in 2011, in the aftermath of a troubled intervention conducted by NATO in 
Libya, which ended up in the deposition and assassination of strongman Muammar 
Gaddafi and engulfed the African nation in enduring turbulence. At that moment, Brazil 
was exerting its 2010-2011 mandate as a non-permanent member of the UNSC together 
with Russia, China, India, and South Africa. It was the first and only moment when the 
BRICS states were sharing seats.  
In the view of Brazilian negotiators, the P3 – the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France – maneuvered resolutions 1970 and 1973, which built on the 
norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), presenting the intervention as a means to end 
the suffering of civilians. However, their implementation led to the active support to 
rebel forces and regime change. Against this background, RwP appeared as a remedy, 
attempting to avoid breaches of international law and assure predictability and 
moderation. More than that, it expected to safeguard the role of the UNSC as the 
authoritative body dealing with peace and security and to preserve normative and 
operational components present in instruments like the UN Charter.  
When it comes to the relationship of RwP with the three explanatory factors, it 
came to light due to the ability of Brazil’s negotiators working at Itamaraty in Brasília 
and at the country’s mission to the UN. Furthermore, Brazil’s membership at the UNSC 
was crucial for the proposal to be advanced and for the country to vocalize preferences 
regarding the use of force. As for the influence of domestic peace and security-related 
assets, they did not play a relevant role for RwP to come about. 
The chapter is divided in seven parts. The first (i) discusses the structure of the 
peace and security regime. I examine the evolution of R2P as well as specific articles 
and excerpts of the UN Charter composing the ongoing peace and security architecture. 
The second section (ii) surveys Brazil’s domestic peace and security-related assets. I 
then (iii) discuss the country’s decision-making procedures and illustrate which 
domestic actors have a say in peace and security matters. The progression from sections 
four to six explains what the proposal of RwP entails (iv); how it interrelates with the 
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explanatory factors (v); and with the regime’s normative and operational foundations 
(vi). Section seven (vii) draws conclusions.  
 
IV.1. The structure of the peace and security regime  
 The cornerstone of the peace and security regime is present in the UN Charter. 
Parties at the San Francisco conference decided that the institution would maintain 
international peace and security and take collective action for the prevention and 
removal of threats to peace (United Nations, 1945). Guiding principles infuse these 
broad directives, such as the sovereign equality of states (art. 2, paragraph 1); the 
prohibition of threat or use of force (art. 2, paragraph 4); the obligation to give 
assistance to the UN and refrain from assisting states targeted with preventive or 
enforcement action (art. 2, paragraph 5); and the principle of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states (art. 2, paragraph 7).205  
Alongside the UN Charter, other jurisdictional instruments intended to guarantee 
the prevalence of human rights and the centrality of the individual. This is the case of 
the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, and their protocols. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights did not impose legal obligations nor had a “treaty-like” character, but 
displayed “moral authority”.206 With time, its norms became accepted as customary 
international law, being reflected in domestic law (Hannum, 1996).  
Ideally, states should uphold human rights while following principles governing 
interstate interaction. In practice, however, several countries avoid ratifying legal 
documents governing the matter. Both 1966 covenants, for example, took ten years to 
enter into force. The significance of the issue was only renewed in 1993 with the 
Vienna Conference on Human Rights, which declared that human rights are universal, 
																																																								
205 See: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/principles.shtml, accessed on 13 December 2019. The 
principle of sovereign equality of states, for example, refers back to the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. 
The principles of non-intervention and of the prohibition of threat or use of force have their origins at the 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 and its Additional Protocol and on the 
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations.  
 
206 Together, these documents compose the international human rights law. International humanitarian 
law refers to assuring minimum protection to victims of conflicts. It emanates from documents like the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their two additional protocols. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/training9chapter1en.pdf, accessed on 13 December 2019.  
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indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, highlighting that states have the 
responsibility to develop and encourage the respect for human rights. 
As for the regulation of interstate affairs, the principles of non-intervention and 
the prohibition of threat or use of force were largely ignored by the two superpowers. 
The right to self-determination was routinely violated, as well as the territorial integrity 
of newly independent countries or states part of the so-called Third World.  
The end of the Cold War came together with two related dynamics. First, it was 
marked by the formation of new states, and the (re)-emergence of internal rivalries. 
Stirred by the consequences of colonial domination and bipolar dispute, domestic 
conflicts attained proper dynamics, leading to massive violations of human rights and 
recurrent instability. Second, a shift in the nature of war was visible and the principles 
expected to govern interstate interaction were not suitable to deal with an era of 
intrastate disorder. In several circumstances, as in the cases of Bosnia, Somalia, and 
Rwanda, the incompatible interests of the permanent members of the UNSC led to 
deadlock and inaction, intensifying human grief. In other situations, their vetoes did not 
prevent organizations like NATO from circumventing the UN and wage “humanitarian 
war” in places like Yugoslavia.  
Against this backdrop, guaranteeing unbridled respect for human rights and 
avoiding novel bloodshed assumed a central role in the functioning of the liberal order. 
Institutions crystalized the importance of duties and rights of the individuals such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), ad hoc criminal tribunals, as well as the individual 
petition systems of regional courts. With that, state authorities are accountable for their 
actions and omissions, being subject to criminal prosecutions and sanctions for certain 
practices. Renewed interpretations of the just war doctrine and the “droit d’ingérence” 
became part of the vocabulary of academics and practitioners (i.e. Luban, 1980). The 
lexicon also comprised ill-defined terms like “human security”. Within the UN system, 
the approval of peacebuilding missions is partly tributary to these reinterpretations.  
The discussion evolved with the publication by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of the document “The Responsibility to 
Protect”, which advocated for a “new approach” and set the tone for an updated 
discussion on the “right of humanitarian intervention” (ICISS, 2001).207 In a nutshell, 
																																																								
207 The discussion comes from previous considerations from UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, who 
addressed the UNGA in 1999 and delivered his Millennium Report a year later. See: 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf, accessed on 14 December 2019. 
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R2P as a concept brings the notion that states are primarily responsible to protect their 
own citizens.208 When a population is under serious harm, and the state in question is 
incapable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the “international community” should assume 
the burden. The principle of non-intervention would “yield to the international 
responsibility to protect”, possibly opening space for the use of force (ICISS, 2001: xi). 
The idea of R2P is based on three elements: the responsibility to prevent, which 
aims to address the conflict’s root causes; the responsibility to react, which “may 
include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme 
cases military intervention”; and the responsibility to rebuild, which takes place after a 
military intervention (ICISS, 2001: xi). Conceptually, R2P adjusts the meaning of the 
major principles present in the UN Charter, flexing strict interpretations and contesting 
sovereignty as a shield behind human rights violations.  
The ICISS defined sovereignty as a double-edged principle, incorporating an 
external dimension (state sovereignty) and an internal aspect (the basic rights of all the 
people within the state). Sovereignty would thus be seen not as control, but as a 
responsibility in both internal and external spheres (Welsh, 2016). The document 
affirms that the use of force would be possible in “extreme cases”, beyond the right to 
self-defense (art. 51 of the UN Charter). It also remarks the obligation to give assistance 
to the UN – or a “call to just action” - in cases enacting R2P. 
The concept is based on a sequential process: less coercive measures should be 
considered and exhausted before the occurrence of an intervention. When it is the case, 
military action for human protection in situations of threat or existing severe loss of life 
or ethnic cleansing should be an exceptional and extraordinary measure. It should be a 
proportional last resort with the purpose to avert human suffering and not cause the 
defeat of a state. In practical terms, interventions are better carried out with regional 
support and their consequences should not cause additional harm.  
ICISS’s view on the UNSC is ambivalent: the document reaffirms the council as 
“a source of authority” and does not hope to find alternatives to it, but expects to 
improve its work. In this early view of R2P, an intervention could be called for in three 
situations: (i) those calling for an intervention request authorization to the UNSC; (ii) 
																																																								
208 Although in some works (i.e. Bellamy, 2013; Crossley, 2018) R2P appears as a “principle” or 
“political principle” (Welsh, 2016), I treat it as a “norm”, “evolving norm” or “concept” for it addresses 
existing principles. I do so alongside many authors (i.e. Benner, 2013; Eaton, 2011; United Nations, 
2004: 55). Calling it an “evolving norm” is related to the fact that it still raises controversy, especially 
after the Libyan case. On the matter, see: Bellamy (2015a).  
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the council raises the matter on its own; (iii) the secretary-general brings the matter to 
the UNSC. The ICISS asked the P5 to restrain resorting to the veto in “matters where 
their vital state interests are not involved” (ICISS, 2001: xi-xiii).  
A pressing circumstance happens when the UNSC rejects a proposal or fails to 
deal with it in a timely manner. In this event, the UNGA should exert its subsidiary role 
in accordance with resolution 377 (V), commonly known as the “uniting for peace” 
resolution.209 Besides that, regional or sub-regional organizations can take enforcement 
action in their areas of jurisdiction subsequently seeking authorization from the UNSC. 
This last possibility represented a departure point from the UN Charter, which affirms 
“no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (United Nations, 1945: 11). 
More worryingly, the document asserted that “concerned states may not rule out other 
means” if the UNSC fails to discharge its responsibility (ICISS, 2001: xiii). 
The debate unfolded in 2004 with the report of the secretary-general’s high-level 
panel on threats, challenges and change. By and large, it reiterated the ICISS’s 
publication, reckoning that states might not be able or willing to meet their 
responsibility to protect. In these situations, the international community may resort to 
sanctions and mediation to prevent threats from emerging and to remedy “catastrophic 
internal wrongs”. “When all else fails”, continues the report, “it may be necessary and 
legitimate to use force” (United Nations, 2004: viii; 66). The report of the secretary-
general classified R2P as an “emerging norm”, affirming that the original focus of the 
UN on state security should shift to a human-centered approach.  
A year later, the UNGA approved the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which 
established that countries have the responsibility to protect populations in the 
occurrence of four specific crimes: “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity”. 210  Its paragraphs 138 and 139 were instrumental for future 
developments on the concept of R2P. The former affirmed that state responsibility 
“entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate 
and necessary means”, also inviting the international community to “encourage and 
help” states to build early warning capabilities. The latter determined that the 
																																																								
209 Adopted in 1950, the resolution affirms that the UNGA can make non-binding recommendations to 
restore peace and security if the UNSC fails to exercise its primary responsibility. 
 
210 In that same year, R2P was embraced by the report of secretary-general Kofi Annan, “In Larger 
Freedom” (United Nations, 2005a).  
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international community should use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter. When peaceful means 
prove inadequate or national authorities are failing or unwilling to protect their 
populations, “collective action, in a timely and decisive manner” might be pursued 
through the UNSC, in accordance with the UN Charter, on a case-by-case basis, and in 
cooperation with “relevant regional organizations as appropriate” (United Nations, 
2005b: 30).  
These two paragraphs established three clear limitations to the exercise of R2P. 
A material limitation, or the idea that state responsibility should only be evoked in 
situations involving any of the four crimes; a formal or procedural limitation, since 
action has to be taken through the UNSC and respecting international law and the 
parameters of the UN; and a temporal limitation, as collective action only occurs on a 
case-by-case basis, with the support of regional institutions and after peaceful means 
prove inadequate or national authorities fail or deny exerting their responsibilities. In 
addition to the conceptual developments present in the document, critical points 
remained unanswered, as it happens with the expressions “case-by-case basis”, “timely 
and decisive manner” and “should peaceful means be inadequate”. No threshold was 
defined for the use of peaceful means or for attesting when they are insufficient. Also, 
states did not ascertain common parameters to characterize the four crimes. 
With the concept still lacking precision, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon 
defined, in a 2008 speech in Berlin, the three pillars upon which rests R2P. The first 
pillar affirms the primary responsibility of states to protect their populations from the 
mentioned four crimes. The second pillar underscores the commitment of the 
international community to help states in meeting their obligations. Instead of reacting, 
the goal should be to promote preventive action for states to succeed in fulfilling their 
duties. The third pillar includes the protection of populations from the four crimes and 
opens room for action to be taken “in a timely and decisive manner”. That response 
involves peaceful and coercive measures and might involve collaboration with regional 
and sub-regional organizations. Properly implemented, R2P would therefore bolster UN 
prevention, protection, response, and rebuilding mechanisms.211 
His subsequent intervention was the 2009 report “Implementing the 
responsibility to protect”, which expanded the Berlin speech into a UN document. It 
																																																								
211 See: https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm, accessed on 16 December 2019. 
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recapped previous discussions, reinforced the three-pillar approach and the importance 
of early warning systems, and informed the understanding of sovereignty as 
responsibility. Most importantly, it specified pacific and coercive measures related to 
pillar three, undeniably the most controversial but not that frequently enacted. These 
included, for instance, fact-finding missions to investigate mass human rights 
violations; possible referral of these acts to the ICC; targeted diplomatic sanctions; and 
arms embargoes (United Nations, 2009a).  
In the life cycle of R2P from being an emerging norm to becoming an 
operational concept, two other documents are relevant. The first is the 2010 report 
“Early warning, assessment, and the responsibility to protect”. Among other things, Ban 
Ki-moon’s report requested states to share more information among themselves, the 
UN, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society organizations and groups of 
experts; for the agencies and bodies part of the UN system to read that information 
through the lens of R2P; and for “careful, accurate and impartial assessments of 
conditions on the ground and of policy choices” (United Nations, 2010: 4).  
The second and last document before Brazil’s proposal of RwP is the 2011 
report “The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the 
responsibility to protect”. At that moment, the Arab Spring was gaining ground. The 
report advocated for a closer relationship between the UNSC and regional and sub-
regional organizations (United Nations, 2011a). Moreover, it evaluated how R2P’s three 
pillars could be followed and overseen. Amongst possible contributions it brings to 
pillar one, there are the creation of regional norms to promote human rights and protect 
vulnerable populations, as happens with the OAS and the African Union (AU); the 
development of early warning systems and quiet diplomacy; and the promotion of 
regional justice mechanisms. As for pillar two, the report mentioned the importance of 
initiatives such as mediation, security sector reforms and rule of law. As concerns pillar 
three, the document reckoned that although the use of force should only occur as last 
resort, the doctrine for the use of peacekeeping and military assets in the context of 
atrocity crimes is not well developed, needing to include regional and sub-regional 
partners.212 
																																																								
212 Up to November 2018, R2P was referenced in 77 UNSC resolutions and presidential statements. The 
overwhelming majority refers to Africa. See: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/unsc-resolutions-and-
statements-with-r2p-table-as-of-27-november-2018-1.pdf, accessed on 17 December 2019. 
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 Bearing in mind the evolution of R2P, four points are worth discussing. The first 
(i) concerns whether R2P is a “Western” norm imposed by the developed countries – 
among them the former colonial powers – upon the developing world (Crossley, 2018). 
On this matter, discussions on the use of force and humanitarian intervention appeared 
in the Constitutive Act of the AU years before the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
(Freire, Lopes and Nascimento, 2016). Furthermore, two former African secretaries-
general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, defended R2P.  
With the 2009 report, the debate focused on making R2P a reality. That 
adjustment legitimized the participation of non-Western players like the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was already implementing some 
aspects of R2P in Africa. Reasoning on the role of regional and sub-regional 
organizations, Chandler (2009: 36) argued that “at the heart, the discourse of 
‘responsibility to protect’ appears to be the desire to divest Western responsibility rather 
than to take on it”, relocating the use of force to the non-Western world. This might be 
true in less dramatic cases like Kenya (2007-2008), which is more related to the non-
coercive dimensions of R2P, but in Libya, Syria or Yemen the effective use of coercive 
force requires not only the authorization of the P5 (three of them “Western powers”), 
but also their military involvement (O’Shea, 2012). As far as countries like Russia and 
more recently China have touched upon R2P, the ones traditionally advocating for it are 
the P3 and states like Australia and Canada.  
The second point (ii) concerns the tensions between R2P as a philosophical 
discussion and as an operational concept (Stefan, 2016). The path from debating the 
right to intervention, human security and responsibility to protect to actually putting the 
“boots on the ground” is not straightforward. Questions remain until this day on how 
the “international community” should assume the burden; what are the triggers to 
clearly ascertain when any of the four crimes are occurring; what “timely and decisive 
manner” means; how proportionality can be assured when all non-military means prove 
inefficient; and how much should the UNSC resort to the veto in situations of mass 
human rights violations (Welsh, 2013). Furthermore, the implementation of R2P is not 
always marked by pure humanitarian orientation, as enacting pillar three requires 
financial, political and military commitments, which might be hard to justify to 
domestic audiences. 
The third point (iii) refers to R2P’s three pillars and to whether they should be 
interpreted sequentially, with pillar three coming only after pillars one and two are 
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deemed ineffective. In his 2009 intervention, Ban Ki-moon affirmed that the three 
pillars are non-sequential and of equal importance, but underscored that they should be 
tailored to each individual situation (United Nations, 2009a). Bellamy (2015b: 53) 
defended that the three pillars “are so intertwined as to make sequencing impossible in 
practice”. In his view, states are “supported in their efforts to fulfill the first pillar by 
both pillar two and those elements of the third pillar which relate to assisting ‘states 
under stress’ before they reach the point of ‘manifest failure’”. This imprecision creates 
an operational problem, since states can affirm that, in a specific case, pillar one was 
quickly not fulfilled, calling for the enactment of pillars two or three. In another case, 
the same set of actors might spend much more time trying to implement the state’s 
responsibility to protect its populations from the four crimes, with the other two pillars 
appearing much later.  
The fourth and related point (iv) alludes to the role of the UNSC. Exactly 
because the inspirations for R2P and its implementation are controversial, the 
permanent members of the council can incur in inaction, as in the cases of Yemen and 
Syria, and in misjudgment, as happened with Libya. Moreover, the individual interests 
of the P5 and their different readings of the principles of non-intervention and sovereign 
equality of states can hamper the authorization for the use of force. Bellamy (2013: 335) 
reckons that although R2P is best seen as a “habit former”, it does not determine 
particular behaviors or guarantee consensuses because decision-making processes are 
“heavily influenced by contextual factors”.  
On the functioning of the UNSC, its decisions are taken by the affirmative vote 
of nine of its 15 members on procedural and non-procedural matters. The veto is cast as 
an instrument of political pressure and display of power and appears in non-procedural 
matters (i.e. Chapter VII resolutions), as they need the concurring vote of all permanent 
members.213 The prerogative became less frequent today in comparison to the Cold 
War, but is still used by the P5 in “sensitive” issues. Besides, they can utilize the 
“hidden veto”, or the threat to use the veto, which normally occurs in informal 
consultations behind closed doors. Permanent and non-permanent members also make 
use of abstentions, which can undermine the legitimacy of a decision.  
																																																								
213 See: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-
vote.php, accessed on 17 December 2019. Decisions of the UNGA on “important questions” require a 
two-third majority of the members present and voting. They include, for instance, recommendations with 
respect to peace and security matters. Other decisions require a majority of the members present. 
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Adding to that, the decision-making procedures at the UNSC are commonly 
non-transparent and subject to restrictive talks between the P5, which prevent non-
permanent members from having a say in matters. As the UNSC is a closed, non-
democratic, and hierarchical setting, non-permanent members have a harder time to 
push forward proposals and influence the agenda.  
Many of the discussed traits are further analyzed in relation to Brazil’s RwP. 
 
IV.2. Brazil’s domestic peace and security-related assets  
  As happened with the climate change regime, Brazilian negotiators rely on 
material and immaterial assets to act on peace and security matters. I hereby point out 
four of them: (i) the country’s “history of peace”, which is commonly evoked in the 
official narrative and reverberated multilaterally; (ii) the participation in efforts of 
mediation and preventive diplomacy, which underscores that force should only be used 
as a last resort; (iii) Brazil’s contributions to peacekeeping operations both in practical 
terms and in discussions advocating for enduring peace; and (iv) recent documents 
guiding Brazil’s general orientation on peace and security issues, as well as the tangible 
assets of its Armed Forces. The first three elements contrast with the fact that the 
country faces endemic levels of domestic violence and is the second-largest producer of 
small arms in the Western hemisphere.  
On the first point (i), authorities reiterate Brazil is a “peace loving” nation, as it 
was not part of any major conflicts since the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) 
and settled most of its border disputes in amicable terms.214 That foundational narrative 
portrays a country “satisfied” with its territory. Brazil would therefore possess a 
“natural” standing to advance constructive proposals regarding peace and security 
issues, a “vocation” that is enshrined in the country’s most recent constitution (Santos, 
2016).215  
Contrary to the official narrative, violence is endemic. The daily death toll tops 
war-torn Syria, with nearly 64 thousand murders and 60 thousand cases of rape 
recorded in 2017. In the same period, Brazil’s police killed around 14 people every day, 
and 385 policemen died. Whereas Brazil promotes itself as a “cordial” country in 
																																																								
214 That narrative continued even with Brazil’s participation in both world wars.   
 
215 Its article 4 brings the principles guiding Brazil’s international relations, which mirrors parts of the UN 
Charter and includes, for instance, “sovereign equality of states”, “non-intervention” and “peaceful 
solution of controversies”.  
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mediation efforts and in multilateral forums, it is afflicted by rampant violence, 
especially against poor, young, black men, not to mention gender-motivated violence 
(Albuquerque, 2018b). Besides, it is plagued by gang wars spurred by an underfunded, 
overcrowded, and deadly prison system.216 On top of that, Brazil is the second-largest 
producer of small arms in the Western hemisphere, after the United States (Dreyfus et 
al., 2010). Its arms industry now ventures in countries with known human rights 
violations and civil wars like Yemen (Muggah and Thompson, 2016).217  
When it comes to Brazil’s credentials as a mediator (ii), that orientation started 
in the early XX century and involved, for example, the participation at the 1907 Hague 
Peace conference, in which the principle of sovereign equality of states was upheld; the 
contributions to the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice; and the 
mediation of the conflict between Colombia and Peru concerning the Leticia region in 
the 1930s (Conduru, 2016).  
With its creation, the UN became the main forum in which negotiators have 
engaged in peace and security debates. Both during dictatorship and democracy, they 
made use of arenas like the UNCTAD and the ECOSOC, reinforcing existing normative 
and operational parameters and, in most occasions, subordinating security to 
development as a means to achieve peaceful solution of controversies. More recently, 
that conciliatory approach was tempered with the intention to assume more 
responsibilities on the global stage, a step further in Brazil’s “graduation process” 
(Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, 2017). Although the country has been a relevant player in 
defusing several regional crises in the 1990s and the 2000s, the intention is to be 
reckoned as a reliable player beyond its immediate neighborhood (Spektor, 2010).  
That will was clearly seen during the administration of Lula da Silva, when 
Brazil attempted to mediate intricate affairs such as the Palestinian-Israeli imbroglio 
and, together with Turkey, the Iranian nuclear program. Furthermore, alongside India 
and South Africa at the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), Brazilian 
negotiators consulted in 2011 with the Syrian government, hoping to achieve a 
																																																								
216 In 2015, the UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment harshly criticized Brazil’s incarceration system. Two years later, the UN’s High 
Commissioner for Human Rights condemned a prison massacre that ended with more than 50 dead. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16325&LangID=E, accessed 
on 19 December 2019. 
 
217 In 2018, Brazil finally ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a binding accord regulating conventional 
arms transfers, five years after signing it. 
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compromise that could lead to a halt in violence. In the three situations, Brazil’s efforts 
did not receive backing from the developed countries nor contributed to a lasting 
solution. That activism was discontinued during Rousseff’s administration, which led 
some to argue that Brazil had been acting “adventurously” and punching above its 
weight. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that all cases are unresolved until this day, so it 
might be unreasonable to expect Brazil to solve these long-standing issues.218  
Brazil’s involvement in peacekeeping operations (iii) dates back to the first 
multinational UN commission on the Balkans in 1947 and the first UN force to the Suez 
in 1956. Up to now, more than 50 thousand nationals – exerting civilian, military and 
police functions – took part in 47 missions, including 43 peacekeeping operations 
(Hamann and Teixeira, 2017). When engaging in these operations, Brazil upholds a 
similar set of principles directing the role of the UN in peace and security matters: 
consent of the main parties; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defense and 
defense of the mandate. Additionally, Brazilian authorities defend that the path to 
enduring peace should take into consideration the interdependence between security and 
development.219  
Beyond that, Brazil ties military participation with technical cooperation 
projects in areas such as health, food security, basic education, and public security. On 
the one hand, that approach serves the intention to be seen as “non-indifferent” (Herz, 
2014). On the other hand, it fulfills the bureaucratic agendas of several ministries 
interested in enlarging their international responsibilities. 
Two cases best illustrate Brazil’s views on security, peacekeeping operations, 
and use of force: its participation at the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and its 
leadership at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 
2004 to 2017. First, beyond directing the Guinea-Bissau Country-Specific 
Configuration, Brazil chaired the PBC in the period 2014-2015, defending a 
comprehensive approach to security and stressing the importance of overcoming the 
																																																								
218 An exception is the Colombian case, as Brazil did not follow through with its participation in the 
agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016. 
See: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/matiasspektor/2016/03/1745739-para-rir-ou-chorar.shtml, 
accessed on 19 December 2019. 
 
219 When presiding the UNSC in 2011, Brazil circulated a statement on the interdependence between 
security and development (United Nations, 2011b). Such a vision is partly seen in peacekeeping 
operations combining tasks like protection of civilians, disarmament, electoral assistance, human rights 
promotion, and restoration of the rule of law.  
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root causes of conflicts.220 Second, Brazil assumed the military command of the 
MINUSTAH, contributed with 37 thousand troops and disbursed more than US$ 630 
million, most of that after the 2010 earthquake.221 During the mission, Brazil was twice 
at the UNSC (2004-2005 and 2010-2011) and its diplomats influenced the contours of 
the security agenda, attempting to fulfill the aspiration to be seen as a responsible 
country (Hamann and Teixeira, 2017). 
Moreover, the participation in MINUSTAH impacted Brazil’s interpretation on 
the use of force. As Haiti was a Chapter VII operation and Brazil traditionally balked at 
missions under that chapter, which is focused on robust action and peace enforcement, 
its involvement required a well-defined strategy. Brazilian diplomats resisted a mandate 
mainly centering on security matters, also defending support to reconstruction and 
development. Facing the opposition of Washington and Moscow, Brazil “diluted” its 
agenda in specific parts of UNSC resolution 1542 (2004), later opening spaces for 
development-related issues in MINUSTAH’s mandate (Fontoura and Uziel, 2017: 11). 
Kenkel (2016) observes that Chapter VII is only mentioned in a specific paragraph, 
which allowed Brazil to participate without fully qualifying the mission as such. That 
diplomatic contortion led some to categorize MINUSTAH as a “Chapter VI and a half” 
mission. 
 Brazil’s domestic assets related to peace and security (iv) are accompanied by 
three main documents: the National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy, and 
the Defense White Paper. Among its objectives, the National Defense Policy – 
established in 1996 and later revised in 2005, 2012, and 2016 - aims to contribute to 
international peace and security; reinforce multilateralism and the reform of multilateral 
institutions; increase Brazil’s role in international decisions; and assure sovereignty and 
territorial integrity (Brasil, 2012).  
The National Defense Strategy, published in 2008 and revised in 2012 and 2016, 
endeavors to fulfill the mentioned objectives through the development of defense and 
security capabilities.222 Brazilian domestic assets would contribute to a global order 
																																																								
220 On the notion of sustainable peace or sustaining peace, see: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12340.doc.htm, accessed on 19 December 2019. 
 
221 See: http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2017-05/apos-13-anos-missao-no-haiti-
comandada-pelo-brasil-se-aproxima-do-fim, accessed on 19 December 2019.  
 
222 The concepts of security and defense are interwoven. In the official view, “security” refers to assuring 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and promoting national interests. “Defense” regards concrete 
initiatives to maintain sovereignty. See: Albuquerque (2016b) and Brasil (2012). 
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marked by multipolarity, or, as the National Defense Strategy defines, “power 
pluralism” (Brasil, 2012: 62). 
The 2012 White Paper, which was also revised in 2016, complements the other 
two documents, serving as a mechanism of accountability and a way to promote 
transparency and trust-building measures. It informs that “Brazilian foreign policy has 
projected values and interests within the framework of global governance” (Brazil, 
2012a: 15). This scenario, marked by a “reorganization of political relations between 
states”, brings opportunities and challenges, which requires “strict coordination between 
foreign and defense policies” (Brazil, 2012a: 31).  
Besides, three sectors are described as essential in the process of upgrading 
Brazil’s military forces: aerospace, nuclear and cybernetic, which are respectively under 
the responsibility of the Air Force, the Navy and the Army. The aerospace sector 
gathers a range of projects such as the Brazilian Satellite Launching Vehicle (VLS-1) 
and the FX-2 project, which involved the purchase of 36 Gripen NG fighters. 
Concerning the nuclear sector, Brazil has mastered the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful 
purposes and the Navy coordinates the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), 
which includes a nuclear-propelled submarine. Lastly, the cybernetic sector aims to 
enhance Brazil’s intelligence and strategic capabilities.  
According to the Military Balance, Brazil had the world’s 11th largest defense 
budget in 2015. With US$ 24,3 billion disbursed, it was the only Latin American 
country in the top 15, representing 40,5% of the defense spending of Latin America and 
the Caribbean and being followed by Colombia (16,5%), Argentina (10,8%) and 
Mexico (10,1%).223 Brazil’s harsh economic crisis led to cuts in defense expenditure, 
affecting initiatives like the KC-390 transport aircraft and the PROSUB project 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016: 369-371).224 The SIPRI Military 
Expenditure Database pointed out that military disbursements recovered in 2017, 
																																																																																																																																																																		
 
223 Nevertheless, Brazil’s defense budget in comparison to its GDP was lower than countries like 
Colombia or Uruguay. Considering the BRICS, Brazil only ranks higher than South Africa (Brustolin, 
2014). 
 
224 The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) of the Correlates of War Project shows Brazil’s 
CINC around (.025) in 2012, which was similar to 2002, 1996 and 1989. Data demonstrates that, up to 
2012, national capabilities have not significantly risen. I should mention, however, that the index does not 
fully capture the new realities of armed conflicts, which do not rely on traditional raw materials like iron 
and steel. Besides that, Brazil’s investments in its Armed Forces were under way in 2011, the last year 
captured by the CINC. Rodriguez (2013) brings valuable insights. See: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, accessed 21 December 2019. 
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reaching circa US$ 25,7 billion or 3,7% of government’s spending.225 In that year, the 
budget of the Ministry of Defense was around 1,4% of Brazil’s GDP.226 
As I further demonstrate, the connection of these domestic assets with the 
proposal of RwP is feeble, with it being more related to the other explanatory factors.  
 
IV.3. Domestic decision-making processes related to peace and security 
 Brazil’s multilateral engagement mainly responds to the participation of the 
ministries of External Relations (MRE) and Defense (MD) in domestic decision-making 
processes. The irregular interchanges between these two government departments date 
back to the independence of Brazil and continued through the beginning of the XX 
century, when Itamaraty and the Ministry of War – renamed Ministry of Defense in 
1999 - worked to secure the country’s borders. Between 1950s and the early 1980s, 
dialogue remained with the promotion of arms exports to several countries, including 
both sides of the Iran-Iraq war; the support for the creation of the Zone of Peace and 
Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS); and the definition of a common 
position regarding the Malvinas War. In democratic times, both ministries agree on 
enhancing Brazil’s standing in global affairs. 
The Ministry of Defense regained relative prestige and bureaucratic space. This 
process was not free from crises and setbacks. During the administration of Lula da 
Silva, four ministers struggled to handle matters related to the incomplete transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy. Under the guidance of ambassador José Viegas 
Filho (2003-2004), for instance, disputes occurred about the legacy of the dictatorship. 
Vice-president and minister José Alencar (2004-2006) had a less troubled 
administration, being able to organize the National Defense Policy and invest in several 
projects. Beyond lacking support from the PT, Waldir Pires (2006-2007) faced 
continuous crises in the country’s commercial aviation sector. 
Lula da Silva’s fourth minister, Nelson Jobim (2007-2011), remained in charge 
until the first year of Rousseff’s government, leaving the position for criticizing the PT. 
This longevity allowed him to combine defense and security with foreign policy, 
reorganize the three forces, and prepare the National Defense Strategy. Under Celso 
																																																								
225 See: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex, accessed on 21 December 2019. Also see: 




aumenta-em-36-investimentos-militares.shtml, accessed on 21 December 2019. 
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Amorim (2011-2014), a former chancellor, the MD’s participation in foreign policy was 
visible in peacekeeping missions. Amorim continued investing in the improvement of 
domestic capabilities and updating key documents, but had to accommodate tensions 
related to the National Truth Commission. The two other ministers during Rousseff’s 
administration, Jacques Wagner (2015) and Aldo Rebelo (2015-2016), were more 
focused on bureaucratic issues.  
The MD exerts a secondary function in Brazil’s role in the peace and security 
regime. Its participation revolves around topics like peacekeeping; defense partnerships; 
and treaties dealing with defense matters, for example the NPT. More recently, the MD 
has broadened its engagement. That expansion is tributary to Brazil’s lasting presence at 
the MINUSTAH and other peacekeeping missions and in reason of the work of 
ministers like Jobim, Amorim, Wagner, and Raul Jungmann (2016-2018), who headed 
the ministry after Rousseff’s impeachment.227 
As for the MD’s inner dynamics, the three forces dispute financial resources, 
bureaucratic clout and prestige. As mentioned, they gained special projects related to 
their expertise during the presidencies of the PT, which helped to appease 
dissatisfaction. Apart from eventual clashes, the Armed Forces normally exhibit an 
image of cohesion. The MD, the Armed Forces Joint Staff, and the Sergio Vieira de 
Mello Peace Operations Training Center (CCOPAB) – both created in 2010 - act to 
reinforce the perception of unity. 
The MRE is responsible for upholding the country’s views in forums such as the 
UNGA, the UNSC, and the PBC. Until the end of Rousseff’s government, Itamaraty 
centered its peace and security initiatives on the Undersecretariat General for Political 
Affairs I (SGAP-I), which included the Department for International Organizations 
(DOI). With Temer, defense issues gained more space with the creation of the 
Department of Defense and Security Affairs (DDEFS).228  
Some diplomats who now rank ambassadors have made their careers based at 
multilateral institutions and Brazil’s mission to the UN. Furthermore, some officials 
developed their thesis for Itamaraty’s Advanced Studies Course (CAE) on peace and 
																																																								
227 After Jungmann, a politician, president Temer appointed former Army general Joaquim Silva e Luna 
as minister. He was the first non-civilian to lead the ministry.  
 
228 For Itamaraty’s organizational charts, see: 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/organograma/20150323-Organograma-eng.pdf (for Rousseff) and 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/organograma/20160810-Organograma-port.pdf (for Temer). 
Accessed on 21 December 2019. 
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security themes. That professional path is imperative for better knowledge of the 
working methods of the UNSC. That is the case of one of Rousseff’s chancellors, 
Antonio Patriota (2011-2013), who wrote a CAE thesis on the role of the UNSC after 
the Gulf War. He worked at the Brazilian mission to the UN when the country was a 
non-permanent member (1998-1999); as the cabinet chief of the chancellor in 2004-
2005, also when Brazil was at the UNSC and the UN discussed the aftermath of the Iraq 
War; was the undersecretary-general for political affairs in Brasília; and chancellor in 
the last year of Brazil’s most recent presence at the UNSC (2010-2011). In total, Brazil 
was at the council 10 times, having a non-permanent seat for the longest amount of time 
after Japan (11 times).229 
 The MD and the MRE are the most isolated ministries of Brazil’s government. 
Both developed inward-oriented values and hierarchical cultures, which led to 
autonomous policies and limited coordination (Kenkel, 2016).230 More recently, some 
initiatives to approximate the two ministries were established, for instance, the strategic 
assessment mechanisms with bilateral partners, and the meetings to promote inter-
institutional cooperation and discuss topics like humanitarian assistance and defense 
exports.231 These activities gained more relevance after Rousseff’s presidency.  
Aside from this, no clear guidelines exist about the role of the MD in relation to 
the promotion of peace and security concepts, ideas or proposals. Fittingly, the decision-
making processes related to multilateral initiatives had, up to the end of Rousseff’s 
administration, Itamaraty exerting a prominent role.232 As it occurs with climate change, 
possible clashes in the domestic dynamics are not perceptible to non-experts. The 
majority of Brazil’s ideas are formulated at the MRE in Brasília or at its delegation to 
the UN in New York. One difference, though, is that disputes are less frequent (or made 
																																																								
229 On the list of non-permanent members, see: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/countries-
elected-members, accessed on 21 December 2019.  
 
230 In 2013, Brazil had 63 military attachés in 34 countries. See: 
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,brasil-espalha-adidos-militares-para-ampliar-influencia-e-
fazer-negocios-imp-,1106111, accessed on 21 December 2019. 
 
231 See: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/17933-reuniao-do-mecanismo-de-
coordenacao-entre-o-ministerio-das-relacoes-exteriores-e-o-ministerio-da-defesa, accessed on 21 
December 2019. These meetings can also include other government bodies like the Institutional Security 
Cabinet. See: https://www.defesa.gov.br/noticias/26193-defesa-mre-e-gsi-aproximam-agendas-
internacionais-e-criam-mecanismo-de-coordenacao, accessed on 21 December 2019. 
 




public) in comparison to climate change. Additionally, the MD does not exert the same 
level of multilateral participation as the Ministry of the Environment, which leaves 
more room for Itamaraty to optimize its actions. 
Lastly, the president nominates the commanders of the three forces and the 
minister of defense and is assisted by them in what concerns the employment of military 
means (Brazil, 2012a). The presidential role in the decision-making process varies in 
accordance with his/her interest in peace and security matters; convergence with the 
minister and the ministry’s bureaucracy; and relations with the three forces. Amorim 
Neto (2012) points out that while during Lula da Silva’s government he and minister 
Jobim formed a cohesive decision-making unit leading to shifts in the defense policy, 
that situation was not repeated with Rousseff.   
 
IV.4. The responsibility while protecting   
Brazilian negotiators proposed RwP as a consequence of NATO’s intervention 
in Libya. The Libyan crisis occurred amid the 2011 “Arab Spring”, or a series of 
protests in Middle Eastern and African countries in which dissatisfied populations 
demonstrated against authoritarian regimes.  
 
IV.4.1. The escalating Libyan crisis 
Protests against Gaddafi initiated in late January-early February 2011 and 
increased after security forces launched a crackdown on demonstrators. Unrest mounted 
against his 42-year rule, quickly escalating into civil strife. From that moment on, 
foreign voices started manifesting over the situation, leading the way to the approval of 
Chapter VII resolutions. On February 21st, the International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH) denounced severe human rights violations (FIDH, 2011a). The following 
day, the Arab League convened an extraordinary meeting reproving the repression.233 
On February 24th, the FIDH published another report asserting that Gaddafi’s regime 
was acting to massively eliminate citizens, which “could be qualified as crimes against 
humanity”. It recalled the UNSC’s “responsibility to protect”, demanding the UNSC to 
refer the facts to the ICC (FIDH, 2011b: 1).   
																																																								




A day later, a special session of the Human Rights Council passed a resolution 
on Libya, condemning the “gross and systematic human rights violations”. Brazil co-
sponsored the resolution, which was adopted by consensus. The notion of R2P is at the 
core of the document, as it “strongly calls upon the government of Libya to meet its 
responsibility to protect its population” (Human Rights Council, 2011: 3). The 
resolution requested the council to dispatch an independent commission of inquiry to 
investigate human rights violations, which can be understood as a first step towards the 
criminal accountability of the ones involved with the mentioned abuses.  
The role of regional and international organizations was crucial, as they helped 
turn criticism into a concerted push towards enforcement action. At that moment, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) vigorously backed a collective call for a 
fact-finding mission. The Arab League affirmed the Libyan government “was bound by 
legal obligations to its people” and the AU demanded the “respect of the aspirations and 
demands” of the population.234 
Pressure mounted when, on February 26th, the UNSC unanimously approved 
resolution 1970. Although voting in favor, only Brazil, India, Russia, and China decided 
not to co-sponsor the resolution. Recalling the severe tone of the Human Rights Council 
and “welcoming” the role of the Arab League, the AU and the OIC, the UNSC 
condemned the use of force against civilians, adding it “may” amount to crimes against 
humanity (United Nations, 2011c: 1). The UNSC recalled the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect, referred the situation to the ICC; established an embargo of 
arms; imposed travel bans; assets freeze; and created a committee to monitor the 
implementation of the resolution. 235  Although resolution 1970 reaffirmed its 
commitment to the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” of Libya 
(United Nations, 2011c: 2-3), its operational paragraphs expected to force the Libyan 
government to undertake its responsibility to protect. Furthermore, the resolution clearly 




accessed on 21 December 2019. 
 
235 Indian UN ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri wrote that Brazil, India, China, Portugal, and Lebanon 
“felt that an ICC referral would have two unintended effects. One, it could queer the pitch and result in 
reprisals by Gaddafi. Two, while the ‘threat’ of an ICC referral could serve as a deterrent, an outright and 
immediate referral would leave him with no incentive for good behavior” (Puri, 2016: 68-69 and 72). 
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A day after resolution 1970, opposition groups formed the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) in Benghazi. In response, Gaddafi accused rebel forces to include 
terrorists from organizations like al-Qaeda.236 As days went by, multiple sources 
affirmed opposition supporters were subject to torture and death – including by 
airstrikes - by Gaddafi’s forces.237  
With the continuation of skirmishes, the EU approved a package of sanctions 
against Libya, the United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton warned that “nothing 
was off the table”, and British foreign secretary William Hague defended suspending 
Libya from the Human Rights Council. Most notably, EU foreign policy chief Catherine 
Ashton affirmed a “more complex set of negotiations was being held over the 
possibility of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya”.238 British prime minister David 
Cameron discussed the matter with French president Nicolas Sarkozy, while the United 
States deployed warships and air force units around the African country. Cameron 
suggested that the United Kingdom might consider arming the Libyan opposition.239 As 
rhetoric escalated, resistance still existed within both the UNSC and NATO. Russia’s 
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called the plans superfluous and NATO secretary-
general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said there was no mandate for a no-fly zone.240  
On March 1st, the UNGA suspended Libya from the Human Rights Council and, 
from that moment on, perspectives of a no-fly zone enhanced (United Nations, 2011d). 
Meanwhile, the ICC launched a full investigation on Libya, where opposition forces 
were advancing and bloody clashes endured. The NTC declared itself Libya’s single 
representative.  
Talks to establish a no-fly zone continued, mostly in response to the rhetoric of 
the British. Foreign secretary Hague mentioned contingency planning was taking place, 
																																																								
236 See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8414583/Libya-al-
Qaeda-among-Libya-rebels-Nato-chief-fears.html, accessed on 22 December 2019. 
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239 See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/28/us-military-gaddafi-libya, accessed on 22 
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240 See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/28/no-fly-zone-libya?INTCMP=SRCH and 




adding that the United Kingdom was negotiating with the Arab League and NATO. 
Rebel groups supported the action. The endorsement from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council came on March 7th, the same day the American administration started moving 
away from the opinions of defense secretary Robert Gates.241  
On March 9th, although the decision-making process was still divided in the 
United States, leaders of Paris, Washington and London were accommodating their 
discourses in and out of the UNSC. Whereas American president Barack Obama and 
Cameron agreed on a “full spectrum” of military responses, NATO started a 24-hour air 
and sea surveillance of Libya, and British and French diplomats composed a draft 
resolution authorizing the no-fly zone. The idea of the P3 was to garner support from 
the Islamic world, the Libyan opposition, and the majority of the members of the UNSC 
to force Moscow and Beijing not to veto. In the next days, NATO secretary-general 
Rasmussen affirmed the no-fly zone depended on three conditions: legal mandate from 
the UNSC, support of regional actors, and a demonstrable need, posing a halt on calls 
for harsher actions.242  
As rebel forces became surrounded in Zawiya, Cameron and Sarkozy failed to 
persuade EU leaders meeting in Brussels. German prime minister Angela Merkel 
remembered there was “no legal basis” for the measure and reinforced the need to 
discuss with the Arab League, while Catherine Ashton affirmed the efficiency of a no-
fly zone was questionable.243 Later on, the Council of the Arab League asked the UNSC 
to impose the no-fly zone, fulfilling one of the three conditions set by NATO secretary-
general: support of regional actors.244 That happened when pro-Gaddafi forces were 
resorting to brute force while approaching Benghazi. These military victories were 
obtained mostly with tanks and artillery and not warplanes. The London-Paris axis then 
redoubled pressures on a hesitant United States and demanded clear positions from 
Germany, Brazil, Russia, and China.  
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242 See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8358841/Libya-as-it-
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More was still needed, as France failed to get an endorsement from the G-8 
foreign affairs ministers. Meeting in Paris on March 14th and 15th, Germany and Russia 
continued blocking the measure. Outside the G-8 but also sitting at the UNSC, Brazil 
and South Africa were said to be against imposing the no-fly zone.245 In this adverse 
scenario, France and Britain drafted another UNSC resolution, hoping to “force the 
pace”. This time receiving the support of Lebanon, the two European countries asked 
for a ban on all flights in Libya and a stronger enforcement of the arms embargo.246  
On March 17th, as Gaddafi’s forces were shelling Benghazi, the UNSC approved 
resolution 1973, authorizing the no-fly zone. With that, the two other conditions set by 
Fogh Rasmussen were supposedly met: a legal mandate and the demonstrable need to 
stop the consequences of Gaddafi’s incursion. The text affirmed the Libyan government 
failed to comply with resolution 1970 and reiterated its “responsibility to protect”. The 
UNSC deplored the systematic human rights violations and again considered that the 
attacks “may amount to crimes against humanity” (United Nations, 2011e: 1). As 
before, the word “may” suggested a lack of consensus within the UNSC.  
Resolution 1973 recalled resolution 1970, referring that the council could 
“consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and 
support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and 
related assistance” (idem, remarked). The resolution enforced the arms embargo, 
broadened the assets freeze and travel restrictions, and created a panel of experts to 
assist the committee created by resolution 1970.  
The central excerpts are operative paragraphs 4 and 8. The first  
 
Authorizes member states (…) to take all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack (…) including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory 
(United Nations, 2011e: 3, remarked). 
 
																																																								
245 See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/15/no-fly-zone-over-libya, accessed on 23 
December 2019. 
 
246 See: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12754519, accessed on 23 December 2019. A Brazilian 
diplomat (MRE#6) mentioned the Lebanese did not have any influence on the text of the resolution: “they 
had to call the French ambassador and [American ambassador] Susan Rice to be able to alter anything in 
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The second also authorized “all necessary measures” to enforce the ban on 
flights (idem). Although the resolution was clear on the prohibition of an occupation 
force, it left wide room for action. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Portugal, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, and South 
Africa voted in favor. Russia, China, Germany, Brazil, and India abstained. The votes 
demonstrate that resolution 1973 was far from enjoying far-reaching legitimacy as 
precedent resolution 1970. As Lizza (2011: 24) points out, “it was the first time in 66 
years that the UN authorized military action to preempt an ‘imminent massacre’”. Also, 
it was “the first manifestation of the UNSC’s operationalization of R2P” (Puri, 2016: 
48). 
In the discussions prior to the approval of resolution 1973, British ambassador 
Mark Lyall Grant mentioned it came to light in reason of the appeal of the Arab League. 
His words are revealing because he transfers the responsibility of approving the 
resolution:  
 
The League of Arab States has been particularly clear in its demands, including for the 
imposition of a no-fly zone. That is why, the United Kingdom, in close cooperation with 
Lebanon and France, has pressed for the early adoption of today’s resolution (United 
Nations, 2011f: 4, remarked). 
 
Clinton similarly mentioned that: “now we are going to see whether the Security 
Council will support the Arab League. Not support the United States – support the Arab 
League. That is a significant difference” (Lizza, 2011: 23).247 
When it comes to the abstentions, Indian ambassador Puri remembered that the 
UN secretary-general appointed a special envoy and the AU was sending a high-level 
panel to Libya, both yet to present conclusions to the UNSC. Without that, the council 
did not have credible information to act. He was reminding the importance of fact-
finding missions and similar measures for the enactment of R2P’s pillar three. China 
and Russia argued that many questions asked during UNSC’s consultations were not 
clarified. However, as the situation in Libya was very volatile, Moscow and Beijing 
decided not to be seen as co-responsible for possible crimes against humanity or war 
crimes.  
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German ambassador Peter Wittig affirmed his country abstained because of 
paragraphs 4 and 8. He explained that “if the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, 
we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict” (United Nations, 
2011f: 4). Finally, Brazilian ambassador Maria Luisa Viotti argued resolution 1973 
contained measures far beyond the call made by the Arab League:  
 
We are not convinced that the use of force as provided for in paragraph 4 of the 
resolution will lead to the realization of our common objective – the immediate end to 
violence and the protection of civilians. We are also concerned that such measures may 
have the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and causing more 
harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting (United 
Nations, 2011f: 6).248 
 
The next days saw Gaddafi’s promise that his regime would comply with a 
ceasefire, which was not verified, and the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn, 
expected to enforce the no-fly zone. The P3 and allied states launched military action 
from air and sea. NATO then started operation Unified Protector, taking over the 
military command from the P3. Its large-scale attacks were “widely seen as 
disproportionate, careless of civilian lives, and extending beyond the agreed plan to 
impose a defensive no-fly zone”.249 
NATO offensive exposed how fragile was the diplomatic consensus and how 
little information parties had (Kuperman, 2013). Questions on the legality of the attacks, 
the possibility of arming the rebels, and if Gaddafi was a target often appeared 
(Zambakari, 2016). Regretting its abstention, Russia saw an indiscriminate use of force. 
China remarked it “was not in favor of any arbitrary interpretation of the council’s 
resolutions or of any actions going beyond those mandated” (United Nations, 2011g: 
10). India called for a cessation of air strikes.250 The Arab League, which was seen as 
the resolution’s guarantor, had reservations. South Africa and Nigeria called for 
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249 See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/libya-nato-us-france-uk. Also see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-ceasefire-consensus-russia-china-india, 
accessed on 26 December 2019. 
 
250 See: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Cessation-of-conflict-need-of-the-hour-
India/article14956402.ece, accessed on 26 December 2019. 
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immediate ceasefire. The United States retreated, leaving the leadership of the operation 
to the United Kingdom and France.  
Days later, the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested arrest warrants 
for senior figures of the Libyan regime. In this specific UNSC debate, the ambassadors 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – this time accompanied by 
Germany – chose to describe the crimes committed by Gaddafi’s forces, while Russia, 
China, and South Africa emphasized legal arguments.251  
In the next months, the situation in Libya continued to deteriorate, which led the 
AU to demand an end to the bombing campaign and remind its “disappointment” at the 
attempts to “marginalize” its role (United Nations 2011i).252 Amidst this uncertain 
route, NATO’s operation shifted from enforcing a no-fly zone to attacking Gaddafi’s 
forces and putting its weight on the side of the rebels. With the conflict coming to an 
end, the UNSC unanimously approved resolution 2009 on September 16th. It reckoned 
the NTC as the representative of Libya, encouraging it to ensure a political process to 
hold free and fair elections; descaled previous measures related to assets freeze and 
arms embargo; and established the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (United 
Nations, 2011j). 
 Gaddafi was assassinated in October together with the fall of Sirte, which led to 
the approval of resolution 2016 and to the termination of the no-fly zone (United 
Nations, 2011k). In retrospect, the way resolutions 1970 and 1973 were operationalized 
escaped the original idea of protecting civilians. They ended contributing to the splitting 
of the country in two, opening space for terrorist groups and engulfing Libya into long-
term instability. 
 
IV.4.2. Brazil’s RwP proposal 
Brazil was not a central actor in the unfolding Libyan crisis. Its negotiators did 
not actively pursue mediation efforts nor ventilated the country’s positions in the media, 
preferring to defend its views in debates at the UNSC. Brazil voted in favor of 
resolution 1970 and abstained from resolution 1973. Regarding this last document, 
																																																								
251 Criticism also came from the UN. In the words of the undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs 
and emergency relief coordinator Valerie Amos: “the adoption of resolution 1973 (2011) (…) has also 
raised concerns in terms of the potential undermining of the protection of civilians agenda and its 
important role in providing a framework for action in future cases” (United Nations, 2011h: 4) 
 
252 On the role of the AU, see Zambakari (2016). 
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Brazilian diplomats were not as vocal as their Russian and Indian counterparts, 
choosing a more moderate tone and asking for dialogue, immediate ceasefire, the 
establishment of a political process, and post-conflict measures (United Nations, 
2011g).   
 Tracing the origins of what would later be named “responsibility while 
protecting” requires reassessing the discourse of ambassador Viotti on May 10th. She 
exposed the many links between protection of civilians, respect to international law and 
international humanitarian law, and use of force. Additionally, Viotti remarked that 
safeguarding populations from mass human rights violations is not a synonym for R2P 
or a justification for its immediate and unchecked operationalization.  
 
The protection of civilians is a humanitarian imperative. It is a distinct concept that 
must not be confused (…) with the responsibility to protect. We must avoid excessively 
broad interpretations of the protection of civilians, which could link it to the 
exacerbation of conflict, compromise the impartiality of the UN or create the perception 
that it is being used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change (United 
Nations, 2011h: 11). 
 
Reckoning that coercive measures may be needed in some cases, Brazil’s 
ambassador observed that the “use of force must always be a last resort” and not cause 
more harm than good. Moreover, the international community should dialogue with the 
involved parties and regard the importance of monitoring and reporting activities to 
achieve civilian protection. Considering the authority of the UNSC and the 
implementation of its decisions, she presented a very legalistic idea:  
 
When the Council does authorize the use of force, such as in the case of Libya, we must 
hold ourselves to a high standard. The Council has a responsibility to ensure the 
appropriate implementation of its resolutions. Force must be used carefully, with due 
regard for the principle of proportionality and in strict accordance with the terms of the 
authorization. The use of force to protect civilians does not abrogate international law, 
but underlines the need for strict adherence to it (idem).  
 
After that, RwP first appeared in an op-ed written by chancellor Patriota in 
Brazil’s newspaper Folha de S. Paulo. For him, the fundamental is that “the 
international community, when exercising R2P through military means, rely on the 
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corresponding multilateral mandate and observe the precept of responsibility while 
protecting. The use of force can only be contemplated as a last resort” (Patriota, 2011: 
1). His words reflect the notion that the use of violence is traditionally framed as a 
problem rather than a solution (Herz, 2014). 
RwP was presented to the world on September 21st. Before the UNGA, president 
Rousseff made reference to the Arab Spring and to Brazil’s repudiation of the brutal 
repression of civilians. Without mentioning Libya, she said that the path to peace and 
security “cannot be limited to interventions in extreme situations”, as the world “suffers 
from the painful consequences of interventions that aggravated existing conflicts”, 
giving rise to terrorism and new cycles of violence. That is precisely what would 
happen in Libya in the coming months and years. Recalling the importance of conflict 
prevention, diplomacy, and promotion of development, she exposed the idea of the 
“responsibility in protecting”, another name for RwP: “much is said about the 
responsibility to protect; yet we hear little about responsibility in protecting. These are 
concepts that we must develop together” (Brazil, 2011: 5).  
The discourse not only linked RwP to R2P, but also stressed their 
complementarity. In the occasion, Brazil presented itself not as a denier, but as a 
contributor to the normative developments of R2P, exposing the limits of its 
implementation (Harig and Kenkel, 2017). In the Brazilian view, R2P needed a 
conceptual update; a corollary embodied in RwP. Reinforcing what was mentioned by 
ambassador Viotti, Rousseff stated that a more representative UNSC would enhance its 
legitimacy, effectiveness and credibility. Brazil’s bid to permanent membership would 
stem from its “readiness to shoulder its responsibility”; history of peace, “we lived in 
peace with our neighbors for over 140 years”; and resignation to develop nuclear energy 
for non-peaceful purposes (Brazil, 2011: 5-6). 
It took some time after Rousseff’s speech for Brazil’s negotiators to present 
RwP in more detail. That happened during a debate on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflicts at the UNSC on November 9th, when a concept note was provided to 
other UN members. By doing so, Brazilian diplomats were actively engaging in an 
exercise of “branding”, building on Rousseff’s imprecise speech and expecting to make 
other states adhere to the idea (United Nations, 2011l: 15).253  
																																																								
253 One interviewee working for a NGO (NGO#12) mentioned that Brazil’s mission to the UN invited 
permanent representatives “from the Global South” to discuss R2P and RwP and “test the waters” prior to 
the circulation of the concept note.  
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Briefly, RwP can be labeled as a “concept” that builds on the norm of R2P, or 
“an additional conceptual step in dealing with the protection of civilians” (United 
Nations, 2011l: 16). It applies to occasions when the use of force is to be conceded and 
cases when it is already under way. RwP comprises four main points. First, it adds up to 
R2P with a view to accentuate the importance of preventive diplomacy. In this sense, it 
directly touches upon R2P’s pillars one and two. Second and when the use of force is 
already in motion, RwP ascertains that “the international community, as it exercises its 
responsibility to protect, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while 
protecting”. In other words, RwP functions as a means to regulate the use of force, 
while not denying it (Tourinho, Stuenkel and Brockmeier, 2015). The notion of “do no 
harm” is illustrative, as the protection of civilians should not cause greater harm 
because “one casualty is one too many, no matter how noble the intentions” (United 
Nations, 2011l: 16). When authorized, the use of force should be judicious, 
proportionate and limited to the objectives defined by the UNSC, preventing unintended 
consequences. 
Third, RwP underpins the role of the UNSC, asking for “enhanced” procedures 
to monitor and assess “the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and 
implemented” (idem: 17). The goal is to certify the respect for the council’s authority 
and the resolutions it approves, preventing misuses and misinterpretations, and 
correcting possible mistakes committed in the name of R2P.  
A diplomat compared R2P’s nature to dual-use technologies: 
 
The original idea is noble. I guess we cannot deny that. But as in all noble ideas, they 
risk being manipulated and that is the greatest sin of R2P. Not because of its nature. Its 
nature is sort of… Dual. Like you find in nuclear energy. It can be used as a source of 
clean energy, but also to make the atomic bomb. Obviously, that comparison is 
exacerbated, but R2P is something like that. No one wants to sit and watch a new 
massacre like Rwanda or Srebrenica. But if you try to flex criteria stabilizing the 
international system like the principle of state sovereignty and not subject that to 
controlling conditions, then you can think that the ones flexing [the fundamental 
principles] have second, third and fourth ulterior motives. R2P is a fragile product 
needing to be taken care of.254  
 
																																																								
254 Interview with MRE#4. 
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Fourth, R2P’s three pillars “must follow a strict line of political subordination 
and chronological sequencing”, exhausting diplomatic solutions and avoiding the 
“precipitous use of force” (United Nations, 2011m: 2). That orientation was not 
satisfactory to many defenders of R2P. They understood it as an impediment to the 
implementation of R2P, raising issues on when preventive diplomacy ends and the use 
of force starts. Moreover, it was against Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 views, as he affirmed that 
the three pillars are non-sequential and of equal importance (United Nations, 2009a).  
After Brazil left the council, RwP appeared again on some occasions, for 
instance, during a debate on January 19th 2012 on the rule of law in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Brazil was invited by the South African delegation, 
which presided the UNSC. Viotti’s speech linked the commitment to the rule of law to 
RwP: 
 
The multidimensional challenges of the current peace and security agenda require that 
the UNSC set the example. Accountability is crucial to the rule of law at the national 
level. It should also be a major concern with regard to the implementation of UNSC 
decisions. Those elements form part of a discussion that Brazil is promoting on 
responsibility while protecting. By reinforcing accountability with regard to the 
implementation of its own decisions, the UNSC reaffirms its commitment to the rule of 
law as a prerequisite to long-lasting peace and security (United Nations, 2012a: 23). 
 
More importantly, on February 21st 2012 Brazil organized an “informal 
discussion” on RwP co-chaired by Patriota and the UN Special Adviser for the 
Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck. At that moment, Syria was the most pressing 
issue. Thirty-seven states, observers and NGO asked to speak at the three and a half 
hour meeting held at the UN, which demonstrates that RwP still raised attention. 
Patriota recalled the need for the international community to “exhaust all peaceful 
means available in the protection of civilians under threat of violence”, adding that the 
use of force “must produce as little violence and instability as possible”. Special 
Adviser Luck welcomed Brazil’s initiative and appreciated its importance in helping 
R2P to reach its full potential. However, he emphasized that “when thousands of lives 
are at stake, what is needed is ‘timely and decisive’ action (…) not philosophical 
debate” (Luck, 2012: 2).  
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Speakers – among them Brazil - were not interested in renegotiating R2P’s 
conceptual foundations, but in enhancing its standards of implementation. Gareth 
Evans, one of the “founding fathers” of R2P and co-chair of the ICISS, affirmed RwP is 
an “important and very constructive contribution to the debate, at a time where dialogue 
is urgently needed in the wake of criticism about” the way the UN dealt with Libya. He 
added that a merit of RwP was to discuss the UNSC working methods, which should 
prevent crises from occurring, escalating and recurring. RwP was crucial for its 
attention to “key prudential criteria before the council agrees to any use of coercive 
force” and, when the use of force is authorized, for urging the UNSC to “establish a 
monitoring and review mechanism” (Evans, 2012: 1-2). 
The informal discussion demonstrated that space for future dialogue on RwP 
and R2P existed, as speakers expected more debate on the three-pillar framework and 
on how the monitoring and review mechanism should operate. They criticized Brazil’s 
chronological view on the three pillars and suggested military experts should be 
engaged in prospective talks.255  
Some Western countries like Germany dropped their initial opposition to RwP 
and started seeing its potential to “bridge the ever growing divide in the global debate 
on the responsibility to protect” (Benner, 2013: 7). As R2P was under severe criticism 
because of Libya, RwP started being seen as a means to recover the original meaning of 
the norm while controlling its implementation (Herz, 2014; Leme, 2015). As time went 
by, it received more support from NGO, the UN and governments. 
Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon was one of the greatest enthusiasts of RwP, 
inserting the idea in the UN agenda more than once. In May 2012, when presenting his 
report on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, Ban Ki-moon discussed Brazil’s 
RwP, mentioning its contributions (United Nations, 2012b). Two months later, he 
dedicated two and a half pages of his 16-page report “responsibility to protect: timely 
and decisive response” to RwP. That is almost the size of Brazil’s original concept note 
explaining the proposal. The report welcomes RwP, acknowledging Brazil “has since 
facilitated broad and constructive discussion of the initiative (…) which has served to 
underscore the commitment of member states to the prevention and protection of 
																																																								
255 For an accurate account of the discussion, see: 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/4002-




principles embodied in” R2P (United Nations, 2012c: 13). Relating RwP to earlier 
reports and the 2005 World Summit, the secretary-general observed that “the essence of 
‘responsibility while protecting’ is doing the right thing, in the right place, at the right 
time and for the right reasons”, as it could serve as a remedy to political interference 
and double standards, as well as a “useful pathway for continuing dialogue” (idem: 14-
15). Tourinho, Stuenkel and Brockmeier (2015: 2) argue that RwP “enabled a debate on 
the use of force and R2P at a time when the discussions were extremely polarized”.  
In a response on September 5th 2012, ambassador Viotti addressed criticisms of 
RwP’s chronological progression, asserting that the sequence “between the three pillars 
of R2P should be logical, based on political prudence. It does not mean the 
establishment of arbitrary check-lists” (Brazil, 2012b: 4). Her speech, however, 
demonstrated that Brazil’s decision-makers started nurturing discomfort with the 
perception of RwP as a via media between pro-interventionists and defenders of 
unlimited sovereignty. Figure 14 shows that the Brazilian proposal was not that 
balanced, as, at the time, R2P was closer to the first group than RwP. RwP’s emphasis 
is much more centered on R2P’s pillars one and two. Viotti’s speech therefore reminded 
the importance of mediation, prevention, dialogue and negotiation, having a different 
tone than Ban Ki-moon’s report.  
 
 
Figure 14. RwP and R2P 
 
That discomfort was exacerbated in Rousseff’s speech to the 2012 UNGA. 
Presenting a vague discourse and changing the conciliatory and moderate tone of RwP 
to a more pro-sovereignty approach, she “came across as burying the concept”. For 
Benner (2013: 8), Brazil lost a great opportunity to clarify new ideas on RwP and 
continue branding the initiative. As Tourinho, Stuenkel and Brockmeier (2016: 134) 
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point out, RwP was extensively debated, “but it never sufficiently materialized into 
specific proposals that could address the problems of collective security and human 
protection”. Ban Ki-moon recognized that in August 2013, when mentioning that the 
“normative framework to protect civilians, including (…) discussions about 
‘responsibility while protecting’, has continued to be the subject of debate, not always 
matched by action” (United Nations, 2013: 8). 
Lastly and as happened with climate change, RwP was solely presented by 
Brazil, although it received the support of some countries and individuals. An 
interviewee mentioned that the issue was discussed at the 2011 BRICS meeting of 
foreign affairs ministers in New York. That gathering occurred two days after 
Rousseff’s speech at the UNGA. The bloc was divided on RwP, which prevented a 
common position (Reis, 2015). “The Russians in particular were like: why are you 
[Brazil] doing this? The Indians and South Africans were, in contrary, very 
supportive”.256 Indeed, South Africa’s delegation raised the matter during a following 
UNSC meeting: “regime change and the arming of civilians cannot be justified in the 
name of protecting civilians, and those entrusted with such responsibilities must uphold 
them while protecting civilians” (United Nations, 2011l: 22).257 
Furthermore, Brazil did not aspire to foment a regional consensus around RwP, 
as it did not sufficiently discuss the matter with neighbors in Latin America or regional 
organizations like the MERCOSUR and CELAC (Serbin and Serbin Pont, 2015: 24).258 
 
IV.5. Responsibility while protecting and explanatory factors 
 The three explanatory factors did not have the same influence nor played a 
similar role for RwP to come about. As I further clarify, Brazil’s proposal mainly 




256 Interview with NGO#12. Likewise, and according to MRE#5, “Brazil did not emphasize national 
sovereignty as Russia and China nor shared P3’s views. Our interpretation was more careful: we 
supported R2P, but understood that its implementation needed to be supervised. Beyond the division 
within the council, the BRICS were not together. In general, our position was closer to India’s and South 
Africa’s”. 
 
257 The episode demonstrates that the BRICS do not have a similar approach to R2P. See: Job (2016). 
 
258 An exception would be the summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA), which endorsed RwP 
in its 2012 meeting in Lima.  
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 The peace and security regime is fundamentally based on a hierarchic and 
restrictive setting. Because of that, non-P5 states have a harder time to promote ideas, 
needing to have the support of the P5 and of the international community. As Puri 
(2016: 2) points out, “very little is known about the Security Council to people outside 
the charmed circle at the apex of multilateral diplomacy. (…) The five permanent 
members have a natural advantage”. In the specific case of this chapter, Brazilian 
negotiators made active use of the country’s mandate to influence the debate on the use 
of force in Libya and beyond.  
While not being part of the UNSC’s inner circle, Brazil partook in meetings, 
interacted with existing norms, rules, and principles, and presented its views. 
Concerning the Libyan situation, Brazilian negotiators first adopted a careful tone, 
asking for the de-escalation of the conflict. After the approval of resolution 1973 and its 
consequences, they adapted the language, expecting to address a critical tension of 
today’s international relations: how to combine the enactment of “all necessary means” 
with the preservation of sovereignty and the protection of populations. RwP epitomized 
that engagement.  
It was precisely because Brazil was a non-permanent member of the council that 
its negotiators could promote RwP and discuss the matter with other delegations. A 
negotiator explained why taking part in the UNSC was required for the proposal to 
exist:  
 
Sometimes we discuss language, the content of resolutions, but they will be put in 
practice in a different way. Consequently, the ones with the capacity to do things define 
the criteria. They do what they want in accordance with their interpretations. As Brazil 
was at the council, we could observe that. And you clearly see that once you give that 
pseudo authorization [resolution 1973] – because the authorization was up to a point 
and not unbridled – they just go beyond and nothing happens. Simple as that. There is 
no monitoring, no accountability, no ‘sunset clause’… How far this mandate goes? Is it 
indefinite? It goes until the enemy is destroyed? Does it lose validity? So… You are 
exposed to states with capacity to act and they will control the situation. No one is 
innocent at the UNSC, so we know that interest and manipulation exist.259  
 
Along the same lines, another diplomat added that,  
																																																								




There is a culture within the UNSC that only the P5 propose things. They are the ones 
organizing meetings, proposing projects. If you look into who is the ‘lead country’ of 
the council’s agenda, you see that most important topics are controlled by the P5. It is 
not very common that non-permanent members expose and propose their ideas. Even 
more in a context like that and regarding such sensitive topics.260 
  
The tide was in favor of Brazil’s proposal even after it left the council. As I 
demonstrated, RwP continued appearing in debates at the UNGA and the UNSC, as 
well as in reports by the secretary-general. This means that while being present at the 
council was a necessary condition for the proposal to exist, the same condition was not 
as crucial when the debate was already under way. 
 
Domestic assets 
As for the domestic assets – the country’s “history of peace”; participation in 
efforts of mediation and preventive diplomacy; contributions to peacekeeping; and 
military capabilities –, they did not play a direct role for RwP to exist. A survey of all 
UNSC meetings during Brazil’s mandate could not provide substantial evidence on the 
importance of these domestic assets. It is true that during her 2011 speech at the UNGA 
Rousseff mentioned that Brazil lived in peace with its neighbors for over 140 years, that 
Brazil is a non-nuclear weapon country, and that it is ready to assume more 
responsibilities (Brazil, 2011). These self-identified credentials were related, however, 
to the country’s bid to permanent membership in the UNSC rather than to the proposal 
of RwP.  
One could argue that the many peace and security topics present in Brazilian 
discourses at the UN are interconnected, which would make the contribution of 
domestic assets decisive. The reasoning goes: by having features that distinguish the 
country from others (namely the P5 and other large developing countries like India), 
Brazilian proposals aiming to promote peaceful solution of controversies, reconciliation, 
mediation, and cooperation would be a consequence of domestic traits. Data did not 
corroborate this claim, nor officials involved with the proposition of RwP I talked with. 
Their answers drifted to general comments about the importance of these qualities – that 
																																																								
260 Interview with MRE#6. 
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are normally reinstated in Brazil’s official rhetoric and historical narratives -, but no 
direct links were made to RwP.  
Instead, Brazil’s RwP stems from technical and legal arguments that combine 
the evolution of the country’s views on R2P and the use of force. These orientations 
were tailored to update R2P and are associated with the many consequences of the 
Libyan crisis and related issues like the operationalization of military actions, the 
protection of civilians, the role of preventive diplomacy, and the authority of the UNSC. 
 
Domestic decision-making procedures 
 RwP was produced at Itamaraty in Brasília and then gained ground at the 
country’s mission to the UN. The concept note circulated on November 9th 2011 that 
describes RwP in detail was, according to a Brazilian diplomat, a “collective exercise”.  
 
Four or five colleagues working on UN-related issues met with chancellor Patriota more 
than once. It [RwP] was originally his idea, and we attempted to put it on paper. 
Afterwards, we instructed New York to circulate it as a numbered document not only to 
the UNSC, but also to the General Assembly.261 
 
Another senior diplomat participating in this process commented:  
 
We insisted that resolution 1973 was being implemented in a very broad and 
controversial manner. What exactly is a ‘military action to protect civilians’? When you 
bombard Libyan infrastructure or a group of tanks that is moving outside the region 
where conflict is occurring… Are you protecting civilians? And which civilians deserve 
to be protected? Why some civilians in Libya and others not? When Gaddafi’s forces 
surrounded Sirte, why did the UNSC not discuss protecting these civilians? We also 
understood that the implementation of resolution 1973 would create ‘antibodies’ to 
R2P. A strong backlash to R2P would come. We discussed these things, and all of that 
was in Patriota’s mind when he started developing the idea.262  
 
Patriota’s participation was crucial. His previous experience with issues related 
to the use of force, protection of civilians, and the functioning of the UNSC helped him 
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read the situation and come up with RwP.263 For having written about the Gulf War and 
contributed to Brazil’s mandate in the UNSC during the Iraq War, the chancellor was 
versed in debates related to peace and security. It is possible to say that the combination 
of his personal experience and institutional position was a necessary condition for RwP 
to exist.  
A precipitate assessment would tie RwP not only to Itamaraty, but also to the 
MD, especially because the idea came into existence in 2011, when ambassador and 
former chancellor Celso Amorim was minister of defense. Nonetheless, the MD did not 
have a role in the production or advancement of the proposal, which appeared as a 
coherent byproduct of Brazil’s foreign policy.  
On the role of president, none of the interviewees pointed out any active 
participation of Rousseff in the creation or promotion of RwP. In spite of that, the idea 
is present in her first speech at the UNGA. She mentioned RwP again in 2012: “we 
want legitimate actions, founded on international legality. In this spirit, I have defended 
the need for a ‘responsibility while protecting’ as a necessary complement to the 
‘responsibility to protect’” (Brazil, 2012c: 5). The pivotal role played by Patriota is 
corroborated by the fact that after he was removed from the position, RwP would not 
appear again in Brazil’s speeches at the UNGA nor occupy a strategic locus in the 
country’s foreign policy. 
 
IV.6. Responsibility while protecting and the degree of change 
RwP directly addressed the existing normative and operational elements part of 
the peace and security regime. In ambassador Viotti’s words, Brazil’s input built “upon 
the existing conceptual framework” regarding the maintenance of peace and security 
and the protection of civilians (United Nations, 2011l: 15). In other words, it relied on 
the norm of R2P. More importantly, it touched upon how it should be put in motion and 
which limits should govern its implementation.  
Without denying R2P, RwP expected to correct the mistakes made in the case of 
Libya, establishing basic criteria to prevent ambiguous interpretations on the use of 
force and avoid Chapter VII resolutions being enacted for ulterior motives. In a sense, 
RwP is a step back in the implementation of R2P, calling the international community 
to consider its underlying elements and ponder whether it works as a “carte blanche” for 
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military action. RwP’s idea of “do no harm”, for instance, embodies that orientation. 
While not moving away from the imperative of protecting civilians from mass human 
rights violations, RwP invites member states to carefully consider preventive and 
peaceful means while assessing the specific situation on the ground. With all these 
elements in place, force could be authorized as a last resort, in proportional manner, and 
following an unequivocal mandate by the UNSC.  
The way Brazilian negotiators tabulated RwP refers back to the basic rules and 
principles composing the regime. According to Viotti, the international community 
should ensure “compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law”. Therefore, R2P should be primarily exercised through diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and other peaceful means, with coercive force coming only after these 
prove inadequate. “Both concepts should evolve together, based on an agreed set of 
fundamental principles, parameters and procedures” (United Nations, 2011l: 16).  
Discussing the legalist nature of RwP, Acharya (2013: 477) mentions that,  
 
The Brazilian initiative attests to the working of ‘norm subsidiarity’, a form of 
normative agency which occurs when the weaker elements in the international system 
seek to protect the integrity of an existing international norm ‘from dominance, neglect, 
violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors.’ Weaker states, especially 
developing countries, resort to this form of normative action ‘when confronted with 
great power hypocrisy’. 
 
One of the most controversial issues regarding RwP is why it stopped appearing 
with the same intensity in UNSC debates and in Brazil’s statements.264 To be sure, RwP 
received much attention from academics and policymakers and still appears in works 
like this thesis. Its contents also relate to more recent developments regarding R2P. 
Brazil’s activism, however, was mostly limited to the time span until September 2012. I 
present four possible motives for that, referring these back to the explanatory factors.  
First (i), RwP did not receive enough backing from the P5, namely from the P3. 
As a diplomat argued, this might have occurred because their initial interpretation was 
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that Brazil pushed forward a defensive idea with the goal to cease possibilities regarding 
the use of force while obliging countries to comply with reporting and accountability. 
 
There is this idea that Brazil is very defensive, being fiercely attached to the notion of 
sovereignty and nothing more. This perception has to do with the evolution of the 
country’s multilateral diplomacy, which has always been very attentive to possible 
manipulations regarding the use of force. But we weren’t… Opposing anything. Our 
idea was not to pass any image of being defensive. Not to pass the impression that: ‘we 
did not like it and we don’t have anything else to add’.265 
 
Another interviewee not part of the Brazilian government but following the 
negotiations closely remembered Washington’s initial reaction: “their tone was: ‘this is 
what Brazilians do. They just kind of wreck stuff and create obstacles. They are not 
really serious. This is just a way of kind of beating up on the West. And it is going to 
become an excuse to do less’".266 The French reaction was also adverse. 
Adding to that, Brazil did not receive backing from Russia or China. Since the 
Syrian civil war was worsening together with the continuing unrest in Libya, Moscow 
undertook a non-cooperative attitude towards R2P. As for Beijing, it maintained a 
traditional vision on the norm, which meant going back to basics and not allowing new 
interpretations.  
These initial reactions have to do with the fact that Brazil took some time to 
circulate the idea and establish ties with NGO and think tanks. Furthermore, RwP could 
have been more frequently exposed in the media. While the British and the French 
“were very active in harnessing the framing power of the media” and were able to 
influence other countries, Brazilians could not do the same (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 
2014: 899). In reason of that, RwP could not be properly promoted and understood, 
which impaired its continuity.  
A senior Brazilian negotiator diplomatically mentioned that  
 
Brazil is not keen on guiding for much time or insistently in a debate focusing on 
military intervention. This is not part of our diplomatic tradition. It is a very sensitive 
debate, a ‘boots on the ground’ debate. (…) If our proposal was interesting, and it was, 
																																																								
265 Interview with MRE#8. 
 
266 Interview with NGO#12. 
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other countries should have continued the debate. (…) But of course I remember people 
asking us the next steps. These things have a dynamic and in the UN you have to keep 
these ideas revolving.267  
 
As I argued before, the negative reaction shifted with the progression of time 
and not necessarily in reason of Brazil’s engagement. While some voices in the West 
started seeing RwP as a means to update R2P, countries like China recalled RwP when 
presenting its view of R2P (Chen, 2016). Designated “responsible protection” and 
forwarded at the UNGA in September 2013, the Chinese contribution has several 
similarities to RwP, namely with respect to the parameters to implement R2P’s pillar 
three (Garwood-Gowers, 2016). 
Second (ii), Brazil left the UNSC at the end of 2011, which made it harder for 
the country to keep advancing RwP. Although the idea continued being discussed, the 
UNSC is the central arena to debate peace and security. Were Brazil in the council, it 
could continue promoting RwP in the unfolding crises of Syria and Yemen, as well as in 
debates on R2P and protection of civilians.  
Third (iii), as the situation in Libya escalated, the discussion on the use of force 
progressed too rapidly, leaving no time for Brazilians to organize strategies (Ravenhill, 
2018). From Viotti’s presentation showing the roots of what would become RwP on 
May 10th 2011 to her detailed speech at the council on November 9th, only six months 
had passed. In comparison, R2P had almost ten years – from ICISS 2001 report to the 
Libyan crisis - to develop and engage academics, civil society organizations, and 
practitioners. In the view of an expert on R2P working for a NGO, “I think they were 
kind of caught in… They couldn’t quite decide to lead or let things happen. Because 
they did all of this, they presented RwP, and then they had people like me saying ‘this is 
great, you are a leader. Now lead’”.268 India’s permanent representative to the UNSC at 
the time agreed: “while RwP has gained some, but limited, traction, even its proponents 
would agree that the ‘doctrine’ needs to be developed” (Puri, 2016: 18). Paris (2014: 
589) added to the criticism, affirming that RwP “sheds no light on the kinds of 
operational problems and dilemmas” prospective interveners might encounter in 
practice. 
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Fourth (iv), domestic reasons affected the continuity of RwP. Patriota lost his 
position in August 2013 after a crisis involving Bolivia, which harmed his ability to 
influence the formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy (Kenkel and Stefan, 2016). 
Although he ended up being the permanent representative to the UN until mid-2016, he 
did not have the same level of contact with president Rousseff nor was equally able to 
frame multilateral debates. On that issue, a diplomat remembered that Patriota’s 
relationship with president Rousseff was not as good as the one between Amorim and 
Lula da Silva.269 Coupled with that, Brazil’s domestic crisis gained traction, which 
diminished the country’s engagement with intricate issues (Kotyashko, Ferreira-Pereira 
and Vieira, 2018). 
 
IV.7. Final remarks 
The proposition of RwP demonstrated Brazil’s attempt to shape not the norm of 
R2P, but its operationalization (Stefan, 2016). By not denying R2P and not necessarily 
seeing it as a Western tool to promote interventions, Brazilian negotiators expected to 
portray the country as a reliable actor interested in advancing the practical 
implementation of an evolving norm. The idea was to bring together states with 
different interpretations, while advancing Brazil’s views on civilian protection and use 
of force.  
Nine years after resolution 1973, the first real test of R2P’s effectiveness, Libya 
is still plagued by instabilities, grave human rights violations, lack of democratic 
governance, and fears of return to full-scale civil war.270 The legacy of NATO’s 
intervention remains controversial, as the African country turned into a safe-haven for 
extremists with potential access to weapons of mass destruction. Obama called the 
intervention a “shit show” and the foreign affairs committee of the British parliament 
admitted it was based on “erroneous assumptions”.271 More than that, the Libyan case 
created suspicion of R2P, which had impacts on the following crisis in Syria. Up to 
																																																								
269 Interview with MRE#8. 
 
270 See: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25048&LangID=E, 
accessed on 2 January 2020. 
 
271 For Obama’s comment, see: Goldberg (2016). For the British parliament, see: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-
committee/news-parliament-2015/libya-report-published-16-17/, accessed on 2 January 2020. For all 
UNSC resolutions on Libya, see: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/libya/, accessed on 
2 January 2020. 
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December 2019, for instance, Russia resorted to the veto 14 times, blocking actions 
against Assad’s regime.272  
RwP came into the equation to enhance the role of the UNSC, assuring 
prudential criteria, accountability, monitoring and transparency. Brazil’s proposal hoped 
to redirect the debate into the importance of prevention rather than military action, 
correcting future misinterpretations of R2P and averting atrocity crimes.   
 
 
Figure 15. Analytical framework and RwP 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the interrelations of RwP with the explanatory factors and 
the outcomes part of this thesis’ analytical framework. When it comes to the structure of 
the peace and security regime (X1), Brazilian negotiators made use of the regime’s 
configuration to advance RwP. Relying on its non-permanent membership in the UNSC 
in a moment of a mounting crisis in Libya, Brazil could engage in discussions on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts and the implementation of R2P. Amidst these 
debates, its negotiators could present RwP as a way forward. UNSC debates in May and 
November 2011 were instrumental for that. Notwithstanding, RwP continued receiving 
																																																								
272 See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/russia-backed-by-china-casts-14th-u-n-veto-
on-syria-to-block-cross-border-aid-idUSKBN1YO23V, accessed on 2 January 2020. 
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attention after Brazil left the UNSC, irregularly appearing in debates at the UNGA, the 
UNSC and the Human Rights Council.  
As for the role of the domestic assets, (X2) a perceptible difference from the 
climate change regime is that immaterial assets like the importance of mediation and 
prevention in Brazil’s multilateral endeavors had more weight - although limited and 
indirect - than material assets such as the state of its armed forces, which could not 
account for RwP. As mentioned, Brazil’s peace and security-related domestic assets are 
much more related to the country’s bid to permanent membership in the UNSC than to 
the specific proposal of RwP. 
Regarding the domestic decision-making procedures (X3), Itamaraty acted 
independently in the process of producing and promoting RwP. It was able to advance 
RwP without the support of other ministries like the MD, controlling the decision-
making process and the content of the proposal. The contribution of individuals such as 
former chancellor Patriota was essential for RwP to come about and for the idea to 
appear in Brazil’s participations at the UNGA and the UNSC. 
Figure 15 illustrates that RwP was not previously discussed with regional peers, 
but appeared at the 2011 BRICS meeting of foreign affairs ministers in New York. The 
bloc could not achieve a common position and RwP continued being pushed forward 
individually by Brazil. Two years later, the Chinese concept of “responsible protection” 
recalled RwP, which could serve as an opportunity for Brazil to dialogue with China 
and influence the broader agenda of protection of civilians. At that moment, however, 
RwP was not as important to Brazilian decision-makers.  
Finally, the proposal lost relevance, but parts of its contents can be found in 
more recent discussions on R2P, some involving Brazil’s participation (Tourinho, 
Stuenkel and Brockmeier, 2015).273 These days, R2P is evolving much more in the 
direction of its first two pillars, centering on issues like accountability for prevention; 
																																																								
273 Brazil’s speech at a 2018 UNGA debate on R2P recovers some elements of RwP: “preventive and 
responsive tools should follow a sequential logic, meaning, above all, that coercive measures and the use 
of military force should always be our last option” (United Nations, 2018a: 15). According to a UN 
official (UN#2), Brazil’s position had the value and merit of stressing the importance of monitoring and 
implementation activities, especially when it comes to the work of the UNSC: “it [RwP] is still ‘there’ 
and relates to discussions about securing voluntary restraint on the use of the veto. RwP also directly 
touches upon the debate on the accountability of the Security Council not only for not taking action, but 
also for how and when it takes action”.  
 
	 159	
risk assessments; sharing of good practices and capacity building; early warning 






274 For a comprehensive list of UN documents on R2P, see: http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p, 
accessed on 2 January 2020.  
	 160	
CHAPTER V 
BRAZIL AND THE FOOD SECURITY REGIME 
 
 This chapter investigates Brazil’s support for the concept of right to food (R2F) 
and analyzes how it interrelates with the normative and operational elements part of the 
food security regime, namely the idea of food security.275 Similar to previous chapters, 
R2F can be understood as a corollary to the notion of food security, incorporating a 
human rights approach without denying its core meaning. Differently from previous 
chapters, the idea of R2F was not a sole byproduct of Brazil’s interests, but a pre-
existing discussion later having Brazil as one of its main promoters. This push became 
more explicit with the election of José Graziano da Silva, former extraordinary minister 
of food security and fight against hunger during the presidency of Lula da Silva, for the 
post of director-general of FAO in 2011. 
I expose how the advancement of R2F as a foreign policy strategy is a direct 
consequence of the convergence of the explanatory factors part of this thesis. Brazilian 
negotiators made active use of FAO’s fairly open and non-hierarchical institutional 
setting to further the country’s views, which gained more strength and legitimacy during 
Graziano da Silva’s two mandates. In the same way, Brazil’s food security-related 
domestic assets played a crucial part for its multilateral activism. Several national public 
policies to fight hunger, alleviate poverty and promote family farming were relevant for 
the country’s engagement with FAO and the WFP. Many of these programs were 
presented as good practices by the Brazilian government, receiving FAO’s institutional 
support, as is the case with Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy. It inspired FAO’s “Zero 
Hunger Challenge” and the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 2, which 
is also named Zero Hunger. That international recognition had impacts not only on the 
continuity of these domestic plans, but also on the political dynamics in Brazil.  
Besides that, domestic actors such as federal ministries, civil society 
organizations, and the presidency were instrumental for the concept of R2F to be 
ingrained in the Brazilian constitution and part of its positions at FAO. Domestic 
decision-making was not always peaceful, being subject to disputes involving ministries 
and government bodies branding differing conceptions of socioeconomic development. 
These clashes affected normative discussions – namely related to the notion of food 
																																																								
275 The right to food also appears in the literature as human right to adequate food and right to adequate 
food. In this chapter I use right to food or the acronym R2F.   
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sovereignty – and the practical implementation of public policies. I demonstrate that 
these internal contradictions were more common in bilateral development cooperation 
projects than in the multilateral domain. There, clashes appeared more frequently at the 
WTO in comparison to FAO, which is partially tributary to Itamaraty’s pacifying role.  
On top of that, I contend that the Brazilian government attempted to develop a 
coherent strategy to internationalize and legitimize its views on topics such as hunger 
fighting and poverty alleviation. That plan involved the domestic level, the regional 
level - in South America with MERCOSUR’s Specialized Meeting on Family Farming 
(REAF) and in Latin America and the Caribbean with CELAC - and the multilateral 
level, particularly FAO. That three-level approach demonstrated a disposition to build a 
broader type of international participation, which did not appear in the other case 
studies part of this thesis. Finally, whereas Brazil expected to continue socializing its 
domestic experiences, that effort was subject to discontinuities after 2016.  
The chapter is divided in seven sections. The first outlines the main normative 
and operational components making the food security regime – its principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures -, having a focus on the concepts of food 
security, R2F, and food sovereignty. The second section delves into Brazil’s domestic 
assets and public policies related to food security. The third section portrays the 
bureaucratic actors mostly involved with the decision-making procedures leading to the 
country’s multilateral behavior. The fourth section looks into Brazil’s understanding of 
R2F. I maintain that, in FAO’s debates, Brazilian diplomats favored a conventional 
view of the concept, avoiding directly relating it to the more disputed idea of food 
sovereignty and attempting to mediate the positions of specific ministries. The fifth 
section exposes the relationship of R2F with the explanatory factors developed in this 
thesis. The sixth section argues that Brazil’s views upheld the regime’s existing 
components, reinforcing its pillars and bringing another interpretation to the notion of 
food security. The last section concludes. 
 
V.1. The structure of the food security regime  
The food security regime largely relies on the group of principles and norms 
present in the work of the three United Nations Rome-based Agencies: FAO, the WFP 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Being the backbone 
of the regime and the main responsible for promoting debates on food security, FAO 
has its origins in the 1943 United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture (also 
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known as the Hot Springs Conference), which established an interim commission. Two 
years later, states gathering in Quebec formally created FAO. It came to life with goals 
such as securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of 
food and agricultural products, enhancing the condition of rural populations, and 
ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger.276 FAO’s profile and importance grew in a 
war-ravaged Europe severely needed to rebuild its food systems. 
In contrast to the climate change regime and the peace and security regime, 
FAO’s foundational treaty was not explicit about its normative underpinnings, which 
are present in the preamble of its constitution but not stated as norms or principles. One 
of FAO’s purposes, for instance, is to contribute towards an expanding world economy 
and ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger (FAO, 2017). Initially, FAO was 
developed as an instrument to assist governments in the areas of food and agriculture. 
That orientation was visible in initiatives like the World Food Survey, the World 
Census of Agriculture, and FAO’s fertilizer, soil management, technical assistance and 
weed control programs. The WFP was created in 1963 as a result of parallel resolutions 
adopted by FAO and the UNGA to deliver food aid to affected areas.  
The normative foundations of the regime became clearer with the organization 
of the World Food Congresses and the 1974 World Food Conference, this last one 
appearing in a context of soaring global food crisis. In the occasion, parties founded the 
IFAD and claimed that the international community should cooperate to reduce poverty, 
malnutrition and hunger while achieving food security, notably in developing countries. 
FAO’s mandate enlarged with the work of the Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS), which was also created in 1974 and operates as a multi-stakeholder platform 
meeting annually and including civil society actors. Topics such as fisheries, early 
warning systems to monitor developments in food demand and supply, environmental 
matters, agrarian reform, gender and trade came together to create an evolving 
regime.277  
																																																								
276 See: https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/14/14-01/food-organization.xml, accessed 
on 3 January 2020. FAO affirms that “a strategy for attacking poverty in conjunction with policies to 
ensure food security offers the best hope of swiftly reducing mass poverty and hunger”. FAO affirms 
around 793 million people experience hunger on a daily basis. For its conceptualizations of hunger, 
malnutrition and poverty, see: http://www.fao.org/3/al936e/al936e00.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
 
277 See: http://www.fao.org/about/en/, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
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The concept of food security is one of the regime’s paradigmatic components.278 
Although interpretations on the idea vary, ranging from the individual level to the 
global level, most recall the responsibility of states and the international community to 
act. Throughout time, that “flexible concept” gained more than 200 definitions in the 
literature, each combining a policy usage with a political orientation.279 According to 
FAO, the first official incarnation of the concept appeared in the 1970s, focusing on the 
volume and stability of food supply. In 1983, FAO reworked the notion, reminding the 
need of states to secure the access of vulnerable people to basic food (FAO, 1983). 
Three years later, the World Bank included a temporal dynamics to food security, 
differentiating between chronic food insecurity and transitory food insecurity (World 
Bank, 1986).280  
The definition was stretched during the 1990s, incorporating the notions of food 
safety, context-based food preferences and nutritional balance. The 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report defined food security as an aspect of human security, which is an 
ambiguous and questioned concept as of today (United Nations Development Program, 
1994). That debate centered on the sovereignty of the individual, which gained ground 
after the Cold War. In the same direction of the norm of R2P, discussed in the last 
chapter, the concept of human security – and its subsets like food security – became a 
catchword used by UN agencies (Waisová, 2003). It questions Hobbesian views of 
unbridled state authority, bringing into the equation the need for states to match rights 
and obligations.281 
            FAO’s 1996 World Food Summit and the 2001 State of Food Insecurity brought 
renewed understandings, with the latter defining food security as a situation “that exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (FAO, 2002). FAO considers this the useful working definition of food 
																																																								
278 Food security also appears in the literature as food security and nutrition and as food and nutrition 
security. 
 
279 See: http://www.fao.org/3/y4671e/y4671e06.htm, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
 
280 Also see: http://www.fao.org/3/al936e/al936e00.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2020. This definition is in 
line with the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG), which aimed to eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger and halve the number of hungry and undernourished by 2015. 
 
281 That research agenda was well explored by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (i.e. Buzan, 
1991). Also see: Kaldor (2007). 
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security, functioning as a basis for following documents and normative discussions. 
More than being related to the orientation to reduce poverty, malnutrition and hunger, 
the concept of food security emphasized a practical goal: ensure the combination of 
physical availability of food, economic and physical access to safe and nutritious food, 
and food usage. 
Among the many factors influencing food insecurity, FAO mentions the lack of 
physical and financial access to food, variations in food prices and market fluctuations, 
armed conflicts, climate change and environmental disasters, and discontinuities in 
domestic food production. For its multi-dimensional quality, food insecurity is not only 
related to the lack of adequate food, but also with obesity.  
Food sovereignty is another concept composing the regime. Although clearly 
interrelated with food security, food sovereignty is a more politically charged and 
disputed notion. Part of multilateral debates since the 1996 World Food Summit, food 
sovereignty echoes the views of the peasant movement La Via Campesina and of civil 
society organizations affirming neoliberal policies do not benefit the “people” nor lead 
to the eradication of hunger. Food sovereignty favors localized food systems and the 
contributions of traditional knowledge as ways to take into account the economic, 
environmental and social impacts associated with food production and consumption. As 
an example, food sovereignty defenders advocate that the WTO is not suited to discuss 
agricultural matters, as its Agreement on Agriculture perpetuates market imbalances 
like export subsidies and trade barriers instead of assuring the rights of family 
farmers.282  
According to many of the views on food sovereignty, trade needs to be “fair”, 
opening room for countries to protect smallholders.283 That orientation infused some 
proposals forwarded by the G-33 in the WTO negotiations, as is the case with the 
defense of subsidies to family farmers, public stockholding programs for food security 
and special safeguard mechanisms for developing countries facing surges in imports of 
																																																								
282 For the “six-pillar approach to food sovereignty”, see Food Security Canada (2012). Throughout time, 
food sovereignty was enshrined, in different manners, in the constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, also being part of Nicaragua’s Law of Food and Nutritional Sovereignty and Security, Senegal’s 
National Assembly, Mali’s Law of Agricultural Orientation and Nepal’s interim constitution. See: Godek 
(2015) and Mann (2014). Latin American countries differ in their interpretations of food sovereignty. The 
views of Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador are not shared by Chile, Colombia, Argentina and 
Mexico. Brazil and Uruguay would stay in-between these two poles. See: Gordillo and Jerónimo (2013). 
 
283 For a civil society perspective on food sovereignty, 
see: https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/Foodsov_triptico_english-2-2.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
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agricultural commodities (FAO, 2015). Food sovereignty places an emphasis on 
reshaping how food is produced, commercialized and distributed, defending the power 
of states to define their own approaches towards national food policies. Food 
sovereignty consequently builds upon food security, questioning its supposed lack of 
normative guidance.  
Beyond food security and food sovereignty, the right to food (R2F) is the third 
major concept underpinning the regime. It has its roots in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (art. 25), the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights (art. 34) and the 1974 Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and 
Malnutrition. R2F first appeared in a legal document as part of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which entered into force 
ten years later. Its article 11 reads that states recognize “the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food” 
(United Nations, 1967: 6). The document reinforced calls for a rights-based approach to 
food security, which should combine a holistic view of food and nutrition with the 
assurance of individual health and wellbeing (Gordillo and Gómez, 2005). 
In 1999, the committee established to oversee the ICESCR stated that the 
concept of R2F implies sufficient quantity and quality of food to satisfy the dietary 
needs of individuals, being free from adverse substances and acceptable to distinct 
cultures.284 The word “right” suggests that countries would be violating international 
law if not freeing their citizens from hunger (Gordillo and Jerónimo, 2013). 
Additionally, R2F was present in other international legal documents such as the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
Throughout time, several countries and regional blocs - with Latin America 
occupying a prominent position - made explicit the need to protect and promote R2F.285 
Its institutionalization advanced in 2000 with the establishment of the UN special 
rapporteur on the right to food, who presents annual reports to the UNGA and the 
Human Rights Council and monitors the situation of the right to food in the world, 
																																																								
284 Especially general commitment 12. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
 
285 See, for example, the proposal to establish a Code of Conduct on the Right to Adequate Food: 
https://www.worldhunger.org/code-conduct-right-adequate-food/, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
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dialoguing with states in cases of alleged violations.286 R2F is defined as “the right to 
have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of financial 
purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food 
corresponding to cultural traditions” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2010: 2). According to Burity, Cruz and Franceschini (2011), R2F starts with 
the fight against hunger, having two inner dimensions: the right to be free from hunger 
and the right to adequate food. States should thus realize R2F progressively, making use 
of legal, administrative, social and financial means.  
In 2004, FAO member states adopted by consensus the Voluntary Guidelines to 
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of 
National Food Security. They provide guidance for countries to implement R2F and 
offer additional means to fight hunger and poverty, to reach MDG targets and to 
integrate human rights into the works of agencies dealing with food and agriculture 
(FAO, 2005).287  
The dramatic rise of global food prices in the period 2006-2008 and its lasting 
consequences contributed to make R2F more recognized and accepted, prompting the 
UN to coordinate multilateral responses. Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon mandated the 
creation of a High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on the Global Food Security Crisis, which 
remarked that all people should realize their right to good food and nutrition security.288 
In the same direction, the 2009 Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security and 
the 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security mention the right to food 
four times, demanding countries to act towards its progressive realization (FAO, 2009; 
FAO, 2012a). 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) work on the role of norms in political change 
provides a good framework to analyze how R2F has evolved. Its life cycle started with 
																																																								
286 The creation of the position guards close relationship with the adoption of the MDG. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx, accessed on 3 January 2020. For an 
overview of the special rapporteur’s mandate and the UN resolutions on the right to food, see: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/Overview.aspx, idem. 
 
287 Valente (2014) nevertheless argues that the document failed to guarantee women’s rights, the role of 
nutrition in food production chains and the regulation of food markets.  
 
288 See https://www.un.org/en/issues/food/taskforce/pdf/ZHC%20ANs-
%20All%20Merged%20Rev%20May%202016.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2020. Ban Ki-moon also 
highlighted that R2F should form a basis for analysis, action and accountability. See: 
http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-timeline/filter-the-timeline/en/, accessed on 3 January 2020. 
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the creation of the UN, with the concept already appearing in legal documents in the 
1960s. That emergence phase was not accompanied by an “opinio juris”,289 which 
curtailed its development. While the regime was not sufficiently institutionalized, FAO 
member states were preoccupied with practical issues that, at that time, were associated 
with concepts like food security and not clearly related to R2F.  
Subsequently, FAO, civil society organizations, the UN itself, secretary-general 
Ban Ki-moon and some member states exerted an active role in creating a political 
momentum for R2F, spreading the concept in multilateral instruments, other regimes 
and national legislations. The 2008 Right to Food Forum organized by FAO in Rome, 
for example, was branded as the first “global opportunity” for countries to share lessons 
on the implementation of R2F, which illustrates how national, regional and multilateral 
levels are interconnected.290 Amid that context of “norm cascades”, the notion of R2F 
gained legitimacy in regional291 and national292 political systems.  
As the authors point out, “at the far end of the norm cascade, norm 
internalization occurs; norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a 
matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). Although it is 
																																																								
289 In customary international law opinio juris means a “subjective obligation, a sense of behalf of a state 
that it is bound to the law in question”. See: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_%28international_law%29, accessed on 5 January 2020. 
 
290 See: http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-timeline#16, accessed on 5 January 2020. Also note the 
establishment of FAO’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA). Ban Ki-moon identified R2F as a 
third track of the CFA at the Madrid High Level Conference on Food Security in 2009. See: 
http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/meeting/017/k6196e.pdf, accessed on 5 January 2020. 
 
291 Examples of regional institutions incorporating R2F involve the OAS, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), MERCOSUR, ALBA, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries 
(CPLP), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), CELAC and the AU. See: http://www.fao.org/right-to-
food-timeline/filter-the-timeline/en/, accessed on 5 January 2020. The role of Latin America and the 
Caribbean is especially important, as it promoted key actions such as the Hunger-Free Latin America and 
the Caribbean Initiative in 2005; the 2009 Interparliamentary Conference about the “Right to Food 
Security”, convened by the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) in Panamá; the 2011 Resolution of the 
Central American Council of Human Rights Ombudsmen; the 2012 Declaration of Cochabamba on 
“Food Security with Sovereignty in the Americas”; the 2013 Framework Law on School Feeding, 
adopted by Parlatino; and the 2014 CELAC Plan for Food and Nutrition Security and the Eradication of 
Hunger 2025. 
 
292 For instance, Costa Rica (1949), Panama (1972), Cuba (1976), Guyana (1980), Honduras (1982), 
Guatemala (1986), Nicaragua (1987), the Philippines (1987), Haiti (1987), Suriname (1987), Colombia 
(1991), Paraguay (1992), Belarus (1994), Moldova (1994), Malawi (1995), Ukraine (1996), South Africa 
(1996), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006), Maldives (2008), Ecuador (2008), Bolivia (2009), 
Dominican Republic (2010), Brazil (2010), Kenya (2010), Niger (2010), Mexico (2011), Zimbabwe 
(2013), Fiji (2013), Egypt (2014) and Nepal (2015). See: http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-timeline/filter-
the-timeline/en/, accessed on 9 June 2019. 
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debatable whether the concept of R2F classifies as a “norm” and how much acceptance 
it has received outside the developing world, the phase of “cascade” is under way and 
might lead to a wider acceptance of the concept throughout time.  
A limitation to further advancement rests on the ongoing debate on R2F as a 
justiciable right and subject of litigation (Courtis, 2007). The adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) in 2013, for instance, provided additional capacities for individuals or groups 
to communicate possible violations of the rights guaranteed by the covenant (United 
Nations, 2009b).293 Currently, bodies like the UNGA, the ECOSOC and the Human 
Rights Council advocate for R2F, with the latter affirming in 2019 that “hunger 
constitutes an outrage and a violation of human dignity” and stressing the “primary 
responsibility of states” to promote and protect R2F (United Nations, 2019: 4). 
Language around the concept is moving into law-like expressions such as “violation”, 
“adoption of urgent measures”, and others related to states’ obligations in respect to 
their populations.294  
What is clear is that the regime’s conceptual boundaries are less defined in 
comparison to the two other case studies part of this thesis. Different from the ideas of 
concentric circles and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (chapter III) and responsibility to protect and responsibility while protecting 
(chapter IV), the normative bases of the food security regime are more pervasive to 
interlinked concepts.295 Knowing exactly when food security ends and food sovereignty 
or right to food begins can be a forceful exercise.296 In a sense, they derive from a 
																																																								
293 The Vienna +20 CSO Declaration, issued on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights, mentions “violations of the right to adequate food”. See: 
https://viennaplus20.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/vienna20-cso-declaration-final.pdf, accessed on 5 
January 2020, p. 10. 
 
294 For an overview of recent documents, see: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=101, 
accessed on 5 January 2020. 
 
295 The Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, for instance, brings the idea of “right to food security”, adding up to the conceptual confusion. 
See: https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/protocol_rights_women_africa_2003.pdf, accessed on 5 
January 2020. 
 
296 Some recent works (i.e. Bellows et al., 2015) are advocating for a reconceptualization of R2F in the 
direction of food sovereignty, incorporating debates on gender and women’s rights and nutrition. 
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renewed UN agenda focusing on the individual and bringing together security, 
development and human rights.297  
Beyond the normative debates, the regime relies on the three Rome-based 
agencies and, specifically concerning FAO, governing bodies like FAO Conference and 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). Members convene at biennial FAO 
conferences to evaluate institutional frameworks, revise objectives, approve budget, 
elect FAO Council Members to serve three-year terms and choose the director-general 
to a four-year renewable term.298 The CFS is a multi-stakeholder intergovernmental 
platform that includes countries and civil society actors and attempts to promote shared 
lessons and accountability, policy convergence, support and advice.  
Reporting to the ECOSOC and to FAO Conference, the CFS was reformed in 
2009. Composed by a Bureau and Advisory Group, Plenary, Secretariat and a High 
Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, the CFS is possibly the most 
inclusive decision-making space part of the UN system. It encompasses family farmers, 
indigenous peoples, youth, private sector associations and international institutions like 
the Work Bank and the WTO.299 Brazilian domestic experiences and bodies like the 
National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) contributed to make the 
CFS more open to non-state actors.  
The director-general guides FAO’s work, delineating strategic actions and 
promoting bureaucratic transformation. Up to now, FAO has elected eight director-
generals. Half of them came from developed countries (two from the United States, one 
from the United Kingdom and one from the Netherlands), and the other half from 
developing nations (India, Lebanon, Senegal, and Brazil for the period 2012-2019). 
Since 1976, only candidates from the developing world have directed the organization. 
This trend continues in 2019 with the election of a Chinese. While the director-general 
does not represent his/her country, candidates can highlight national and regional 
																																																								
297 That perspective fittingly appears in the final document of the 2012 Rio+20 Conference and in more 
recent UN documents (i.e. United Nations, 2019b; FAO publications and reports of the special rapporteur 
on the right to food, just to mention some).  
 
298 See: http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsbhome/gsb-home/en/, accessed on 5 January 2020. 
 
299 On the reform of the CFS, see: http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/meeting/018/k7197e.pdf, 
accessed on 5 January 2020. For its rules of procedure, see: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
mp046e.pdf#page=125, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
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experiences in the fields of agriculture, hunger fighting and poverty alleviation as well 
as the partnerships they developed during their careers when bidding for the position.300 
As in most multilateral arenas, negotiations at FAO not only polarize developed 
and developing countries, but also provoke disputes within these groupings. Yet, FAO’s 
institutional configuration makes it one of the most open and non-hierarchical 
institutions part of the UN. In comparison to the peace and security regime, for instance, 
FAO does not have distinctions in membership nor countries with special prerogatives 
like the veto. The fact that it has had director-generals coming from developing 
countries for more than 40 years and the existence of innovative governance bodies like 
the CFS contribute to make FAO a more democratic setting in relation to the UNSC, the 
Bretton Woods institutions, or even its sister organization, the WFP, which receives 
most of its funding from developed countries and is controlled by the United States.301  
Developed and developing countries make use of FAO to advance themes that 
range from tenure of land, fisheries and biotechnology to gender and climate change. 
FAO is not only seen as a forum in which mainstream topics are discussed, but also as a 
space for advancing concepts like R2F and food sovereignty and even alternative views 
of world order. Additionally, coalitions like the G-77+China and GRULAC and 
regional organizations like ALBA can be very active when engaging with this 
multilateral arena, which is still scarcely studied by international relations scholars.  
 
V.2. Brazil’s domestic food security-related assets  
When engaging multilaterally, Brazilian negotiators commonly make reference 
to domestic food security-related assets, as is the case with the country’s prominent 
standing in global agricultural markets, its endogenous technologies adapted to tropical 
climates, and a series of domestic public policies to fight hunger and alleviate poverty. 
While policymakers expect to find synergies between export-oriented agribusiness and 
inward-oriented family farming, contradictions are frequent. As I argue in the next 
section, dualities are a consequence of the different bureaucratic agendas of ministries 
and government bodies.  
																																																								
300 The Chinese candidate, for example, stressed that his mandate would promote “win-win cooperation” 
and remarked that China’s contributions to global food security could “provide helpful experience to 
other countries”. See: http://www.fao.org/3/mz073en/mz073en.pdf, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
 
301 FAO has 194 members. For the WFP, see: https://www.wfp.org/funding, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
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First of all (i), Brazil overcame historical food production deficits to rank among 
the top suppliers of goods like beef, poultry, sugar, coffee, orange juice, sugarcane 
bioethanol, cotton, soybean and cellulose. Being a major hub for arable land behind 
only the United States, Russia, China, and India, 302  Brazil is considered an 
“agribusiness superpower”, a “farm powerhouse”303 and an “agricultural frontier” (The 
Economist, 2010: 2).304 According to WTO estimates and as shows figure 16, Brazil 
was the third major exporter of agricultural products in 2017 (US$ 88 billion) after the 
EU (US$ 647 billion) and the United States (US$ 170 billion), having a positive annual 
percentage change of 14%. Argentina was the only other Latin American country to 
rank in the top 10.  
 
 
Figure 16. Top ten exporters of agricultural products (World Trade 
Organization, 2018) 
 
A key factor for that is China. Its growing demand for commodities matched the 
aspirations of the agribusiness sector, providing Brazil’s largest trade surpluses and 
partially compensating deficits in services and primary income in the balance of 
																																																								
302 See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
 
303 See: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-forum-fao/u-n-food-agency-sees-brazil-as-major-hub-for-
arable-land-growth-idUKKBN1KD2CL, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
 
304 See: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/02/revealed-amazon-deforestation-driven-
global-greed-meat-brazil, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
 
	 172	
payments (Banco Central do Brasil, 2017).305 Around 84% of Brazil’s exports to China 
are concentrated on three products: soybeans, petroleum oils and iron ores. According 
to the World Bank (2014: 88), “the evolving characteristics of trade with China have 
also been driving a decline in Brazil’s overall export sophistication to the world since 
2006”, which led some to argue that China has accelerated a process of de-
industrialization and “reprimarization” of Brazilian exports. As Malamud (2017: 159) 
points out, the opportunity posed by a “China effect” inadvertently turned into a 
restriction.306 
Beyond trade (ii), the importance of domestic assets is visible in Brazil’s 
multilateral initiatives. Not so much at FAO but notably at the WTO, Brazilian 
negotiators engaged in trade disputes against the United States and the EU; formed the 
commercial G-20, a coalition of developing countries pressing for agricultural reforms 
in developed states and advocating for more flexible rules for the developing world; and 
relied on the country’s comparative advantages with the hope to expand and liberalize 
agricultural global markets (Hopewell, 2013). At FAO, reference to these domestic 
assets is not as explicit, with the official narrative portraying Brazil as a know-how 
provider, capable of contributing to tackle food insecurity and minimize hunger through 
bilateral and triangular cooperation initiatives.  
That rosier narrative is visible in cases not focused on family farming such as 
the ProSavana, a Japan-Brazil-Mozambique joint initiative. When addressing criticism, 
Brazilian bureaucrats commonly argue that the project - mostly based on the 
monoculture of commodities directed to foreign markets and largely replicating the 
large-scale agribusiness model of Brazil’s Cerrado – not only supports Mozambique’s 
economic development, but also generates positive results to its overall rural sector 
(Chichava et al., 2013).  
That strategy is tributary to the expertise developed by the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (EMBRAPA). Created in 1973 and institutionally part of the 
																																																								
305 For 2018 data, see: https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/balance-of-trade, accessed on 6 January 2020. 
From 2009 to 2018, primary products increased participation from 77,7% (US$ 16,3 billion) to 88,9% 
(US$ 56,8 billion) of total Brazilian exports to China. On the other side, Brazil has consistently imported 
manufactured goods from its Asian partner, varying from 98,1% (US$ 15,6 billion) to 97,8% (US$ 33,9 
billion) of total imports. For trade data and lists of products, see: http://www.mdic.gov.br/comercio-
exterior/estatisticas-de-comercio-exterior/comex-vis/frame-pais, accessed on 7 January 2020. 
 
306 Beyond the relevance of the agribusiness sector, I should mention that family farming is responsible 
for supplying 80% of the domestic demand for agricultural products, with smallholders occupying 24,3% 
of total agricultural area and employing more than 12 million workers (IBGE, 2009). 
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Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), EMBRAPA has pursued since 
the 1990s a policy of fomenting collaborative networks with foreign partners, mostly in 
developed countries. Through its Virtual Laboratory Abroad Program (Labex), 
EMBRAPA promoted partnerships with the United States, France, the Netherlands, 
South Korea, United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Japan (Nascimento, 2016).307 The 
poll of technologies devised in Brazil and acquired with the mentioned partnerships 
allowed EMBRAPA to become internationally renowned for its research on tropical 
agriculture. 
As explain Cabral and Shankland (2013), policymakers made use of the 
country’s technical expertise to promote cooperation initiatives with partners in Latin 
America and Africa, to foster inter-regional exchanges and to underpin Brazil’s interests 
at FAO. In a nutshell, Brazilian negotiators attempted to merge solidarity with 
pragmatism even when moved by commercial imperatives (Albuquerque, 2015).308   
Finally (iii), subsequent governments established public policies to fight hunger 
and alleviate poverty, contributing to tackle chronic and historical food insecurity. Most 
of these advancements were seen during the presidencies of Lula da Silva. Between 
2004 and 2014, the percentage of population in situation of poverty and extreme 
poverty decreased dramatically, making FAO to no longer list Brazil in the World 
Hunger Map for the first time in its history.309 The country also achieved the first MDG 
– halve extreme poverty – ten years before the deadline.  
These successes result from diverse factors, such as the creation of the National 
Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) in 1993, during the presidency of 
Itamar Franco (1992-1994); the organization of the first National Conference on Food 
and Nutrition Security in 1994;310 the macroeconomic stability achieved during the 
mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002); social policies and programs 
																																																								
307 See: https://www.embrapa.br/en/busca-de-noticias/-/noticia/34297870/labex-embrapas-international-
program-completes-20-years, accessed on 7 January 2020. 
 
308 Looking into how domestic assets interrelate with the nuances of Brazil’s discourses in the fields of 
agriculture and food security, Cabral (2016) identifies three main types of narratives within EMBRAPA: 
“technicians”, who would be bringing knowledge on modern tropical agriculture to South-South 
development cooperation initiatives; “priests”, who claimed to be in Africa for an altruistic mission; and 
“traders”, who sent the technicians to explore business opportunities.  
 
309 See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4033e.pdf, accessed on 7 January 2020. 
 
310 Other editions occurred in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2015. 
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introduced in the federal administration during his presidency and,311 at the same time, 
by the PT in municipalities like Porto Alegre (Niedzwiecki, 2018); increases in 
minimum wage, greater access to social welfare benefits and universal social policies 
developed during the government of Lula da Silva and the first mandate of Rousseff; 
and the active role of civil society organizations. 
The Zero Hunger Program “became the main governmental strategy guiding 
economic and social policies in Brazil (…), integrating structural and emergency 
policies into actions to fight hunger and poverty” (Graziano da Silva, Grossi and França, 
2011: 11). According to Aranha (2010), Zero Hunger was based on four axes: (a) access 
to food, which included Bolsa Família, 312  the National School Feeding Program 
(PNAE), the Worker’s Food Program (PAT), the Food and Nutrition Surveillance 
System (SISVAN) and the Cisterns Program; (b) supporting family farming through the 
Territórios da Cidadania Program (“Territories of Citizenship”), the National Program 
for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) and the Food Acquisition Program 
(PAA), which purchased products from smallholders; (c) income generation;313 and (d) 
institutional linkages, mobilization and social control.314  
The definition of hunger fighting and poverty alleviation as political priorities 
paved the way for legal instruments that ensured the continuity of food security-related 
policies and programs in Brazil (Leão and Maluf, 2012). In 2006, for instance, the 
Organic Law on Food Security (LOSAN) established the National System of Food and 
Nutrition Security (SISAN), which was regulated in 2010 with the goal to verify the 
impact of state-led initiatives, articulate national and subnational policies and plans, and 
guarantee R2F. Article 2 of LOSAN affirms that the state has the duty to “respect, 
protect, promote, provide, inform, monitor, supervise and evaluate the realization of the 
																																																								
311 Comunidade Solidária, Bolsa Escola, Cartão Alimentação, Vale Gás, Programa de Erradicação do 
Trabalho Infantil and Bolsa Alimentação. 
 
312 Bolsa Família unified several initiatives, becoming the largest Latin American conditional cash 
transfer program targeting families with per capita income below the poverty line. See: 
https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/programme?id=6, accessed on 9 January 2020. Among the most frequent 
criticisms of the program, Albuquerque (2019b) points out the unbalanced focus on emergency policies, 
budget instabilities, emphasis on specific sectoral policies and disputes involving bureaucratic actors. 
Also see Takagi (2006). 
 
313 Neri, Vaz and Souza (2013) demonstrate how each R$ 1 disbursed with Bolsa Família generated R$ 
1,78 to the overall Brazilian economy.  
 
314 Takagi (2011) identifies three related axes: (a) implementation of public policies; (b) participatory 
building of the food and nutrition security policy; and (c) self-help action against hunger. 
 
	 175	
human right to adequate food, as well as to assure the mechanisms for its 
enforceability”. More importantly, article 6 determined that the “Brazilian state must 
work for the promotion of technical cooperation with foreign countries, therefore 
contributing for the achievement of the human right to adequate food in the 
international realm” (Cunha, 2010).315 The text makes clear that, at least since 2006, the 
domestic and the international dimensions were linked concerning R2F. 
In 2010, constitutional amendment 64 altered article 6 of Brazil’s constitution, 
making it to unequivocally recognize and secure R2F as a social right.316 These 
measures “helped to create a legal framework at the federal level that facilitated 
policymaking to explicitly guarantee every Brazilian the right to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food” (IPC-IG, 2013). FAO endorsed the move, pointing out that the 
amendment was a very significant step towards a comprehensive realization of this 
human right in Brazil. The UN organization affirmed it “has supported this process 
through capacity development, awareness building and advocacy”, being “proud of this 
important achievement”.317 In the view of Burity, Cruz and Franceschini (2011: 15), 
Brazil has “gradually advanced in the promotion of right to food claim mechanisms and, 
to a certain extent, stands out as a role model for the practical realization of this right”.  
Moreover, R2F is embedded in the law that established CONSEA, which 
created in 2004 a Standing Commission on the Human Right to Adequate Food. A 
Special Commission to Monitor Violations of the Human Right to Adequate Food was 
established in 2005 as part of the National Council for the Defense of the Rights of the 
Human Person. All in all, the group of public policies and domestic plans led to 
considerable reductions in poverty and inequality (Albuquerque, 2019b).318  
																																																								
315 See: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Lei/L11346.htm, accessed on 9 
January 2020. 
 
316 See: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc64.htm, accessed on 9 
January 2020. 
 
317 See: http://www.fao.org/right-to-food/news/detail-events/en/c/157360/, accessed on 9 January 2020. 
Likewise, the World Bank, which technically and financially supported Bolsa Família, mentioned that 
Brazil was showing how social policies could go beyond assistance and become active tools of social and 
economic transformation. It cited Bolsa Família as “one of the key factors behind the positive social 
outcomes achieved in Brazil in recent years”. 
See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/05/27/br-bolsa-familia, accessed on 9 January 
2020. 
 
318 Between 1990 and 2013, the number of undernourished in Brazil declined from 22,5 million to 3,4 
million, a percentage reduction of 84,7%. 
See: http://www.mds.gov.br/webarquivos/acesso_informacao/institucional/gabinete-da-
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Such a trend continued into the first mandate of Rousseff. Initiated in 2011, 
Brasil sem Miséria (“Brazil without Misery”), narrowed the role of Bolsa Família, 
expecting to overcome specific problems of income deprivation, promote access to 
labor markets, goods and services, and lift 16,2 million from extreme poverty. With 
different programs for rural and urban beneficiaries, the plan aimed to promote 
sustainable emancipation from poverty. 319  A year later, Brasil Carinhoso started 
providing monthly transfers to poor families for each child below the age of six.320 In 
2014, circa 14 million families – or 46 million people – received funds from Bolsa 
Família (Campello, Falcão and Costa, 2014). In addition, the Ministry of Social 
Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) established national plans for food and 
nutrition security (PLANSAN) and for agroecology and organic production 
(PLANAPO). 
Between 2004 and 2014, 26,5 million Brazilians left the poverty line. 
Undernourishment fell from 11,9% in 1999-2001 to less than 2,5% in 2008-2010. The 
economy grew at an annual rate of 3,2% between 1999 and 2014, whereas the Gini 
coefficient dropped from 59 in 1999 to 51 in 2014. Brazil also reduced the rate of 
stunting for children by 6% between 1996 and 2007 (FAO et al., 2019). Obesity rates 
nevertheless continued to climb. 
As explains Albuquerque (2019b), that overall positive scenario had its first 
signs of reversal in mid-2014 in reason of Brazil’s economic downturn, which was 
marked by a rise in inflation and interest rates, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
and a plunge in commodity prices. Mounting unemployment was accompanied by 
decreases in GDP per capita, average income and labor formalization. These factors 
affected the efficacy of public policies, making extreme poverty rise 11,2% between 
2016 and 2017.321 Setbacks were not offset by increases in the value of conditional cash 
																																																																																																																																																																		
ministra/apresentacoes/201409_Brasil%20fora%20do%20mapa%20da%20fome%20-%20port.pdf, 
accessed on 9 January 2020. 
 
319 See: https://www.oas.org/en/sare/courses/webinar-ripso-plan-brasil.pdf, accessed on 9 January 2020. 
 
320 FAO’s country fact sheet brings a compilation of the main strategies, policies and plans related to food 
security adopted by the Brazilian government in the period 2003-2015. See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i3759e.pdf, accessed on 9 January 2020.  
 
321 See: https://www.valor.com.br/brasil/5446455/pobreza-extrema-aumenta-11-e-atinge-148-milhoes-de-
pessoas, accessed on 11 January 2020. 
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transfers paid to families in 2011 and 2014, during Rousseff’s government, and in 2016 
and 2018, already into Temer’s administration.322  
  
V.3. Domestic decision-making processes related to the right to food 
In comparison to the two other case studies part of this thesis, the domestic 
decision making procedures related to food security and to R2F are the most complex. 
This happens for three main reasons: first, the topic of food security is more transversal 
than climate change and peace and security, encompassing issues that range from 
socioeconomic development and human security to inequality and modes of production, 
involving the overall Brazilian society and requesting the participation of more 
bureaucratic actors; second and associated with that, hunger fighting and poverty 
alleviation gained much weight during the 2002 presidential election then turning into 
PT’s main political agenda, which affected the composition of the federal 
administration and budget allocation; third, domestic progresses prompted external 
partners to demand technical cooperation, which was not backed by organized 
responses by the Brazilian government.  
The mentioned public policies can be directly associated with novel spaces in 
the federal bureaucracy and in Brazilian subnational governments. For that to occur, the 
role of the presidency, especially under Lula da Silva, was crucial. His inaugural speech 
in 2003, for example, situated food security and R2F in the center of national debates, 
setting the tone for policy planning and institutional change: “I defined, among the 
priorities of my government, the food security program called Zero Hunger. (…) We 
shall end hunger in my country. We shall transform hunger fighting in a great national 
cause”323. On his first day in office, he created the Extraordinary Ministry of Food 
Security and Fight Against Hunger (MESA), which had the mission to promote Zero 
																																																								
322 The reversal of progresses accelerated during Temer’s presidency. His government kept Bolsa Família 
and programs like the PAA, but approved controversial measures such as constitutional amendment 
55(241)/2016. It established public spending caps for 20 years, limiting annual spending growth to the 
previous year’s inflation rate and affecting social expenditures. The UN special rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, affirmed the measure was entirely incompatible with Brazil’s 
human rights obligations, as it breaches rights like R2F (Alston, 2017). The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights argued it would “create a major crisis in the public education, health, and social 
security system, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable sector”. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21006&LangID=E, accessed 
on 11 January 2020. Also see: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2016/183A.asp, 
accessed on 11 January 2020.  
 
323 See: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u44237.shtml, accessed on 11 January 2020. 
Lula da Silva received the 2011 World Food Prize together with Ghanaian president John Kufuor.  
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Hunger. In the following year, MESA became the Ministry of Social Development and 
Fight against Hunger (MDS).  
Besides that, the General Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and Fight 
Against Hunger (CGFOME) was established as a part of Itamaraty, government bodies 
were recreated (CONSEA), and others were reorganized, as happened with the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency (ABC), also affiliated to Itamaraty, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Supply (MAPA), and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA).324 
Although efforts to coordinate so many entities existed, they frequently disputed 
prestige, budget and access to the presidency.325 Dissent appeared not only inside these 
ministries, but also among them and in their relationship with Itamaraty, as they 
sometimes acted autonomously. That “independence” was mainly seen in development 
cooperation initiatives headed by Brazil (Albuquerque, 2013; Faria, 2012). Clashes 
increased during Rousseff’s administration, as budget was scarcer, access to the 
presidency more restrictive and lack of presidential guidance on foreign policy matters 
greater.  
The MDS broadened MESA’s initial functions in the course of Lula da Silva’s 
mandates, which led Chmielewska and Souza (2011) to argue that this process shifted 
its initial focus on food security towards poverty reduction. In their view, the scale of 
Bolsa Família and other policies under the guidance of MDS enhanced its political 
importance vis-à-vis other ministries, but led to a less focused approach with regard to 
food security-related matters. The MDS also expanded its participation and importance 
in the decision-making processes related to Brazil’s international affairs. On the one 
hand, foreign governments and multilateral institutions requested to learn from 
Brazilian domestic experiences. On the other hand, the MDS – together with other 
entities part of the bureaucracy and external partners - formulated development 
cooperation projects and internationalized Brazil’s know-how.326 
																																																								
324 As I opted to cite government bodies mostly related to the content of this chapter, this is not an 
exhaustive list. Other institutions like the National Food Supply Company (CONAB); ministries 
participating in interministerial groups such as the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture, the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Education and its fund for education development (FNDE); and special 
secretariats directly responding to the presidency can also be mentioned.  
 
325 One of the attempts to generate coherence and coordination was the Interministerial Chamber of Food 
and Nutrition Security (CAISAN), created in 2007 (Chmielewska and Souza, 2011). 
 
326 The MDS had a career diplomat directing its office of international affairs, which reinforces the 
interconnections of domestic and international matters and demonstrates the existence of attempts to 
promote dialogue with other ministries (Albuquerque, 2013). The MDS received, between 2011 and 
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Created during the presidency of Cardoso, the MDA gained more importance 
and budget during Lula da Silva’s administration. It assimilated themes related to 
family farming that were previously under the responsibility of the MAPA and defined 
other areas of work such as the implementation of South-South technical cooperation 
projects. These changes intensified a bureaucratic division that echoed the interests of 
different domestic groups. Generally, whereas the MDA promoted family farming, the 
MAPA upheld the country’s positions on agribusiness. In some circumstances, the two 
ministries were in obvious dissonance, disputing the “official narrative” and 
undermining the cohesiveness of Brazil’s views. That bureaucratic and functional 
separation was more easily perceived in development cooperation projects headed by 
the MDA and MAPA’s EMBRAPA.  
Already in the beginning of Lula da Silva’s presidency, minister Miguel 
Rossetto (2003-2007) created an international working group within the MDA. It 
suggests that efforts were under way to make visible Brazil’s domestic policies and 
externally legitimize the PT.327 Together with its role at FAO, the WFP and IFAD, 
MDA’s multilateral activism was focused on promoting family farming in trade 
negotiations at the WTO and enhancing the presence of civil society organizations in 
multiparty talks. The MDA integrated Brazil’s Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) 
and influenced Brazilian positions during the WTO’s Doha Round. Regionally, the 
MDA was instrumental for the formation of the Specialized Meeting on Family 
Farming of MERCOSUR (REAF) in 2004. It represented a progress in relation to the 
Confederation of Family Farmers Organizations of the Extended MERCOSUR 
(COPROFAM), created ten years earlier.328  
																																																																																																																																																																		
2014, 347 missions from 92 countries interested in learning from Brazil’s experiences. Of that total, 
94,8% came from developing countries of Latin American and the Caribbean (172 missions from 26 
countries) and Africa (113 from 37 states). During the same period, MDS officials participated in 284 
missions in 53 countries. They took part in meetings in multilateral institutions, regional integration 
forums and bilateral talks, not to mention technical visits and development cooperation projects. See: 
http://mds.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/internacional/iniciativas-de-cooperacao/intercambio-
missoes, accessed on 11 January 2020. Also see WFP (2016). 
 
327 It is worth mentioning that the MDA was associated with the Socialist Democracy (“Democracia 
Socialista”), a far-left Trotskyist group part of the PT. It had much influence in the municipal government 
of Porto Alegre, organizing the World Social Forums and elaborating the Participatory Budget. As argues 
MDA#3, “these two examples show the intention to develop an international orientation years before the 
PT entered the presidency”.  
 
328 The REAF was established as an advisory organ to MERCOSUR’s Common Market Group. Its 
origins come back to, among other things, IFAD’s regional coordination unit for MERCOSUR, which 
was set up in 2000; a seminar on family farming and international negotiations held in Brasília in 2003; 
and COPROFAM (Márquez and Ramos, 2012). As explains Albuquerque (2017), REAF’s inception is 
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As for CONSEA, it was recreated after a hiatus during the government of 
Cardoso. CONSEA functioned as a direct advisory body of the presidency, formulating 
strategies and guidelines for food security and nutrition policies, being an essential actor 
for the promotion of R2F in domestic and multilateral debates.329Amongst its six 
permanent commissions, one dealt specifically with R2F. 330  According to decree 
4.582/2003, CONSEA should propose forms to articulate and mobilize civil society and 
foster the creation of subnational food security and nutrition councils. Its inclusive 
nature later influenced Brazil’s positions at FAO, namely on debates regarding the 
reform of the CFS (Rondó and Lopes, 2016).331 The decree affirmed CONSEA should 
invite, as observers, representatives from FAO, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank and the IDB, 
which suggests that a strategy to associate national policies with international activism 
was being planned since the early years of Lula da Silva’s administration.332 As 
mentioned by a CONSEA official, “already in 2005 we released a document discussing 
the construction of an international agenda (…). We had the intention, let’s put it like 
that, to assimilate the international agenda and shape it”.333 
The institutionalization of food security-related matters advanced with the 
creation of CGFOME in 2004, which expected to ensure an external façade to Zero 
Hunger (Lopes Filho, Sabourin and Sayago, 2018; Rondó and Lopes, 2016). Its 
activities encompassed themes such as land reform, family farming, food and nutrition 
security, R2F and international humanitarian assistance. By and large, this new 
																																																																																																																																																																		
closely intertwined with the ascension of left/center-left wing governments in many South American 
states. In 2008, MERCOSUR established a family farming fund (Fondo de la Agricultura Familiar - 
FAF), to which Brazil contributes 70%, Argentina 27%, Uruguay 2%, and Paraguay 1%. In 2013, FAO 
and MERCOSUR engaged in a joint initiative to beef up REAF.  
 




accessed on 11 January 2020. 
 
331 CONSEA also served as a model for CPLP’s Food and Nutritional Security Council.  
 
332 See: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2003/D4582.htm#art3, accessed on 11 January 
2020. FAO named CONSEA “the voice of the people”, calling it a good example of Brazil’s attempts to 
promote enhanced stakeholder dialogue and more effective coordination mechanisms. See: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-au833e.pdf, accessed on 11 January 2020. 
 
333 Interview with BRA#1. 
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ministerial division attempted to infuse an “active and assertive” foreign policy with 
components of solidarity and “non-indifference” towards other developing countries 
(Amorim, 2017). In the opinion of an interviewee, CGFOME operated with “excessive 
autonomy”, attempting to present itself as the “central point” of the discussions on food 
security and trying to organize partnerships and activities with social movements in 
Latin America and Africa without prior discussions with the MDA or the MDS.334 That 
opinion, shared by another interviewee, demonstrates that federal ministries lacked 
coordination and faced bureaucratic competition.335  
Similar criticism appears in relation to the work of ABC, also part of Itamaraty 
and having the mandate to negotiate, coordinate, implement and supervise technical 
cooperation projects (Cunha, 2010). While external demand for Brazil’s national 
experiences increased in the period starting in 2003, ABC and Itamaraty did not manage 
the different actors part of the bureaucracy nor imprinted a general strategic view to 
development cooperation projects involving the country. Because of that, ministries like 
the MDA and the MDS developed individual agendas that had connections with 
Brazil’s foreign policy but were not totally subordinated to Itamaraty. In some cases, 
two or more government bodies were implementing projects in the same country and 
not dialoguing or attempting to find synergies.  
Clashes involving MDA’s pro-family farming orientation and MAPA’s pro-
agribusiness approach were most frequent in forums like the WTO, in which the MDA 
tended to uphold positions closer to the G-33, while the MAPA shared the views of the 
commercial G-20.336 At FAO, as I further explain, Brazil’s positions were more 
congruent.  
That scenario of bureaucratic disjunction was less obvious in Brazil’s 
international behavior during Rousseff’s years. On the one hand, her administration 
devoted less attention to foreign policy coordination, not solving a problem inherited 
from Lula da Silva. Relative disregard for Itamaraty and lack of budget affected the 
chances of her government to coordinate so many domestic actors and create effective 
interministerial groups or channels of dialogue. On the other hand, these players were 
																																																								
334 Interview with MDA#1. 
 
335 Interview with MRE#10. 
 
336 I here make reference to their major lines of work, as both the MDA and the MAPA (through 
EMBRAPA) could respectively deal with trade liberalization and projects aiming to benefit smallholders.  
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less active in the international arena, which constrained the possibilities of the 
development of new bureaucratic conflicts. More than creating new initiatives, the 
actors involved with Brazil’s foreign policy expected to avoid broader losses.  
Together with the economic crisis and political paralysis, problems with the 
country’s hyperactive international agenda became more apparent. The large number of 
technical development cooperation projects impaired their proper implementation and 
continuation, making Rousseff to scale down ongoing projects and avoid creating new 
ones, as depicted in figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17. Disbursements (BRL) with technical cooperation (IPEA and ABC, 
2016)337  
 
This situation frustrated some African and Latin American partners that voted 
for Graziano da Silva and expected Brazil to step up its role as a provider of technical 
assistance.338 
 
V.4. Brazil and the right to food at FAO 
																																																								
337 The last official compilation of Brazil’s international development cooperation demonstrates that 
CONAB, EMBRAPA, the MDS, and CGFOME/ABC spent less with development cooperation projects 
in 2016 than in the two previous years (IPEA, 2018). 
 
338 MDS#2 explained the strategy to win votes for Graziano da Silva and the central role of Africa: “our 
diplomacy worked hard to win votes and that was based not on sympathy for Brazil, but on programs and 
plans. We sent a mission to the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa to understand what 
were the agricultural challenges in Africa, especially concerning family farming, and what Brazil could 
do. How Brazil could share its experiences and help these countries through the work of FAO. Graziano 
said he would be the ‘African candidate’ and put Africa at the center of FAO’s agenda. This mission 
stayed there for three months. Later, Graziano went to a summit of the African Union and met with heads 
of state, saying he would defend African pledges during his mandate”. 
 
	 183	
Throughout the last years, Brazilian negotiators have attempted to mainstream 
the country’s view on the concept of R2F in discussions at FAO. In order to evaluate 
that engagement, I traced three circumstances that are interrelated: (a) Brazil’s 
involvement with the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of 
the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security; (b) its 
contributions to debates on R2F at the Committee on World Food Security (CFS); and 
(c) the election of Graziano da Silva and its impacts on the promotion of Brazil’s 
interpretation of R2F.  
I defined these moments for two main reasons: first, R2F is a much wider 
concept in comparison to the two others presented in previous chapters. It not only 
addresses and broadens the notion of food security, but is also part of many other 
discussions of the food security regime. Second, because Brazilian negotiators advanced 
the concept more frequently than they did with the ideas of concentric circles and RwP 
respectively in the regimes of climate change and peace and security. For that reason, I 
decided to work with a larger time span, which allows me to further analyze the role of 
each explanatory factor.  
To start with (a), Brazil attempted to influence the intergovernmental working 
group negotiating the voluntary guidelines, serving as a country “with experience in 
implementing the right to food” (FAO, 2004: 4). That behavior is a consequence of self-
perception and external validation of Brazilian experiences. Whereas FAO supported 
domestic initiatives and considered Brazil’s approach to R2F convergent with its 
institutional perspective, that endorsement made Brazil’s delegates to keep branding 
national successes and placing the country as a central player in debates.339  Suitably, 
Brazil was commended by FAO for approaching the task “within a human rights 
framework”.340  
In the same way (b), negotiators expected to internationalize the “Brazilian” 
view of R2F, defending that the CFS should tie together the need for intersectoral 
governance of domestic policies, the promotion of mechanisms of social participation 
																																																								
339 That strategy generated novel demands of countries willing to learn from Brazil’s experiences. In 
2006, for example, the Philippines expressed at FAO the interest to implement “its own version of 
Brazil’s Zero Hunger Program in the form of a ‘Strategy towards a Hunger-free Philippines”. See: 
http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/meeting/011/j8532e.pdf, accessed on 13 January 2020. 
 
340 See: http://www.fao.org/3/J2891e/J2891e.htm, accessed on 13 January 2020. The executive-director of 
the WFP, Josette Sheeran, affirmed in 2010 that Brazil knew how to “break the grip-hold of chronic food 
insecurity”. See: http://www.fao.org/3/k9551e/k9551e.pdf, accessed on 13 January 2020. 
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and the importance of enshrining R2F in national constitutions. As I demonstrate in the 
next section, Itamaraty articulated that official view at FAO. It avoided linking R2F 
with more contested notions like food sovereignty, also choosing not to defend R2F as a 
justiciable right and subject of litigation. As explained by an interviewee, the MAPA 
“never accepted food sovereignty and the MDA insisted on it. So Itamaraty had to 
harmonize these views”.341 A diplomat similarly mentioned that “if we defended food 
sovereignty, we would create an issue [with domestic actors like MAPA] because we 
also wanted to export food”.342  
The strategy was to come to terms with both ministries and adopt an 
intermediate position that, at the same time, would allow Brazil to influence debates, 
evince the country as a cooperative and reasonable player, and not displease multilateral 
partners. In the end, that halfway view ended up being fully convergent with FAO’s 
mainstream approach to R2F.  
The disposition to promote R2F within the CFS appeared in a 2004 meeting, 
when the Brazilian delegation informed that Lula da Silva convened a “Summit of the 
World Leaders for the Action Against Hunger and Poverty”, attempting to “mobilize 
international attention and political will to the challenges of combating hunger and 
poverty”.343 Likewise, Zero Hunger was later promoted as an example of a national 
initiative in the context that led to the creation of the International Alliance Against 
Hunger (IAAH).344 In 2006, Brazil hosted the International Conference on Agrarian 
Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) in Porto Alegre, associating, in subsequent 
talks at the CFS, agrarian reform with R2F and cultural diversity.345 Brazil made use of 
its role as host to advance its positions, relying on the conference as another stepping-
stone for the progressive realization of R2F. 
The intention to act was also present during Rousseff’s first presidential 
mandate. In 2011, FAO member states established the Global Strategic Framework for 
																																																								
341 Interview with FAO#2. 
 
342 Interview with MRE#12.  
 
343 See: http://www.fao.org/3/J3345e/J3345e00.htm, accessed on 13 January 2020. Lula da Silva also 
pledged to establish a solidarity fund to reduce hunger and poverty together with members of the G-8 and 
UN agencies. 
 
344 See: http://www.fao.org/monitoringprogress/docs/IAA_Towards_Int_Com.pdf, accessed on 13 
January 2020. 
 
345 See: http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/meeting/011/j8345e.pdf, accessed on 13 January 2020.  
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Food Security and Nutrition (GSF). It expected to enhance the role of the CFS, improve 
coordination, and combine efforts of state and non-state actors to prevent future food 
crises, fight hunger and eliminate poverty. Brazil was the coordinator of the GSF and, a 
year later, pointed out as a “success story institutionalizing multi-ministerial 
coordination and civil society participation to address food insecurity and promote the 
right to food”. Since the creation of Zero Hunger, “the country has promoted food 
security and the right to food on many fronts, through effective laws, strong institutions, 
sound policies and an empowered civil society” (FAO, 2012b: 27).346  
Elected during Rousseff’s administration (c), Graziano da Silva opened novel 
avenues for civil society participation, especially at meetings of the CFS, which, to 
some extent, mirrored Brazil’s domestic experience with CONSEA. During his 
mandate, not only FAO increased ties with non-state actors favorable to R2F, but also 
financed their presence in CFS debates.347 Furthermore, Graziano da Silva explicitly 
mentioned his interest in transforming FAO into a development agency. That intention 
guards intrinsic relationship with a more systematic way of approaching food insecurity, 
which Brazil promoted with Zero Hunger and other national policies and plans.  
The regional dimension played an important role in Brazil’s participation in the 
regime. It was part of a broader foreign policy strategy through which Brazil’s views 
were socialized regionally and then forwarded multilaterally. By doing so, Brazilian 
negotiators could present the country’s ideas as receiving regional support and being 
based on ongoing projects. That domestic-regional-multilateral course of action 
intended to strengthen Brazil’s claims and make them be seen as collective endeavors. 
As an official working for the MDA at the time explained: “we had the deliberate 
intention not to make other countries copy our policies, but help them implement their 
own, so we could foster regional cooperation”.348 According to another interviewee, 
former MDA minister Miguel Rossetto approached chancellor Celso Amorim with the 
idea of MERCOSUR establishing a specialized meeting to work on food security-
																																																								
346 On Brazil and the GSF, see: http://www.fao.org/3/mc025E/mc025E.pdf, accessed on 13 January 2020. 
During Rousseff’s presidency, other topics gained space in Brazil’s participation at the CFS, namely the 
controversial relationship between biofuels and food security.  
 
347 On that matter, MRE#9 explained that a fluid dialogue with civil society organizations was crucial to 
minimize power concentration within FAO. “Some of our positions were similar to the ones of the civil 
society. We thus reinforced one another as much as possible”. MDS#3 shared the opinion.  
 
348 Interview with MDA#2. 
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related topics, which ended up being the REAF: “we expected to foment a cooperative 
regional platform even before being able to measure the effects of our policies”.349 
Depending on the case, the path from the domestic to the multilateral level was 
not as direct. A good example is the 2006 Hunger-Free Latin America and Caribbean 
Initiative (IALCSH), which was pioneered by Brazil and Guatemala. It was “inspired by 
Brazil’s Zero Hunger”, having more ambitious targets than the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) (Sanches et al., 2019: 47). The IALCSH echoes the basics 
of R2F, relying on the notion that hunger is a violation of human rights. The IALCSH 
received technical support from FAO and countries like Spain, which demonstrates that 
linkages between the levels of analysis might vary. In the specific case of the IALCSH, 
the regional dimension assumed its present form after the existence of domestic policies 
and the multilateral backing of FAO.  
Beyond that, in talks at FAO, GRULAC frequently acted as a bloc, promoting 
common views, collectivizing interests and putting its weight to influence the agenda.350 
The convergence with Brazilian interests was visible in, for instance, GRULAC’s bid 
for the CFS to include civil society representatives;351 FAO regional conferences for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, which encouraged the role of international 
cooperation for the realization of R2F; attempts to approximate CELAC with 
GRULAC, mostly following summits and presidential diplomacy;352 and bilateral and 
trilateral technical cooperation projects with regional partners like Haiti.  
Cooperation with extra-regional groups was also relevant. In the case of the 
CPLP, it had its own Food and Nutritional Security Council and shared Brazil’s view on 
the importance of R2F (Dias, 2017).353With the African continent, Brazil organized the 
																																																								
349 Interview with FAO#2. 
 
350 As point out a CONSEA official (BRA#1), that convergence with regional partners occurred but was 
not a rule. “We had some difficulties to compose joint positions with Argentina. Until recently they had a 
conventional view on food security, sometimes in opposition to Brazil’s perspective. In fact, they have 
displayed a position very similar to MAPA’s”. 
 
351 See: http://www.fao.org/3/j3202e/j3202e.htm, accessed on 14 January 2020.  
 
352 See, for instance, http://www.fao.org/members-gateway/grulac/documentos/celac/en/, accessed on 14 
January 2020. A good example of how regional and multilateral dynamics are intertwined is the 2014 II 
CELAC Summit in Habana, in which member states requested FAO, the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to 
prepare a food security plan for CELAC. See: http://www.fao.org/americas/prioridades/plan-celac/acerca-
de-celac/en/, accessed on 14 January 2020. Beyond its regular summits, CELAC has a ministerial 
meeting on family farming.  
 
353 See: https://www.cplp.org/id-4719.aspx, accessed on 14 January 2020. 
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2010 “Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight Against Hunger, and Rural 
Development” in Brasília, sharing a portfolio of public policies like the PAA and 
development cooperation programs such as the More Food International. As for the 
BRICS, its members have “actively participated in and facilitated global discussions on 
nutrition-sensitive social protection”, also being seen as sources of good practices 
(FAO, 2016). The bloc created the BRICS Agriculture Research Platform (BRICS-
ARP), which operates as a “virtual facility to promote food security, sustainable agri-
development and poverty alleviation through strategic cooperation in agriculture within 
the BRICS countries”. Under the Action Plan 2012-2016 for Agricultural Cooperation 
of BRICS Countries, Brazil was responsible for working on “food security to most 
vulnerable people” and on creating a BRICS group in FAO, which could also act within 
the WFP.354 Finally, Brazil co-created the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for 
Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), which was established in 2004 but lost 
ground during Rousseff’s administration. 
 
V.5. The right to food and explanatory factors 
 Beyond enabling Brazil to promote R2F, the structural, the domestic and the 
bureaucratic explanatory factors reinforced each other, enabling the country to exert a 
prominent role in the food security regime.  
 
Regime structure 
The open structure of the food security regime was a necessary condition for 
Brazil to be able to advance its view on R2F. I raise five points about that. First (i), it is 
a non-hierarchical setting, granting more opportunities for developing countries to shape 
existing normative and operational multilateral foundations. Relying on the inexistence 
of veto power or distinct types of membership, Brazil could not only bring its interests 
to the negotiating table, but also successfully elect and re-elect a national for FAO’s top 
position. Second and differently from the two previous case studies (ii), Brazil made use 
of the support of its Latin American and Caribbean partners to promote R2F. While 
GRULAC legitimized Brazilian positions, its members pursued similar strategies at 
FAO. They pushed forward initiatives that were previously socialized in arrangements 
such as MERCOSUR and CELAC, validating individual claims.  
																																																								
354 See: http://infobrics.org/post/25585/, accessed on 14 January 2020. Also see: 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/111030-agriculture-plan.html, accessed on 14 January 2020. 
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Third (iii), Brazil enhanced its engagement at FAO when the institution was 
undergoing changes. The reform of the CFS reflected the intention of making it more 
representative and responsive to demands of civil society actors upholding a rights-
based approach to food security. These shifts found echo in the attempts of Lula da 
Silva and Rousseff to find common interpretations of R2F and enlarge the number of 
stakeholders partaking in CFS meetings. National experiences like CONSEA, which 
was a crucial actor for R2F to gain prominence in Brazil, served as one of the models 
for a reformed CFS. Fourth (v), although the voluntary guidelines were adopted in 
2004, FAO member states continued discussing measures to support the progressive 
realization of R2F. As the path from normative orientation to practical enactment was 
still unfinished, countries like Brazil could find more chances to influence ongoing 
discussions. Fifth (iv), the election of Graziano da Silva helped to legitimize Brazil’s 
pledges. As mentioned by an interviewee:  
 
Brazil gained the possibility to better expose its policies. (…) [before Graziano da 
Silva], social movements did not have the same level of participation at FAO. [After 
Graziano da Silva] Several themes acquired political relevance they never had before. 
The crucial topic of poverty, for example, it was not that present before his election.355 
 
On that matter, a Brazilian diplomat ironically commented: “Itamaraty has to 
pretend the director-general is neutral. Countries support their nationals for a reason. 
Otherwise the United States would not want to elect Americans for the WFP. The 
elected candidates indeed exert influence”.356 
 
Domestic assets 
As with the previous explanatory factor, the group of domestic policies and 
plans composed a necessary condition that enabled Brazil’s behavior at FAO, namely 
when it comes to R2F.357 As contends Albuquerque (2019b), programs like Zero 
Hunger, the PAA, the PNAE, the defense of R2F at the domestic level and the 
																																																								
355 Interview with FAO#2. 
 
356 Interview with MRE#11. 
 
357 As stated by MRE#9, “when we were able to include... When CONSEA was able to include R2F in 
Brazil’s constitution, it opened an avenue for Itamaraty to act. R2F became a fundamental right that 
should be protected and promoted”.  
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development of a set of integrated public policies inspired Brazil’s role at FAO in 
debates on both conceptual and practical issues. In the view of a Brazilian official, 
 
As Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world, it doesn’t have enough 
legitimacy to say how the world should be better. However, when you have the external 
recognition that you are fighting a historical problem, having positive results, and 
reducing inequality, your credentials are enhanced and you are heard. That process 
happened with Brazil.358 
 
Domestic assets not only enacted subsequent multilateral positions, but were 
also legitimized by institutions like FAO, composing a dynamic feedback mechanism. 
According to an interviewee, “in the end, Zero Hunger strengthened FAO’s agenda. 
Diouf (Jacques Diouf, FAO’s director-general between 1994-2011) perceived that. So 
you had Lula favoring Brazil’s agenda, which was good for Diouf, for FAO and 
consequently for Brazil”. 359  In the view of a bureaucrat working for that UN 
organization, “since Lula could not obtain validation from the Brazilian press and 
because Brazil’s elites are very susceptible to international opinions, external 
legitimation served as a means to amplify the acceptance of Zero Hunger in the 
country”.360 An interviewee working for the WFP mentioned that the international 
validation was used by Brazil as a marketing tool: “the Brazilian government did not 
think: ‘they are admiring us, so what can we do better? How can we enhance our 
domestic policies?’ Instead, their behavior was: ‘they are saying great things about us, 
so that means we are doing the right thing’”.361  
Some interviewees mentioned that the externalization of domestic experiences 
was not clearly planned: “back in 2003, they [policymakers] were lost. They only knew 
they wanted to make it happen, that they wanted to bring innovative solutions and unify 
																																																								
358 Interview with MDS#2. 
 
359 Interview with MDA#1. 
 
360 Interview with FAO#3. The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) and the WFP’s 
Centre of Excellence against Hunger, both operating in Brasília and respectively founded in 2004 and 
2011, were important allies in the diffusion of domestic practices (Fraundorfer, 2013). WFP’s Centre of 
Excellence against Hunger affirmed that “this rights-based approach to food security is a hallmark of the 
Brazilian experience. Brazil’s social programmes are widely recognized as successful cases of 
government investment in inclusive growth policies” (WFP, 2013: 6).  
 
361 Interview with WFP#2. 
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policies”. 362  Others, at Itamaraty and the MDA, disagreed, arguing that it was 
“deliberate and strategic”, as illustrates the international working group established by 
minister Rossetto and the talks involving FAO and the MRE.363 The existence of 
domestic instances of deliberation and decision-making bodies like CONSEA also 
served as a model for the country’s multilateral inroads.  
Domestic plans like Brasil sem Miséria continued being developed during 
Rousseff’s government and Brazil persisted in taking part in conceptual debates. 
However, Brazil’s international dynamism diminished, primarily when it comes to its 
role as a provider of development cooperation. As stated by an interviewee, whereas 
Lula da Silva offered EMBRAPA’s services to other developing countries, Rousseff 
remarked that Brazil should be its priority.364 Lastly, although domestic assets like 
being an agricultural powerhouse were not directly associated with R2F, they can be 
linked to Brazil’s technical expertise on rural matters, which could theoretically be 
driven towards the realization of R2F.  
 
Domestic decision-making procedures 
 Brazil’s promotion of R2F is a direct consequence of the activism of specific 
governmental and non-governmental actors during the period 2003-2016. Brazil would 
hardly come up with a renewed stance at FAO without the MDA, which increased its 
leverage throughout the presidency of Lula da Silva, and the MDS and CONSEA, 
which were respectively established and recreated by the PT. Beyond that, the role of 
the presidency – namely president Lula da Silva – was pivotal for a set of domestic 
policies and plans to come about and later be part of the country’s multilateral positions 
throughout Rousseff’s mandates. In this regard, an interviewee remarked that it was 
Lula da Silva who imprinted centrality for the topics of food security, hunger fighting, 
																																																								
362 Interview with MRE#11. MDS#1 and WFP#2 shared a similar opinion. According to WFP#1: 
“Nothing was planned. Sometimes we think everything is well organized, but that was not the case. 
Things happened very slowly. Zero Hunger started having some good results and many other programs 
were being developed. Afterwards, many countries asked for Brazil’s support. So when Lula and Amorim 
travelled abroad, some bureaucracies received telegrams from Itamaraty telling them to ‘act accordingly’. 
Act accordingly how? So these ministries started to evaluate how they could cooperate”.  
 
363 Interviews with MDA#1 and MDA#2. According to MRE#9, “already in the transition to Lula’s 
presidency, we started to dialogue with FAO. Already in December 2002, FAO officials came to help us 
and it became clear that we needed to have a structure like CGFOME in the government”. BRA#3 also 
defended that the internationalization of domestic policies was deliberate.  
 
364 Interview with FAO#1. 
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poverty alleviation and R2F: “before him, Brazil had no specialized bureaucracy 
working on the implementation of domestic policies in such a scale”.365 These players 
continued influencing the domestic agenda under Rousseff in spite of the domestic 
economic crisis and shifts in foreign policy orientation.  
Reflecting on why Brazil chose FAO as a “privileged forum”, an interviewee 
explained the strategic role of domestic players: 
 
Lula had an advisory group of experts on agricultural and food supply policies since the 
presidential campaign of 1989. When he was elected in 2002, that group composed the 
working group mandated to devise Zero Hunger. The program started receiving a lot of 
criticism in Brazil, so Lula reunited this group and asked: ‘in the alphabet soup that is 
the UN, is there a letter dealing with food security in a similar way we do here in 
Brazil?’ After that, someone said: ‘well, there is the WFP’. Another person mentioned 
IFAD. And then an official said that FAO could work best. It was in this specific 
meeting that they started to articulate how to perform at FAO, which later resulted in 
the election of Graziano da Silva as FAO’s regional representative for Latin America 
and the Caribbean and then as director-general.366 
 
More than in the previous case studies, the political party in power adds up to 
explain why Brazil could come up with a set of policies and plans and later promote 
their internationalization. Two interviewees reminded that the PT had a “significant 
international orientation” even before coming into the presidency. One of them 
complemented, however, that some prominent figures within the party such as Marco 
Aurélio Garcia, the special advisor to Lula da Silva and Rousseff on international 
affairs, “never favored the topic”, being more focused on articulating matters related to 
regional integration.367  
Bureaucratic disputes – mostly between the MAPA and the MDA, but also 
within these ministries - were frequent at the domestic realm, but not so much at FAO. 
That happened for three main reasons: (i) the MAPA centered its actions and pro-
agribusiness positions at the WTO, leaving more spaces for the MDS, the MDA, 
																																																								
365 Interview with FAO#1. 
 
366 Interview with FAO#3. 
 
367 Interviews with FAO#3 and FAO#1. 
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CONSEA and CGFOME to act at FAO (and the WFP);368 (ii) with the exception of 
Itamaraty, who attempted to mediate bureaucratic disagreement, these actors could join 
forces and converge agendas, sidelining the MAPA and preventing it to move its 
interests forward; and (iii) Itamaraty, as in the climate change regime, worked to pacify 
tensions and present a “unified” narrative about Brazil’s successes, silencing dissent and 
avoiding cacophony. That singularity of FAO was not repeated in other contexts in 
which food security was also debated. Beyond quarrels at the WTO, clashes involving 
and within bureaucracies were commonly seen in Brazil’s bilateral and regional inroads.  
Concerning bilateral development cooperation, Itamaraty’s ABC did not 
coordinate the multiple initiatives championed by Brazil nor imprinted a common 
vision to projects carried out by the MDA or MAPA’s EMBRAPA. That scenario 
became more complicated with Rousseff’s government, when the budget to technical 
and humanitarian cooperation diminished considerably (Albuquerque, 2019b; IPEA and 
ABC, 2016). Regionally, during discussions leading to OAS’ 2012 Declaration of 
Cochabamba on “Food Security with Sovereignty in the Americas”, for example, 
Brazilian negotiations were attempting to single out the centrality of the concepts of 
R2F, food security and nutrition and food sovereignty. Brazil received the backing of 
most of CELAC and the opposition of the United States, Canada, Mexico and 
Colombia. When talks were advancing towards Brazil’s interests, a negotiator recalled 
that tensions reflecting the agribusiness versus family farming dualism appeared within 
Itamaraty. 
 
An ambassador instructed me to change our position. I explained that these concepts – 
R2F, food security and food sovereignty – are safeguarded by national legislation, by 
LOSAN. When I finished my point, he said something like: ‘I understand that as a 
human being, but the Brazilian state is a major agricultural exporter and I am here to 
defend the Brazilian state’. As we could not agree, the issue was brought to Itamaraty in 
Brasília. The problem was only solved when we received a direct orientation from the 
presidency telling our delegation to abide by the law.369  
 
																																																								
368 At FAO, MAPA was more interested in discussions on livestock and sustainability.  
 
369 Interview with FAO#3. 
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 A government official diplomatically named these differences “constructive 
ambiguity”. He summed up how bureaucratic disagreement reflected in Brazil’s 
positions in the following manner:  
 
In many moments we had prevailing positions, but they were not undisputed. This 
generates conceptual confusion and some observers could find it problematic to clearly 
understand Brazil’s initiatives. We always had difficulties to talk about food 
sovereignty because while CONSEA, the MDA and other ministries defended it, parts 
of Itamaraty considered it troubling, as it could open the way for domestic agricultural 
subsidies, something we were fighting against at the WTO. That was the trickiest 
concept and Brazil never consistently expressed its defense for it. With R2F things were 
different. It was backed by domestic policies and supported by our strategic alliances 
with other developing countries. China, India and South Africa were also promoting 
it.370  
  
V.6. Brazil’s right to food and the degree of change 
 Brazil’s promotion of R2F fits well into the country’s overall approach to 
multilateralism. While expecting to influence FAO’s debates, Brazil did not display a 
revisionist behavior. A CONSEA official corroborates the notion that R2F was only 
directed to supplement the idea of food security: “food security is a goal, an objective, 
that should be guided by R2F”.371 The intention was to make it reflect a rights-based 
interpretation that was already visible in Brazil’s constitution and in policies like Zero 
Hunger. In the words of a FAO official who helped build the flagship program during 
the presidency of Lula da Silva: “these concepts coexist, but you can consider that they 
evolve throughout time (…). The right to food is a complement to food security and 
member states are the forces defining how conceptual evolutions will take place”.372  
Beyond making use of R2F to influence ongoing normative debates and 
strengthen the centrality of the topics of hunger and poverty at FAO, Brazilian 
negotiators engaged with the regime’s operational components. That intention was 
																																																								
370 Interview with MDA#2. 
 
371 Interview with BRA#1. 
 
372 Interview with FAO#1. Accordingly, in a 2017 document, the CFS affirmed that “the right to adequate 
food can serve as an underlying guiding principle, a common thread to engage governments at different 
levels as duty bearers to ensure sustainable change and the availability of nutritious food at all levels”. 
See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-mu275e.pdf, accessed on 17 January 2020, p. 13. 
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visible with the election of Graziano da Silva, who came with the mission to develop 
FAO’s cooperative dimension and promote inclusive spaces of debate such as the CFS. 
In addition to FAO, Brazil expected to have an enhanced participation in the main 
governing body of the WFP.373  
As it occurs with the other case studies part of this thesis, although Brazil’s 
negotiators kept the general orientations of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy, the country’s 
inner dynamics affected the continuous defense of R2F. During Rousseff’s years, that 
was a consequence of the economic crisis, fewer development cooperation projects, 
Brazil’s incapacity to maintain a proactive role at the WFP and a reduced engagement 
with multilateral debates. Temer’s government extinguished Itamaraty’s CGFOME and 
the MDA in 2016, transforming the latter in the Special Secretariat for Family Farming 
and Agrarian Development (SEAD).374 With the MDA out the equation, concepts like 
R2F – and even more food sovereignty - lost space in Brazil’s political agenda in both 
domestic and multilateral dimensions. Notwithstanding these setbacks and bureaucratic 
changes, Brazil’s delegation at FAO did not receive new instructions at least until late-
2016. As pointed out a FAO official,  
 
It was no use for them [Temer’s government] to undermine Brazil’s director-general. 
Brazil was being commended. Although Graziano was elected because of successful 
programs developed under Lula and Dilma, the extinction of some of these programs 
with Temer was not reflected here [at FAO]. A temporal gap [between domestic 
changes and subsequent multilateral behavior] was visible.375 
 
																																																								
373 National legislation (law 12.429/2011 and law 13.001/2014) allowed Brazil to donate food (mostly 
rice, beans and corn) to nations affected by crises and/or environmental disasters, which made the country 
rank between the WFP’s top 10 donors in 2011 and 2012 and integrate its Executive Board. The idea was 
to articulate donations to countries in humanitarian distress with structural support, to which Brazil would 
receive the assistance of WFP’s Centre of Excellence against Hunger in Brasília. However, the WFP is a 
program and not an agency like FAO, which means that it depends on reliable sources of funding. 
Brazil’s sluggish economy and the diminished relevance of the country’s foreign policy in the last years 
of Rousseff’s government impaired a continued activism at the WFP. See: 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/133-tables-and-charts/51214-top-10-donors-to-
wfp.html, accessed on 17 January 2020. Furthermore, Brazil’s inroads at the WFP were criticized because 




combate-a-fome.shtml, accessed on 17 January 2020. 
 
375 Interview with FAO#2. 
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Bolsonaro went further, transferring functions of SEAD to the MAPA; 
allocating its remaining duties to the newly created Secretariat for Family Farming and 
Cooperativism (SAF), which is also subordinated to the ministry; ending the MDS; and 
engaging in a legislative battle to extinguish CONSEA.376 Mixing diffuse narratives of 
“socialism”, “authoritarianism”, “Bolivarianism” and “meritocracy”, his administration 
defended that many of the domestic policies and bureaucratic departments created 
during PT’s presidencies needed to be reversed. Contributing to this view is the fact that 
the PT did not effectively expose to Brazil’s society what were the direct and indirect 
gains of the development cooperation projects headed by the country as well as how the 
linkages involving the national and the multilateral dimensions could prove beneficial 
(Albuquerque, 2019b).  
 
V.7. Final remarks 
This chapter illustrated Brazil’s reading of R2F and intention to promote it in the 
food security regime, notably at FAO. As far as Brazil did not invent the concept, it 
imprinted its own view to continuing normative debates. Relying on successful national 
experiences, Brazilian negotiators upheld the centrality of R2F, defending that an 
evolving food security agenda should take into consideration a rights-based dimension. 
Without denying the importance of ensuring economic and physical access to safe and 
nutritious food, Brazil highlighted that the right to be free from hunger and the right to 
adequate food should come together. 
In comparison to the concentric circles and RwP, Brazil’s R2F is less defined 
and conceptually bounded. It happens because R2F is a fluid idea, being tied to the 
notions of food security (and its variants like food security and nutrition) and food 
sovereignty. Brazil’s view on R2F is purposely vague and moderate because domestic 
actors part of the federal bureaucracy and civil society organizations do not uphold 
coinciding interpretations. Whereas some ministries, NGO, and smallholder’s 
movements approximate R2F to food sovereignty, other players avoid making this 
connection. Moreover, not opting to follow a narrow understanding allows Brazilian 








 Figure 18. Analytical framework and R2F 
 
 As displayed in figure 18, the three explanatory factors were individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for Brazil’s R2F to be put forward in the multilateral 
domain and more specifically at FAO. Succinctly, (X1) FAO is a non-hierarchical 
setting in which member states can influence the agenda more easily than in, for 
instance, the UNSC. Moreover, it was undergoing changes resulting from the reform of 
the CFS and the election of a new director-general, who favored the promotion of novel 
ideas and the reinterpretation of existing ones. Graziano da Silva epitomized a set of 
national public policies, being responsible for Zero Hunger and favoring similar 
approaches during his mandates. Although he did not follow a “Brazilian” agenda, it is 
fair to say that he contributed to legitimize Brazil’s food security-related domestic 
assets. 
Domestic policies and plans (X2) were also decisive. Whereas they were part of 
Brazil’s credentials, their successes and international recognition portrayed the country 
as a responsible and non-indifferent player. Domestic bodies like CONSEA were 
directly associated with a reformed CFS and with the need to strengthen R2F. Programs 
like Zero Hunger later materialized as the UN “Zero Hunger Challenge” and the UN 
SDG number 2. Policies like the PAA and the PNAE were commended by FAO, 
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integrating its strategic lines of work and serving as models to trilateral development 
cooperation projects implemented with partners in Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. As stated throughout this chapter, the relationship between the domestic 
realm and the multilateral domain was clear and mutually reinforcing. Brazilian 
decision-makers explored that connection particularly during the presidencies of Lula 
da Silva and Rousseff. 
Brazil’s activism at FAO was a direct consequence of the work of several 
bureaucratic actors (X3), namely the MDA, the MDS, Itamaraty, and CONSEA. 
Clashes were mostly confined to the domestic realm, but also visible in South-South 
development cooperation projects and in forums like the WTO. At FAO, Itamaraty was 
able to avoid cacophony, presenting Brazil’s views as a coherent byproduct of domestic 
debates. By and large, that happened because of MAPA’s relative absence from 
normative debates and in reason of Itamaraty’s initiatives to control “radical” stances 
linking R2F to food sovereignty and to litigation and claim mechanisms. In spite of the 
new Temer government, Brazilian negotiators at FAO continued with Lula da Silva and 
Rousseff’s foreign policy guidelines. Lack of orientation from Brasília and the 
diminished importance conferred to FAO allowed that multilateral behavior to continue 
by inertia.  
The path from the domestic to the multilateral level took into consideration 
diplomatic exchanges with regional and extra-regional peers. Regionally, Brazil built on 
MERCOSUR’s REAF, CELAC and GRULAC to reinforce views, socialize practices 
and collectivize individual interests. Extra-regionally, normative preferences and 
national experiences were replicated in CPLP’s Food and Nutritional Security Council 
and in development cooperation initiatives with African partners, from whom Graziano 
da Silva received votes. The role of regional and extra-regional players was much more 
important than in the two previous chapters, which means that Brazilian policymakers 
could strategically foment partnerships to enhance multilateral clout. As depicted in 
figure 18, these partnerships did not shift the content of Brazil’s R2F nor resulted in a 








In dire times for multilateralism, international relations scholars tend to go with 
the flow, embracing narratives that “multilateralism is dead”,377 “in free-fall”378 and 
“needing to be rescued”. 379 Especially after the election of Donald Trump, 
multilateralism is under stress and being questioned by both developed and developing 
powers. Yet, multilateralism is still a key foundation for a rattled global order. Studying 
some of its inner components – here treated as regimes – is crucial for understanding 
how solid is the current order, its principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures. Change is indeed under way and while states are discussing standards of 
conduct and rules of engagement, no viable alternatives were presented. In times of 
renegotiation of entrenched practices and normative orientations, setbacks and reversals 
are possible. This thesis looked into what type of change is occurring and how 
disruptive it is. 
I started the research questioning how developing powers interact with the main 
normative and operational foundations of multilateral regimes. I demonstrated that 
whereas mainstream – and mostly realist literature – tends to sharply divide the world in 
“keepers” and “challengers” (Gilpin, 1981; Goldstein, 2005; Kupchan, 2014; 
Mearsheimer, 2010), this might not be the case if one looks into certain states, 
explanatory factors and contexts. Having a clear focus on Brazil, my investigation 
illustrated that attaching definitive adjectives to foreign policy behavior can be 
misleading. Instead of uncritically adopting terms such as revisionist, partner, free rider 
and bandwagon, just to mention some, I resorted to domestic and structural factors to 
explain how foreign policy is actually produced and implemented. Without attempting 
to create an all-encompassing (and surely defective, not to say over-ambitious) 
explanatory model, I focused on specific concepts that Brazilian negotiators forwarded 
in particular negotiations.380 As they appeared between foreign policy formulation and 
																																																								
377 See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-22/multilateralism-is-dead-long-live-the-g-7, 
accessed on 23 January 2020.  
 
378 See: https://cpr.unu.edu/the-multilateral-freefall.html, accessed on 23 January 2020. 
 
379 See: https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/rescuing_multilateralism, accessed on 23 January 
2020. 
 
380 This methodological choice approximates to the definition of middle-range theories. See, for instance, 
Merton (1968). 
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the existing normative and operational multilateral components, these concepts were 
framed as foreign policy strategies or mechanisms. 
Methodologically speaking, process tracing is a powerful method to uncover 
causal sequences and define chains of events leading to particular outcomes. The 
research showed how process tracing can be an extremely valuable method for in-depth, 
within case, interview-based analyzes. Moreover, process tracing was instrumental for 
studying concepts whose origins go back in time (Goertz, 2017). Doing so allowed me 
to relate their content with the normative and operational elements part of multilateral 
regimes. The method nevertheless ended up being exceedingly time-consuming, 
demanding an iterative way to conduct research that might not be applicable to works 
dealing with more cases and data, which would require the use of qualitative 
alternatives like QCA and/or quantitative methods.  
Taking into account the mentioned insufficiencies and expecting to broaden the 
analysis and enhance the quality of my findings, I combined process tracing with the 
comparative method. In all the three case studies, I carefully chose matching 
explanatory factors and mechanisms, which allowed me to compare cases and look for 
patterns and contrasts. While process tracing alone could not do so, the comparative 
method would not provide detailed information on the cases. For these reasons, my 
analytical framework brought together the two qualitative methods, enhancing their 
usefulness. Future works should test this methodological combination when studying 
specific foreign policy outcomes bound to determined time frames and thematic arenas. 
Coming back to the first hypothesis part of this research (H1), I conclude that 
Brazil’s recent foreign policy cannot be characterized as revisionist. That applies to 
cases having different combinations of explanatory factors and dealing with distinct 
subjects. Throughout the interval 1985-2018 and more specifically in the time frame of 
this work (2011-2014), Brazilian foreign policy decision-makers did not expect to harm 
the core presupposes of the ongoing order, or its norms and principles. Referring back 
to the discussion held in the first chapter, Brazil did not vouch for changes of regimes 
nor defended alternative views of world order and ordering. Although sometimes 
accusing the present liberal arrangement of being unjust and anachronistic, Brazil did 
not question its bases. On the one hand, it benefited from the existing order. On the 
other hand, it did not have the means to provoke broader changes.  
Taking into consideration the second hypothesis (H2), Brazil did not assume a 
pro-status quo position either. As the case studies demonstrate, the country had the 
	 200	
intention to alter some rules and decision-making procedures, or specific operational 
components making regimes. The current state of things, although it normatively 
matched Brazil’s aspirations, was not operated in accordance with its interests. Because 
of that, Brazil attempted to change and/or adapt specific rules and decision-making 
procedures. Its negotiators strived for changes within regimes. Amongst the strategies to 
pursue so, I focused on conceptual contributions that took the form of multilateral 
proposals and ideas.  
I contend that while Brazil can be taken as a pro-status quo player in respect to 
the existing norms and principles, it was in favor of revising some specific rules and 
decision-making procedures.381 The three case studies consequently tested the two 
previous hypotheses and, after exposing their inadequacies, substantiated an alternative 
hypothesis: instead of going for changes of regimes, Brazil hoped for changes within 
these arrangements, but only to the extent they did not lead to broader normative 
transformations. 382  Brazil’s nuanced approach to multilateral regimes was neither 
revisionist nor pro-status quo, but in favor of certain changes in how thematic arenas 
should be governed. In other words, Brazil favored shifts in regimes’ operational 
elements while keeping their normative components in place.  
This in-between condition defined the country’s multilateral behavior until 
recently and that conduct was shared by other developing countries.383 As said by a 
senior diplomat, Brazil’s strategy “was about occupying spaces, adjusting the order to 
																																																								
381 Recalling the discussion developed in chapter I, I decided not to frame Brazil’s behavior as “soft 
revisionist”. Besides being an inaccurate concept, it implies that Brazil would be, at the same time, an 
overall “pro-status quo” state without clearly delineating how it interacts with regimes’ existing 
normative and operational foundations. Brazil’s behavior would also not fit into “norm antipreneur”, 
which is how Bloomfield (2016) defines countries defending the normative status quo and relentlessly 
resisting changes. Furthermore, it would not correspond to the notions of “norm entrepreneur” or 
“competitor entrepreneur”, as Brazil did not propose new norms in the three case studies nor supported 
existing norms without reservations, but expected to control their implementation through defined rules.  
 
382 Coming back to the four process tracing tests discussed in chapter II, case studies not only eliminated 
rival hypotheses (hoop test), but also offered a sufficient criterion – individually or through a combination 
of necessary explanatory factors - for accepting causal inference (which characterizes passing a smoking 
gun test). I would also contend that the cases here studied provided robust inferential leverage, 
approximating the analysis to a doubly decisive test (Collier, 2011; Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). 
 
383 In the words of a senior diplomat (MRE#14), “I understand that we [Brazil] lived with a certain 
tension between short-term realism, which served more immediate interests, and a long-term vision that, 
in my view, could be conciliated with that realism. A more multilateral world, one that was subject to 
norms, one in which utopia and realism could function together”. It should be remembered that none of 
these behaviors is restrictive to Brazil or other developing countries. Many changes in rules and decision-
making procedures occurred throughout the last decades, for example, as a consequence of the 
discussions to regulate and liberalize trade at the WTO or to define membership categories at the UNSC. 
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new challenges, exploring new avenues. And that was totally justified and in 
accordance with how multilateralism functions. (…) It was not about subverting 
norms”.384 This thesis therefore differs from most works dealing with similar topics, as 
it not only dealt with the degree of change, but also with the type of change states like 
Brazil might pursue. 
The analytical framework present in the second chapter and in the final part of 
each case study portrays Brazilian-led concepts or proposals as means through which 
Brazil pursues its interests. Two points can be made about these concepts. First (i), they 
can be seen as ways to achieve consensuses and posit Brazil as a reasonable mediator. 
This fits well especially with the first two case studies. In the climate change regime, 
Brazil expected to bring together countries defending more ambitious carbon emission 
reduction targets and the group of states advocating for the maintenance of the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). 
As demonstrates chapter III, with the concept of concentric circles Brazil managed to 
influence the continuity of the regime at least until early 2016, also receiving 
recognition from UNFCCC officials.  
Similar situation happened in the peace and security regime. There, Brazilian 
negotiations placed the country between supporters of unbridled use of force in cases 
when state responsibility is not fulfilled and the ones leaning towards the defense of 
strict sovereignty. Relying on the perspective that force can be used as a last resort and 
only in accordance with specific circumstances, Brazil could count on RwP to dialogue 
with most parties. Chapter IV shows that the proposal appeared in subsequent UN 
debates, receiving backing not only from the UN secretary-general, but also from other 
countries and the architects of the norm of R2P.   
The food security regime slightly differs, as Brazil’s intention to portray itself in 
a conciliatory manner was not as present. This occurs because the concept of right to 
food (R2F) was already being discussed at FAO, not being a sole byproduct of the 
country’s foreign policy. In spite of that, players such as Itamaraty tailored domestic 
views on R2F, leaving aside more controversial notions like food sovereignty and trying 
to present Brazil as a moderate country.   
Second and related (ii), these concepts are expressions of pragmatic state 
behavior. As Gardini (2011: 15) defines, pragmatism converges with ideology to “shape 
																																																								
384 Interview with MRE#7. 
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the determinants of foreign policy”, also being a manifestation of it and able to lead to a 
more plural and diverse global order. This pragmatic approach is visible in the three 
case studies. In the climate change regime, Brazilian negotiators advanced the 
concentric circles specifically when the country – together with China, India and South 
Africa - was under pressure to assume more ambitious targets. They did so taking into 
consideration Brazil’s domestic comparative advantages and bearing in mind national 
commitments on the way to the COP-21. In the peace and security regime, Brazil was 
against the uncritical enactment of R2P, which led its negotiators to promote ways to 
control the operationalization of that norm. By placing constraints on the usage of force, 
Brazil helped to reinforce the role of the UNSC and avoid the repetition of interventions 
like the one in Libya. In the food security regime, Brazilian negotiators enhanced the 
country’s role at FAO and actively promoted the concept of R2F as ways to legitimize 
national social protection programs and experiences related to hunger fighting and 
poverty alleviation. 
Additionally, two of the case studies indicate how negotiators could maneuver 
these concepts and change their meanings throughout time. Both the climate change and 
the peace and security chapters illustrate how the concentric circles and the RwP were 
initially used to obstruct contending proposals that could harm existing principles and 
norms. Following this defensive step and in consequence of general positive responses, 
Brazilian negotiators started to proactively make use of these same concepts to increase 
the country’s legitimacy. That shift of strategy did not occur in food security talks 
because the proposal of R2F was already convergent with the regime and being 
followed by a group of states. 
When it comes to the three explanatory factors (regime structure, domestic 
assets and domestic decision-making processes), their importance varied with each case 
study. In the climate change regime, the three factors were individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for the concentric circles to come about. The regime is non-
hierarchical and the fact that it was undergoing changes leading to the Paris Agreement 
helped negotiators to come with the idea. Itamaraty diplomats working in conjunction 
with the MMA could read the situation and, relying on the country’s domestic assets, 
forward the idea and attempt to influence evolving talks.  
In the peace and security regime, the role of domestic assets was not essential 
for RwP to exist. The combination of a streamlined decision-making process controlled 
by Itamaraty and Brazil’s presence as a non-permanent member at the UNSC, however, 
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was critical for the country to be able to present its views on the operationalization of 
R2P as regards the Libyan crisis. The food security regime guards similarities with the 
climate change case. Although not enduring a similar level of structural transformation 
(i.e. a new agreement reviewing the state of things and defining how responsibilities 
should be divided), the regime was open and non-hierarchical enough for Brazil to 
promote its own and converging reading of R2F. As far as bureaucratic players clashed 
in the domestic realm, Itamaraty exerted a pacifying role, being able to present a unified 
narrative of the country’s successful food security-related policies and plans. 
This thesis also demonstrated that apart from the rhetoric of fomenting 
partnerships and acting collectively, Brazil’s multilateral behavior is essentially 
individual. Brazil commonly presents proposals without previously discussing their 
content with regional or extra-regional partners, as exemplify the climate change and 
the peace and security cases. More collaboration occurred in the food security case, but 
even there the proposal continued being “Brazilian” and not Latin American or a 
byproduct of regional blocs like MERCOSUR or extra-regional blocs like the BRICS. 
This finding contradicts Itamaraty’s official discourse and corroborates works 
(Malamud, 2011) that affirm Brazil bypass the regional dimension to act globally.385 
Further studies should test this assertion and compare its root causes with established 
regimes like non-proliferation and trade and emerging regimes such as cyber security. 
All these case studies are, according to Levy (2008), attempts to understand and 
interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events. I specifically located these 
cases in the period 2011-2014, or when Brazil was under the first government of 
Rousseff.386 Three concluding remarks should be made about that choice. First (i), 
Rousseff’s administration, namely her second term, was damaging to Brazil’s economy 
and to the overall image of the country. The three case studies illustrate that the worst 
recession since the 1930s, more sensed in the interval 2015-2016, affected the 
continuity of national policies, created budget deficits, impaired government spending 
and contributed to spiraling political turmoil. Several ministries endured financial cuts, 
																																																								
385 The theoretical discussion on “misplaced states”, which investigates mismatches between a state’s 
aspirations and other’s expectations for it, also provides good insights. See: Aslam et al. (2020). 
 
386 Process tracing nevertheless required me to conduct research before and after that time frame. 
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which affected development cooperation initiatives, the diffusion of domestic 
experiences abroad, and Brazil’s ability to project power.387 
Second (ii), even amidst this complicated scenario, Brazilian negotiators were 
able to promote creative ideas in multilateral discussions. RwP appeared in 2011, the 
concentric circles in 2014 and R2F in several circumstances throughout that period. All 
these ideas – or part of them - continued integrating the diplomatic discourse after that. 
Beyond them, other proposals were forwarded in different regimes. Going back to the 
explanatory factors, I present the idea of “foreign policy inertia” to explain why that 
activism was still possible. In the climate change case, for instance, domestic setbacks 
and the rise in deforestation rates were not so patent to external observers. Also, as the 
major stakeholders part of the regime were more apprehensive with the challenges 
posed by the 2016 election in the United States, Brazil was not placed in the spotlight. 
The peace and security case demonstrates the existence of a detachment between 
domestic assets and multilateral engagement, with Brazil’s attempts to assume greater 
responsibilities not necessarily being tied to specific capabilities. As for the food 
security case, the impacts of the economic crisis on social policies were more observed 
during Rousseff’s second mandate and in the subsequent presidency of Temer.  
The key element explaining foreign policy inertia is people. Officials working at 
federal ministries – I here cite the MMA in climate matters and the MDA in food 
security talks - and more specifically at Itamaraty could carry on the country’s main 
positions and keep Brazil’s multilateral involvement. According to a diplomat who 
worked closely with RwP: “in that moment, a very active government was ending 
[Lula] and Brazil was at the UNSC. Everyone involved with the topic was ingrained 
with the idea of being active”.388 As Brazil was still being seen as a legitimate country, 
its negotiators could manage to keep the pace in multilateral discussions and come with 
novel proposals, particularly after the hyperactive Lula da Silva’s years. That trend 
repeated in all the three case studies, corroborating the idea of a detachment between the 
domestic and the multilateral levels of analysis.  
Foreign policy inertia occurred even with a president having lack of charisma 
and disinclination towards foreign affairs in comparison to her two predecessors (Cason 
																																																								
387 Brazil also faced pressures for not paying its contributions to international organizations. See: 
https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/economia/brasil-deve-r-32-bilhoes-a-orgaos-internacionais-como-onu-
e-oms-8rps0wzglrfnkb41kegrux05z/, accessed on 27 January 2020. 
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and Power, 2009; Malamud, 2017). Her dormant presidential diplomacy helped to 
rollback Brazil’s international insertion but did not entirely play against the multilateral 
proactivity of bureaucratic actors. Adding to that, she was not contrary to the main 
directives guiding Brazil’s foreign policy since the return to democratic rule. Foreign 
policy inertia therefore happened even with shifts in the top positions at Itamaraty and 
with Rousseff’s tendency to concentrate responsibilities and not delegate power.   
Until recently, foreign policy inertia benefited from the perceptions of other 
countries, namely the gatekeepers of the current liberal order, as discussed in the first 
chapter. As long as Brazil’s initiatives received overall positive feedback and were seen 
as contributing to existing regimes, the costs of altering multilateral behavior were 
considerably higher. In that situation, Brazilian negotiators could more easily 
circumvent a wavering president and continue keeping previous courses of action. I also 
mention that beyond being part of the same political party, which in Brazil’s history 
helped to avoid more encompassing changes in foreign policy orientation, the 
progression of time between Lula da Silva and Rousseff’s first mandate was short to 
provoke greater shifts.  
Foreign policy inertia started to erode under the presidency of Temer, who 
promoted bureaucratic reforms, extinguished ministries, scaled down social programs, 
reduced South-South development cooperation projects and looked for “liberal-leaning” 
partnerships (Marcondes and Mawdsley, 2017). But even during this transitional period 
Brazil could keep some previous positions, as illustrate the offer to host international 
climate talks (COP-25); the lack of new orientations from Brasília, which led 
negotiators to hold their views at FAO; and the continuous participation of Brazil in 
peace and security talks at the UN. Temer’s government also disbursed around US$ 400 
million to pay debts with multilateral organizations and maintain Brazil’s voting 
rights.389 Although attempting to promote shifts in relation to previous PT governments, 
his administration did not threaten the normative foundations of multilateral regimes. 
According to a senior diplomat serving during these last governments, “it is very hard 
for a country like Brazil to develop new attitudes in multilateral forums that represent 
																																																								
389 See: https://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2019/01/06/cooperacao-internacional-
onu-governo-temer-jair-bolsonaro.htm, accessed on 31 January 2020. 
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substantial changes in relation to what it used to do. It is very hard and uncommon. That 
is true especially in a context of democracy”.390 
This being said, inertia ended with Bolsonaro, who imprinted new contours to 
Brazil’s foreign policy, acted to save a country “on the brink of socialism” and 
developed a selective type of presidential diplomacy favoring right-wing, nationalist, 
conservative and Christian governments (Casarões and Flemes, 2019).391 As chancellor 
Ernesto Araújo loosely defined, “the moment of a new independence” started. Opposing 
the “homeland” to the “international liberal order” and saying that Brazil “would not 
work for the global order nor please its managers”, he defined the United States, Israel, 
Hungary, and Poland as favored partners and affirmed Brazil would resist what he 
called “globalism”. Bilateral and multilateral relations would be oriented to produce 
“tangible results”, surpassing the scarce outcomes of previous engagements. Together 
with Bolsonaro, he promoted sweeping changes in Itamaraty, opening the possibility of 
non-diplomats being appointed to key positions.392  
While openly attacking the current state of things and mentioning that the UN 
would not “erase nationalities or sovereignties in the name of an abstract ‘global 
interest’”, Bolsonaro’s Brazil continued participating in the multilateral system, being 
prepared to “take on the responsibilities attributed to us”.393 Making use of the existing 
international forums, his government criticized the very order they are embedded in and 
expected to weaken its bases, as did the United States under Trump. That represents a 
profound shift in relation to previous governments. Whereas Cardoso, Lula da Silva and 
Rousseff promoted conceptual contributions, reinforced normative foundations and 
aimed to alter specific operational elements of current regimes, Bolsonaro developed a 
contrasting approach. His government tried to undermine entrenched norms and 
principles, hoping to harm the mandate of institutions like the UN Human Rights 
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Council. Bolsonaro therefore moved away from the idea of Brazil being neither 
revisionist nor pro-status quo.  
Brazil’s foreign policy since 2019 expected to make use of multilateral forums 
to change them from within. Normatively and operationally, the current international 
order did not match Brazil’s interests, consequently needing to be altered. In this sense, 
Brazil’s behavior became much more revisionist than previous moments in the 
country’s diplomatic history.394 Having said that, Bolsonaro did not propose any 
coherent alternatives nor forwarded feasible conceptual contributions, which makes his 
revisionism more an allegory aiming to please domestic audiences and certain foreign 
partners than reality.395 This revisionism had its nature placed on resisting accepting 
most liberal norms and principles and on questioning how they are put in motion. 
By and large, the three explanatory factors discussed throughout this thesis 
underwent transformations during the first year of Bolsonaro’s presidency. When it 
comes to regime structure (i), the international order saw a rising challenge coming not 
only from the developing world, but also from developed countries like the United 
States. Areas like trade, human rights, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation had 
their underlying normative and operational foundations questioned. Brazil acted 
accordingly, also hoping to benefit from a closer relationship with these players. 
Nevertheless, as points out MacDonald (2020), a shared hard right worldview does not 
necessarily align national interests. As for the domestic assets (ii), Brazil’s sluggish 
growth rates (1,3% in 2017 and 2018 and 1,1% during Bolsonaro’s first year) affected 
its ability to exert influence and sustain effective public policies and plans. Together 
with that, Brazil’s image abroad was tarnished by a president who, among other things, 
openly defends torture and commemorates the 1964 military dictatorship,396 attacks 
science and scientific knowledge, 397  boosts culture wars between defenders of 
																																																								
394 Reminding Johnston’s (2003: 11), indicators of revisionist behavior, “the actor may participate in 
these institutions and may abide by their rules and norms temporarily, but if given a chance, it will try to 
change these rules and norms in ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution and the 
community”. 
 
395 Brazil’s contradictory behavior is exemplified by its bid to enter the OECD and internalize its norms 
and rules, which started during Temer’s presidency and continued with Bolsonaro.  
 
396 See: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/27/brazil-bolsonaro-celebrates-brutal-dictatorship, accessed 
on 7 February 2020. 
 
397 See: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02484-w, accessed on 7 February 2020. 
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“traditional values” and more progressive voices,398 and mixes religious beliefs and 
foreign policy.  
Concerning the domestic decision-making procedures (iii), Bolsonaro’s lack of 
guidance pushed several domestic groups to openly struggle for influence over Brazil’s 
foreign policy. In a situation of permanent dispute, his government can more easily play 
with different positions, shift preferences, and confuse public opinion and international 
partners. The number of domestic actors involves Evangelical leaders, pro-market 
reformists, large landholders, defenders of stricter public security measures, the Armed 
Forces, and followers of Olavo de Carvalho, the “architect of Bolsonaro’s far-right 
vision”.399As chancellor Araújo aligned with this last group and Itamaraty lost relative 
prestige and access to the president, the ministry missed its ability to mediate distinct 
positions and provide some direction to Brazil’s foreign policy. As a result, Brazil was 
seen as a source of instability, being taken as a difficult and unreliable partner 
(Stuenkel, 2019). Congressmen like Rodrigo Maia, the speaker of the Lower House, and 
Senate president Davi Alcolumbre, not to mention subnational governments – mostly in 
the Northeast and North regions of Brazil – often acted to circumvent and oppose the 
presidency, seeking to preserve international partnerships.400  
Lastly, changes in the explanatory factors and in the overall foreign policy 
provoked contrasting outcomes, which were mostly seen in Brazil’s behavior in the 
climate change and the food security regimes. Calling Amazon deforestation “cultural”, 
Bolsonaro’s government scaled back efforts to fight illegal logging, ranching and 
mining, weakened environmental agencies, attacked NGOs operating in the region and 
foreign governments who provided forest protection payments, as well as abandoned 
hosting the COP-25.401 Data for 12 months through July 2019 shows that Amazon 
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Northern governors and the EU as regards climate matters as well as Northeastern governors and China in 
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deforestation saw the biggest spike in more than a decade.402 Coupled with that, his 
administration ended climate change divisions within Itamaraty and the MMA, 
empowering an environment minister who “ridicules climate talks”. These measures 
affected Brazil’s image as a country interested in tackling climate change.403  
Similar occurred in the food security regime, as Bolsonaro’s administration 
extinguished the MDS and CONSEA and promoted bureaucratic shifts that favored 
large landholders and the MMA. With more than 1.3 million beneficiaries losing access 
to Bolsa Família, the president claimed hunger in Brazil was a “big lie”.404 Graziano da 
Silva deplored his comment and said he was “uninformed”.405 The UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concerns, reminding the 
“impressive results and progress” achieved in the last decades.406 These examples 
display a clear mismatch between the more recent domestic decisions and the existing 
multilateral normative and operational elements governing food security.  
As concerns the peace and security regime, Bolsonaro’s government developed 
a lower profile and avoided publicly opposing the established norms and principles, an 
inconsistent behavior for a government that fundamentally questions how the 
multilateralism system operates. In his speech at the UN, for example, he praised 
Brazil’s contributions to peacekeeping operations, which in early 2019 involved 275 
nationals in eight missions abroad. 407  That more prudent multilateral conduct in 
comparison to the other case studies part of this research can be associated with the 
number of military occupying high-ranking positions in the government, many of them 
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beneficiarios-enquanto-espero-na-fila-vou-pegando-fiado.html, accessed on 14 February 2020. 
 
405 See: https://www.dw.com/pt-br/bolsonaro-est%C3%A1-mal-informado-diz-diretor-geral-da-fao/a-




accessed on 14 February 2020. 
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having participated in UN peacekeeping operations like the MINUSTAH. Beyond his 
vice-president, who is a retired Army general, Bolsonaro militarized his inner circle and 
allowed the military to influence decision-making. However, that bureaucratic leverage 
did not immediately revive Brazil’s bid for permanent membership in the UNSC.  
In sum, explanatory factors shifted in relation to the actors now defining foreign 
policy and in respect to the role of Brazil’s domestic assets after years of protracted 
economic crisis and, more recently, the impacts of Bolsonaro’s government on the 
country’s image. Coupled with that, the global order is undergoing changes, altering 
external perceptions towards Brazil as well as the margins of maneuver for this and 
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APPENDIX A – LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
The dataset of interviews is based on Cabral (2016) and Seabra (2016) and 
comprises 65 interviews divided in the case studies of climate change (34), peace and 
security (8) and food security (21). Two other interviews are unrelated to cases, as they 
focused on the overall Brazilian foreign policy and its historical evolution. All 
anonymous interviewees received codes related to their institutional positions, but the 
following list only features the ones appearing in the thesis. The numbers part of each 
code represent the order in which the interviews were made. In-depth interviews not 
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6 Deutsche Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
 

















9 UNFCCC 06-Aug-2015 
 

































13 European Union 
 
 
14-Aug-2015  Unrecorded   
14 Germanwatch 
 












17 Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) 
 




18 Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) 
 




19 MMA 22-Sep-2015 
 
1h 06m Audio 
recording 
MMA#1 
20 Instituto de Manejo e 
Certificação Florestal e Agrícola 
(Imaflora) 
 






























25 IPCC 18-Nov-2015 1h 18m Audio 
recording 
IPCC#1 
26 Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental 25-Jan-2016 1h 04m Audio NGO#9 
	 244	




























32 World Resources Institute (WRI) 
 















Peace and Security 
 
35 International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect 
 











37 Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect 










39 UN Office on Genocide 
Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect 
































































47 MRE 14-Jul-2016 
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59 Empresa de Assistência Técnica 
e Extensão Rural (EMATER) 
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APPENDIX B – SAMPLE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 This guide was used for an interview with a Brazilian diplomat working with 
peace and security matters. Some excerpts of the responses appear in chapter IV.  
 
1. Since the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome the world has faced new cases of 
disrespect for human rights and disputed humanitarian interventions. What is 
your opinion on the idea of R2P and how do you evaluate its evolution? 
2. There is great confusion about the definition of R2P. This is visible both in 
academic debates and in the policy arena. How do you define R2P?  
3. The literature suggests that R2P is not clearly understood because politicians 
and academics mismatch its content with its operationalization. What is your 
view on that? 
4. What is your opinion on the way developing powers deal with R2P? Do you see 
any similarities or differences in their behaviors?  
5. Regarding Brazil, how did the idea of RwP come about? In which context?  
6. Again, how do you define it? As a principle? Norm? Idea? Concept? 
7. What is your interpretation of RwP?  
8. RwP did not go forward in debates at the UNSC, eventually losing momentum. 
Why did that happen?  
9. Do you think the idea behind RwP was clearly understood by the other players 
within and outside the UNSC?  
10. RwP was forwarded when all BRICS countries were part of the UNSC. What 
was their reaction to Brazil’s idea?  
11. Concerning the structure of the peace and security regime, does the composition 
of the UNSC affect the ability of non-P5 member states to come with novel 
ideas? Please elaborate.  
12. Do you consider that domestic assets have a role for this type of idea to exist? If 
so, what type of assets? Could you mention any intangible assets as well?  
13. With regard to the role of bureaucracies, domestic actors other than Itamaraty 
exerted influence on RwP?  
14. What was the role of president Dilma Rousseff? 
15. The idea of RwP was not well understood by many people working with peace 
and security matters. Why did that happen? 
